Disputatio XIV: De Intensione et Intentione in Discurso Theologico

On Intension and Intention in Theological Discourse

Quaeritur

Utrum in theologia intensio significet participationem sermonis in veritate quam nominat, intentio vero designet pneumaticam ordinationem sermonis et cognoscentis ad Deum; et utrum hae duae constituant duplicem structuram loquelae theologicae, scilicet formam significationis et actum directionis.

Whether in theology intension signifies the participation of speech in the truth it names, while intention designates the pneumatic ordering of both speech and knower toward God; and whether these two together constitute the dual structure of theological discourse, namely the form of meaning and the act of orientation.

Thesis

Theological discourse is constituted by a double ordering. By intension, language participates in divine truth. By intention, that same language is directed by the Spirit toward its divine referent. Theology remains true only where these two are held together, so that what is said of God and the act of saying it belong to one unified movement of faith.

Locus Classicus

1 Corinthians 2:16
ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν.
“We have the mind of Christ.”

Here cognition and orientation are inseparable. To possess the mind of Christ is not merely to grasp correct propositions but to be inwardly ordered by the Spirit toward God’s own knowing and willing.

Explicatio

In Disputatio XIII, theological intension was shown to be participatory. Meaning is not generated by abstraction but received through divine self-communication. Language shares in what it signifies because it is authorized by the Spirit.

Yet theology does not consist in meaning alone. Theological language is not static content but enacted confession. It is spoken toward God. This directedness is intention.

Although intensio and intentio share an etymological root in intendere, they differ in theological function. Intensio names the form of meaning, the structure by which language participates in divine reality. Intentio names the orientation of the speaker, the act by which language and knower are ordered toward God as their end.

In theology these cannot be separated. Language that participates in divine meaning but is not rightly oriented becomes formalism. Language that intends God without true participation collapses into enthusiasm. Only the Spirit holds form and direction in unity.

Formally, and then explained:

Let I(p) denote the intension of a theological predicate p, its participatory form of meaning and J(p) denote the intention with which p is uttered, its pneumatic orientation toward God.

The relation I(p) → J(p) expresses not a logical inference but a theological completion. Meaning reaches its truth only as it is drawn toward God by the Spirit. Theological truth is therefore not exhausted by semantic adequacy but fulfilled in right orientation.

Theological discourse is thus teleological. It moves from participation to communion, from meaning to invocation. To confess is not merely to signify but to be directed. Theology speaks from God and toward God in one act.

This resolves the classical tension between speculative and practical theology. Speculation concerns intensio, the contemplation of truth. Practice concerns intentio, the movement of will toward the good. In the Spirit these are one. To know God truly is already to be ordered toward God rightly.

Objectiones

Ob I. Meaning and intention are properties of individual minds. To invoke the Spirit as their cause undermines epistemic autonomy.

Ob II. Language is governed by public use, not inward intention. Pneumatological intention adds nothing to semantic explanation.

Ob III. Within the Church, intention is simply conformity to communal grammar. Divine authorization is unnecessary.

Ob IV. Intention belongs to moral willing, not to cognition. Theology confuses ethics with knowledge.

Ob V. Finite language never coincides with intention. To claim convergence through the Spirit reinstates a metaphysics of presence.

Responsiones

Ad I. Theology does not begin with the autonomous subject but with divine address. The Spirit does not override cognition but grounds it. Finite intentionality becomes genuinely God-directed only because it is first drawn.

Ad II. Public use is necessary but not sufficient for truth. The same words may be grammatically correct yet theologically empty. The Spirit distinguishes mere use from confession.

Ad III. Ecclesial grammar defines possibility, not actuality. The Spirit animates grammar, making it a living act of truth rather than a closed system of use.

Ad IV. In revelation, intellect and will are not divided. To know God is to love God. The Spirit unites cognition and desire in a single act of faith.

Ad V. Theology does not deny finitude or différance. It confesses that finitude is upheld by grace. Intension and intention converge not by closure but by participation. The Word becomes flesh without ceasing to be Word.

Nota

The dual structure of theological discourse mirrors the Incarnation. As the Word assumes human nature without abolishing it, so divine meaning assumes human intention without coercion.

Intensio secures truth. Intentio secures direction. The Spirit secures their unity.

Where intensio is isolated, theology becomes a system. Where intentio dominates, theology dissolves into affect. Only their union yields confession.

Thus theology is neither mere science nor pure devotion. It is ordered speech addressed to God, true because it participates, faithful because it intends.

Determinatio

It is determined that:

1. Theological discourse possesses a dual structure of intensio and intentio.

2. Intensio grounds participatory meaning; intentio grounds pneumatic orientation.

3. The Spirit unites these without confusion or collapse.

4. The truth of theology lies not only in what is said but in its being said toward God.

5. Theology is therefore at once contemplative and doxological.

Transitus ad Disputationem XV

Human intention has been shown to be derivative and participatory. The mind of faith intends divine truth only because it is already intended by God. If our knowing is genuinely directed toward God, this must be because divine knowing precedes and grounds it.

A deeper question therefore arises. Does God know creatures by representation or by causation? Is divine knowledge receptive, as in us, or creative, identical with being itself? How does finite cognition participate in an eternal act of knowing that does not learn but gives being?

Accordingly, we proceed to Disputatio XV: De Intentionalitate et Cognitione Divina, where it will be asked how divine knowing relates to creaturely being, and how all finite acts of understanding are grounded in that eternal cognition by which all things are known, willed, and sustained.