On Conceptual Schematism and the Real Word
Utrum conceptus humanus sit schema sufficiens ad apprehendendum divinam veritatem, an vero omne conceptum, ut finitum et intentionaliter clausum, indigeat participatione Verbi realis ut fiat verum de re et non tantum in mente.
It is asked whether the human concept is a sufficient schema for apprehending divine truth, or whether every concept, as finite and intentionally enclosed, requires participation in the Real Word in order to be true of reality and not merely within the mind.
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Thesis
Concepts are forms of thought by which the intellect schematizes being. Yet the conceptual schema, as finite and discursive, does not contain the fullness of the real. Theological truth demands not only conceptual adequation but ontological participation. Therefore, every true theological concept must be conformed to, and fulfilled by, the Verbum reale, the Real Word that grounds both thought and being.
The Word is not merely the object of theology, but its constitutive cause: the act in which the conceptual becomes real. Hence, the intellect’s schemata are true only insofar as they are taken up and completed in the Real Word.
Locus Classicus
“In thy light shall we see light.” — Psalm 36:9
The Fathers interpreted this as a confession of the participatio intellectus divini—that the human mind sees truly only in the light of the divine. Athanasius writes: “The Word is the light that illumines every man; by participating in Him, the mind becomes mind indeed.” Aquinas echoes: “Intellectus noster non intelligit nisi per participationem lucis divini intellectus.” (ST I.79.4). Thus, conceptuality in theology is not autonomous schematization but participatory illumination.
Explicatio
Kant described human cognition as a synthesis of intuitions under concepts, governed by the transcendental schematism that orders appearances in time. In this view, knowledge arises from the spontaneous activity of the understanding, which imposes form upon the manifold of intuition.
But such a scheme, while sufficient for the phenomena, cannot reach the noumenon. The concept mediates but does not disclose being as it is. The structure of finite knowing is thus intentional, not ontological: it orders what appears to us, not what is.
For theology, this limitation is decisive. If the concept’s formality closes knowing within itself, no divine reality could ever be known; the Word would remain forever outside human reach. The only alternative is that the Word itself participates in the concept, making it not only a schema of thought but a vessel of real presence.
This is the meaning of the Verbum reale: not merely the word spoken, but the Word that speaks through the human word, giving it truth and being. When theology utters, “God is love,” the conceptual structure of is and love does not capture God; it becomes true only when the Spirit gathers that utterance into participation with the Real Word, which is love.
Hence, theological schematism is pneumatic, not transcendental: it depends upon the Spirit’s act of conforming thought to reality. The intellect does not constitute its object but is constituted by the divine light that enables understanding.
The Real Word thus functions as the infinite horizon of intelligibility, the meta-logos within which conceptual forms are true. The human concept is an instrument, the Spirit the act of illumination, and the Logos the truthmaker of all thought.
Interlocutio cum Davidsone
Donald Davidson, in his celebrated essay “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974), denied the existence of any distinction between scheme and content. For him, there is no neutral reality to be “interpreted” through a scheme, nor any scheme-independent world. Language and world are one continuous web of belief. Thus truth consists in the internal coherence of that web, not in correspondence with something beyond it.
This move that is designed to collapse relativism succeeds only at the cost of transcendence. By abolishing the space between scheme and content, Davidson inadvertently abolishes the possibility of logos as mediation. If there is no “beyond” of language, there can be no Word that enters into it. His monism of truth leaves no ontological interval through which the divine could speak.
The theological consequence is grave. The Incarnation presupposes exactly what Davidson denies: that there is a reality (res divina) which can enter into and transform the finite scheme of human discourse.
Without the possibility of a divine Word beyond our conceptual frame, theology dissolves into anthropology: its language is no longer participatory but self-referential.
Against Davidson, theology must affirm a transcendental asymmetry: there is both a word spoken by man and the Word that speaks man into being. The finite conceptual scheme is not abolished but gathered into the Infinite Logos. Theological realism thus restores what Davidson’s pragmatism erases: the ontological distance within which relation, revelation, and participation become possible.
For the Word that words does not stand outside discourse as a second world, but within it as its constituting act. In that act, scheme and content, concept and being, are reconciled, not by fusion but by participation.
Hence, theology agrees with Davidson that the dualism of scheme and content cannot stand as a rigid opposition, but it insists that their unity must be ontological, not linguistic. It must concern the unity of the Logos that gathers both thought and thing into truth.
Obiectiones
Obj. I. Kantians claim that concepts are the sole means by which the understanding orders experience. To claim access to reality beyond conceptual mediation is to violate the limits of reason and regress to dogmatic metaphysics.
Obj. II. In the phenomenological tradition, the phenomenon appears only within intentional correlation. “Real Word” as a cause of intelligibility is a metaphysical projection beyond the horizon of appearance.
Obj. III. Analytic thought assumes that concepts are semantic structures, that their truth depends on usage and reference, not on any “Real Word.” To posit a metaphysical truthmaker is unnecessary duplication of explanatory entities.
Obj. IV. Postmodern thought supposes that language produces the world it describes. There is no “Real Word” behind words; every word is its own world. Theological appeal to a transcendent Word reinstates metaphysics as domination.
Obj. V. Theological nominalism argues that God’s Word signifies by divine will, not by ontological participation. To assert that human concepts participate in the divine Word risks collapsing Creator and creature.
Responsiones
Ad I. Kant rightly limits the spontaneity of finite understanding, but his very limitation testifies to the reality that exceeds it. The incompleteness of conceptual schematism points to the act of being that grounds it. Theology affirms that this act is personal—the divine Logos—who enables finite thought to know without abolishing its limits.
Ad II. Phenomenology discloses intentionality but not its source. The appearing of phenomena presupposes a ground of appearance. The Verbum reale is not another phenomenon but the condition of manifestation itself—the “light in which all appearing appears.”
Ad III. Semantic structure explains the operation of meaning within discourse, not the reason that meaning itself exists. The “Real Word” names not an entity among meanings but the ontological act that makes meaning possible. Without a truthmaker transcending use, semantics floats without being.
Ad IV. If every word creates its own world, no world could gather the words into intelligibility. Yet meaning presupposes gathering (logos). The postmodern thesis thus refutes itself: the very claim that all is linguistic difference depends upon the unity of discourse, which is the act of the Real Word.
Ad V. Participation does not collapse the distinction of Creator and creature but secures it. The concept’s reality is derivative, not identical, with the divine Word. God remains transcendent as the source in which all signification finds its being. The human word is true not by essence but by grace.
Determinatio
From the foregoing it is determined that:
The human concept, as schema of the understanding, orders appearances but does not generate being.
Theological truth requires that this schema be taken up into the act of the Real Word—the divine Logos who is the principle of intelligibility itself.
The Spirit mediates this participation, illumining the intellect so that its concepts signify truly, not only performatively but ontologically.
Therefore, conceptus is fulfilled only in participatio Verbi realis: the finite form of thought becomes true when it participates in the infinite act of knowing and being.
The Real Word is the bridge between syntax and semantics, between felicity and truth, between human discourse and divine reality.
Hence we conclude: Omnis conceptus verus est verbum participatum, that every true concept is a participated word. In the gathering of the Logos, conceptual schematism becomes revelation: the intellect is not merely the possessor of forms, but the hearer of the Word that makes being intelligible.
