Disputatio LV: De Intentione Divina et Identitate Actuum in Deo

On Divine Intention and the Identity of God’s Acts

Quaeritur

Utrum intentiones divinae sint ipsi actus divini secundum rationem essendi, an potius principia actuum; et quomodo unitas intentionis et actus in ipso Logō constituatur sine confusione personarum vel collapsu distinctionum operum.

Whether divine intentions are themselves divine acts in their ground of being, or whether they should be understood as principles preceding divine acts; and how the unity of intention and act is constituted in the Logos without confusing the persons or collapsing the distinctions among divine operations.

Thesis

Divine intention is not a condition that precedes action, nor a preparatory state within God. Intention in God is itself a divine act. To distinguish the two, even conceptually, would introduce sequence or internal differentiation into the divine life and thereby undermine divine simplicity.

Divine intention and divine act are therefore identical in being but distinguished in their formal orientation: one names God’s act as it is understood in relation to God’s inner life, the other names that same act as it is directed toward creatures. This unity is constituted in the Logos, in whom all divine action is intelligible, and it is donated to creatures by the Spirit, who grants participation in the concrete act that God is performing.

Thus, the identity of intention and act is neither a collapse into unipersonalism nor a fragmentation of God’s work. It is the form of divine agency itself.

Locus Classicus

1. Isaiah 55:11
   לֹא־יָשׁוּב אֵלַי רֵיקָם
   “My word shall not return to me empty.”

Here intention (my word) and act (it accomplishes) are indivisible. The divine Word is the performing.

2. John 1:3
   καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν
   “Without Him nothing came to be.”

The Logos is not merely the instrument of intention but its operative identity.

3. Maximus Confessor, Ambigua 7
   ἡ θεία πρόθεσις ἔργον ἐστίν.
   “The divine intention is an act.”

Maximus explicitly identifies intention and act, distinguishing them only by their tropos of manifestation.

4. Luther, WA 40 I, 360
   Deus operatur, dum loquitur.
   “God acts in speaking.”

In God, intention (speaking) and operation (acting) are metaphysically identical.

Explicatio

1. Why created intention does not illuminate divine intention

In creaturely agency, intention precedes action. A human being entertains possibilities, evaluates alternatives, forms a plan, and then carries it out. Intention and action are therefore distinguishable stages within a temporal process, and each stage has psychological and deliberative elements appropriate to finite agents.

None of this applies to God. To speak of a divine “intention” that is not already identical with divine action introduces a conceptual gap into God’s life. Such a gap implies sequence, potentiality, or unrealized form—all of which are incompatible with divine simplicity. Any model that treats intention as a prior state that makes action possible inadvertently imposes creaturely categories on God. It mistakes the internal life of the Trinity for a process analogous to human deliberation. This obscures the nature of divine action rather than clarifying it.

Thus, in theology we must reject accounts of intention that retain even a faint shadow of psychological or modal priority. They cannot describe a God who is pure act.

2. Intention as formal act in the Logos

If intention cannot stand before action, the alternative is not to remove the concept but to understand it correctly. Divine intention is the act-form of God’s own acting. When we speak of God’s intending, we speak of the internal form of an act as it exists in the Logos.

Because the Logos is the constitutive ground of divine intelligibility, every divine act has its determinate form in the Logos. That form is not something separate from the act itself; it is the act in its intelligible structure. Thus “intention” names the act as it exists in the Logos, and “action” names that same form as it is directed toward creatures. These are two relational orientations of the same divine reality, not two stages or components.

This distinction is not an embellishment but a necessity: it allows us to explain how divine acts are both one in God and manifold toward creatures without collapsing either level into the other.

3. How the Spirit donates the unity of intention and act

The Spirit’s work makes this unity available to creatures. The Spirit does not donate a general divine favor or a generic presence. Rather, the Spirit donates the specific act that God is performing—God’s forgiving, consoling, sanctifying, or indwelling here and now.

Because the Spirit’s donation is always of a concrete and particular act, the divine intention behind that act must itself be concretely and particularly formed. The Spirit cannot give what is not already determinate in God. This specificity presupposes a hyperintensional divine life in which acts are distinguishable by their internal form, even when their effects coincide.

Thus, divine intention and divine act remain united in God but are given to creatures according to the Spirit’s donation of the act-form appropriate to them in that moment.

4. The Trinity and the identity of intentions

It may seem that identifying intention with act risks eliminating Trinitarian distinctions. But the opposite is the case: it protects them. If we treat intention as a pre-act located in the Father, action as the execution of the Son, and application as the work of the Spirit, we create a sequence of roles that mirrors creaturely agency. Classical theology rejects this.

What we must say is this: the same divine act-form exists in the one God, but it is known and given according to the personal modes of Father, Son, and Spirit. The Father’s willing is the Son’s acting is the Spirit’s donating—one act, fully divine, yet personally differentiated.

Thus, the unity of intention and act is theologically indispensable. Without it, the divine life becomes a chain of tasks distributed among persons; with it, we preserve both unity of being and distinction of persons.

Objectiones

Ob I. If intention and act are identical, then distinctions of divine willing become unintelligible.
Ob II. If intention is act, the Trinity collapses into a single operational subject.
Ob III. Classical Thomism teaches that God’s will is simple; therefore all intentions are one, and their individuation is a creaturely projection.
Ob IV. If intention is hyperintensional, this is merely linguistic, not metaphysical.
Ob V. Postliberal theology denies that divine intention bears metaphysical significance beyond ecclesial grammar.

Responsiones

Ad I. Distinctions remain at the level of the rationes formales of act—hyperintensional forms in the Logos—not at the level of temporal sequencing.

Ad II. The act-form is one, but the personal modes of intending/acting/donating remain irreducibly distinct. Unity does not imply unipersonality.

Ad III. Simplicity entails non-composition, not indistinction. The Fathers (Athanasius, Basil, Gregory) maintained simplicity while affirming real distinctions of operation.

Ad IV. Hyperintensionality is a metaphysical precision: it describes the identity of divine action, not the finesse of creaturely language.

Ad V. Grammar without metaphysical anchor collapses into self-reference. Divine intention grounds the community’s speech, not vice versa.

Nota

The theological implications follow directly. A God whose intentions are not identical with His acts would be a God who deliberates, evaluates, and chooses between unrealized options. This would make God’s inner life resemble that of creatures rather than the self-sufficient life of Father, Son, and Spirit.

By identifying intention and act, we preserve the immediacy of divine agency and the personal character of God’s deeds toward creatures. It is also what allows the Spirit to donate not abstractions but living realities: forgiveness, consolation, new life, and the presence of Christ.

The unity of intention and act is therefore not a speculative refinement. It is the metaphysical condition for understanding God as the one who acts personally and decisively for us.

Determinatio

We therefore determine:

1. Divine intention is not a precursor to action but the act itself in its intelligible form.

2. This act-form is constituted in the Logos, who is the principle of divine intelligibility.

3. The Spirit donates this act-form concretely, making it present to creatures.

4. The unity of intention and act preserves divine simplicity while allowing real distinctions of divine operation.

5. Theological truth depends on this unity, for Λ ⊨* Tₜ presupposes a determinate divine act that grounds a determinate theological statement.

Transitus ad Disputationem LVI

Having established that divine intention is itself a divine act and that its unity with action is constituted in the Logos and donated by the Spirit, we now turn to the deeper question of intelligibility itself. If every divine act is intelligible because it has its form in the Logos, then the Logos is not merely the site of intelligibility but its very condition.

Thus we proceed to Disputatio LVI: De Formā Logi Ut Principio Intelligibilitatis, where we consider how the Logos grounds the possibility of knowing anything of God’s action at all.

__________

Quaestiones Analyticae Post Determinationem

Q1. You often speak of a difference in ratio while the essendi remains constant. But this immediately reminds many readers of the Scotist distinctio formalis, which has a long and uneven history, and which many analytic philosophers regard as incoherent. Some even collapse it into a mere distinction of ratio and essendi. What do you say to those of us who find the formal distinction itself problematic?

Responsio.

The concern is understandable, because whenever one distinguishes ratio from essendi there is a temptation to hear Scotus in the background, as if I were claiming that one and the same entity contains quasi-formal “aspects” that are neither purely conceptual nor fully real. That is not what I am doing. My position requires something far more modest, something that belongs firmly within the broader scholastic tradition and that does not depend on the apparatus of Scotist formalities.

The distinctio formalis of Scotus is a bold metaphysical thesis. It asserts a mode of distinction that is intrinsic to the thing itself yet short of a real distinction. This “middle category” has always been difficult to defend. Many philosophers suspect that it introduces an ontological complexity that cannot be stably articulated.

My usage does not require this. What I need is simply the claim that one and the same entity can be intelligible under more than one valid conceptual ratio without thereby being divided in its being. This is the classical distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re. It allows the intellect to approach the same reality in different conceptual postures without implying multiple formal components in the object.

Thus when I distinguish two rationes in relation to a single essendi, I am not claiming that God or creature possesses internal formal partitions. I am claiming that the intellect legitimately encounters the same reality under different questions of understanding. These distinct conceptual angles track genuine features of the real, yet they do not require positing any intrinsic multiplicity in the thing considered.

The distinction is therefore epistemic in function, though not arbitrary. It is grounded in the richness of the object’s intelligibility, not in any internal composition. One can investigate divine transcendence and divine immanence as distinct rationes without thereby asserting two formalities within God. The distinction belongs to the mode of our apprehension, not to the internal structure of the divine being.

In brief: I do not employ the Scotist distinctio formalis. I employ the more modest and broadly accepted distinction of ratio with a single essendi, understood as a conceptual distinction that has grounding in reality but does not posit ontological division. This is sufficient to sustain the metaphysical and theological work of the disputation without incurring the liabilities of Scotist formalism.

Q2. If the distinction you use is only a distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re, how does this avoid collapsing into a purely conceptual distinction? In other words, what secures the ‘fundamentum in re’ so that the distinction of ratio tracks something real and is not merely a projection of the intellect?

Responsio.

The question is important because the distinction of ratio can become fragile if it lacks a real anchor. A purely conceptual distinction would indeed be insufficient for theological work, since it would reduce our differentiations to categories imposed by the mind rather than disclosures of something in the object.

The key point is that a distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re requires two elements.  First, the intellect must adopt different conceptual postures toward the same being. Second, the being must be such that these conceptual postures correspond to real modes of intelligibility latent in the object itself.

This means that the distinction has an epistemic form but an ontological grounding. We do not posit internal parts or formal components within the entity. We say instead that the entity lends itself to more than one valid conceptual entry point. The richness is in the object, not in our mental constructions. The different rationes arise because the reality under consideration is capable of being understood under diverse questions.

A simple example from classical theology illustrates the point. When we consider God under the ratio of simplicity, the intellect is attending to God’s unity. When we consider God under the ratio of goodness, the intellect is attending to God’s communicative plenitude. These are distinct conceptual approaches, but they correspond to actual features of the divine being. They do not fracture the divine essence; they articulate the multiple lines along which that essence is intelligible.

Thus, the distinction of ratio is neither arbitrary nor merely verbal. It is constrained by what the object is. The fundamentum in re is the object’s intelligible plenitude. The intellect does not impose distinctions. It recognizes those aspects of intelligibility that belong naturally to the object.

In this way, the distinction functions as a disciplined conceptual tool anchored in being, not a free floating mental projection.

Nota Finalis

The two analytic questions taken together protect the metaphysical grammar of this disputation from misunderstanding. They show that the distinction I employ neither falls into Scotist formalism nor collapses into mere conceptualism. It is a distinction of ratio grounded in the object, allowing one being to be the subject of multiple lines of intelligible approach without implying internal composition. This is the structure upon which the later disputationes rely when treating divine action, participation, and the intelligibility of God’s self revelation.

Disputatio LIV: De Hyperintensionalitate Divinae Operationis:

 

On the Hyperintensionality of Divine Action

Quaeritur

Utrum actus divini, quoad identitatem, formam, et rationem essendi, non possint explicari per extensionalem aequivalentiam, modalem necessitationem, vel possibilia mundorum, sed sint essentialiter hyperintensionales; et utrum veritas theologica requirat talem hyperintensionalitatem ut Deus cognoscatur secundum actum, non secundum eventum.

Whether the identity and form of divine acts can be explained by extensional equivalence, modal necessity, or possible-world semantics, or whether they are essentially hyperintensional; and whether theological truth requires such hyperintensionality so that God is known according to the act God performs, not merely according to an outcome.

Thesis

Divine acts are hyperintensional. By this we mean that the identity of a divine act cannot be captured by any framework in which acts are considered the same whenever they yield the same outcomes, share the same extension, or hold necessarily across all possible worlds. A divine act is not defined by its effects, nor by the set of circumstances under which it occurs, nor by its modal profile. Instead, a divine act is individuated by its formal identity within the Logos, by the specific constitutive act through which the Logos brings a res into being or presence, and by the Spirit’s concrete donation of that act to creatures.

Thus, extension does not capture divine identity,modal equivalence does not capture divine identity, and possible-world semantics is too coarse-grained to describe divine agency. A hyperintensional account alone preserves the theological conviction that God’s acts are personal, irreducible, and internally differentiated modes of the one divine life.

Locus Classicus

1. Exodus 3:14 — אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה

“I AM WHO I AM.”

This is not a definition, but an identity of act. Being itself is hyperintensional, for it names a unique form of divine acting, not a property instantiated across possible worlds.

2. John 5:19 — ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ

“Whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise.”

The divine act is not duplicated or numerically separable. Rather, its identity is internal to the Trinity, not extensionalized in effects.

3. Athanasius, Contra Arianos I.21

ὁμοούσιος οὐ κατὰ θέλησιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν.
“Of one being not by will but by nature.”

The divine act is identical with divine being; it is an identity finer than any modal equivalence.

4. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium

Οὐ τὰ γινόμενα, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἐνεργείας τὴν διαφοράν ποιεῖ.
“It is not the outcomes, but the manner of operation that makes the distinction.”

This is a classical statement of hyperintensionality clearly stating that the manner by which something obtains profoundly matters.

5. Luther, WA 40/III, 343

“Deus non est causa sicut causae creatae.”
“God is not a cause as created causes are causes.”

Thus God cannot be modeled extensionally.

Explicatio

1. Why extensional identity is inadequate

Extensional identity holds when two expressions apply to precisely the same set of objects. If two predicates pick out exactly the same individuals, classical extensional logic treats them as equivalent. For example, if every creature that is forgiven is also elected, and every creature that is elected is also justified, then these predicates are extensionally equivalent: they have the same extension.

Formally, if for all x, x is forgiven ↔ x is elected and x is elected ↔ x is justified, then the predicates forgiven, elected, and justified are coextensive.

Similarly, in the Spirit’s work, if for all x, x speaks in the Spirit ↔ x has been given the Spirit, and x has been given the Spirit ↔ the Spirit dwells in x, then Spirit-speaking, Spirit-giving, and Spirit-indwelling are extensionally equivalent expressions.

But extensional equivalence tells us nothing about what distinguishes these divine actions in God Himself. Forgiving is not the same divine act as electing, nor is electing the same divine act as justifying. Likewise, the Spirit’s giving, indwelling, and speaking are not identical divine operations simply because they coincide in the believer. Extensional identity collapses formally distinct divine works into a single undifferentiated outcome and therefore cannot serve as the framework for a theology that seeks to speak truthfully of God’s own acting.

2. Why modal equivalence is insufficient

A second temptation is to appeal to modal identity. Accordingly, if two acts occur in every possible world in which God acts toward creatures, or if one cannot conceive God performing one without the other, then they are treated as identical.

Creation and preservation offer a clear example. Classical theology holds that God’s preserving of the creature is nothing other than the continued giving of being. Because no creature could exist for a moment apart from God’s sustaining act, creation and preservation are necessarily coextensive: wherever one occurs, the other is already taking place.

So too with incarnation and redemption. In the Christian confession, the Son becomes incarnate for our salvation, and His incarnate life is unintelligible apart from His redeeming work. One cannot separate them modally, for in every possible description of God’s salvific activity, incarnation and redemption occur together.

Yet modal inseparability does not entail formal identity. Creation and preservation differ in their reason, because one brings being into existence, while the other maintains that being in existence. Incarnation and redemption differ likewise, for one is the assumption of human nature, the other is the reconciling act performed in that nature. Modal equivalence cannot register these distinctions because it treats any necessarily co-occurring acts as identical, thereby losing the finer structure of God’s activity that theology must retain.

3. Why divine acts require hyperintensional individuation

If theology is to speak truthfully, it must be able to say why this particular divine act grounds this theological statement. In our broader account, a theological utterance is true because the Logos performs a determinate act—Λ ⊨* Tₜ. But determinate truth requires determinate action. If divine acts could not be distinguished except by their extensions or modal profiles, then the truthmaker for any theological statement would be some undifferentiated divine activity, and doctrinal distinctions would lose their ontological grounding.

By hyperintensional identity I mean that divine acts differ not by their outcomes or by their modal placement but by their internal form in the Logos—the determinate way God is acting here and not otherwise. This internal form cannot be captured by appeal to effects, extensions, or modal profiles; it belongs to the act as God performs it. Forgiving is formally distinct from electing because each expresses a different aspect of the divine life, even when the same creature receives both. The Spirit’s indwelling is formally distinct from the Spirit’s giving because each arises from a different manner of divine self-communication. Hyperintensionality preserves the integrity of these differences.

4. The Spirit’s donation is hyperintensional

The Spirit does not donate to creatures a general divine presence or a generic divine favor. Instead, the Spirit donates the specific act that God is performing toward the believer. In one moment, this may be forgiveness; in another, consolation; in another, empowerment. The specificity of the Spirit’s donation presupposes a finely articulated structure of divine action in God Himself. Without this specificity, divine presence would become conceptual rather than real, and theology would lose the concreteness of God’s address.

5. Felicity is indexed to particular divine acts

A theological assertion is felicitous only if it corresponds to the act God is performing here and now—an act that is already individuated in God with a hyperintensional precision. The Spirit authorizes not theological grammar in general but this particular word because this particular divine act is being given. Thus the intelligibility of theology depends on a hyperintensional account of divine acting.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to classical extensionalism if two divine acts produce the same effects, they are the same act. If this is so, there is o need for hyperintensional identity.

Ob II: Modal realism holds that if God necessarily performs A and B, then He performs A and B in all possible worlds, and thus A = B. Therefore, modal equivalence suffices in individuation.

Ob III: Thomism claims that since God is simple, all divine actions are identical and distinctions collapse.

Ob IV: Deflationism asserts that hyperintensionality describes linguistic distinction, not metaphysical difference.

Ob V: Postliberalism holds that since all distinctions arise from use within the community, divine action adds nothing.

Responsiones

Ad I: Effects underdetermine cause. Divine acts differ in their formal ratio, not merely in outcome (Gregory of Nyssa). Thus, extension collapses personal identity.

Ad II: Possible-world semantics assumes shared structure with creaturely action. But divine acts exist outside modal ontology; they ground modality rather than inhabit it. God is not a node in a modal structure but its creator.

Ad III: While implicity entails no composition in God, it does not follow that divine acts lack distinct formal identities. The Fathers held simplicity alongside real distinctions of operation.

Ad IV: Hyperintensionality is not linguistic fineness but metaphysical precision. Divine act identity is not a function of language but of participation in the Logos.

Ad V: While usage explains how we talk, it does not identify what God does. Without hyperintensional divine action, grammar loses its anchor in reality.

Nota

Hyperintensionality is the ontological form of God’s personal action. We have seen that constitutive causation (L) requires fine-grained identity; that real presence (LI) is specific, not generic; that donation (LII) concerns a particular res, and that felicity (LIII) authorizes a particular act of creaturely speech. If theological semantics were simply extensional or modal, the Trinity collapses into one role, the sacrament collapses into symbol, revelation collapses into a proposition, grace collapses into an effect, and Christology collapses into monism.

Regarding the Trinity, hyperintensionality preserves the distinction of the trinitarian persons, Christ’s unique acts, sacramental specificity, and the performative depth of divine truth. Simply put, hyperintensionality is not an analytic embellishment but a theological necessity. Without it, we could not preserve the conviction that God acts personally and decisively for the creature, nor could we maintain the integrity of the Gospel’s claim that God’s work is addressed to us in its fullness and specificity.

Determinatio

We have determined that:

1. Divine acts are intrinsically hyperintensional, distinct in their internal form even when extensionally identical.

2. Neither extensional equivalence nor modal necessity suffices to individuate divine action.

3. Hyperintensional identity flows from the Logos’ constitutive act (L) and is made present (LI), donated (LII), and authorized (LIII).

4. Theological truth (Λ ⊨* Tₜ) requires such hyperintensional grounding.

5. Therefore, theology must employ a hyperintensional semantics to speak truly of God.

Transitus ad Disputationem LV: De Intentione Divina et Identitate Actuum in Deo

Having established hyperintensionality in divine action, we proceed to the related question as to how divine intentions are related to divine acts, and how the Logos unifies them without collapsing distinctions. 

Thus, we turn to Disputatio LV: De Intentione Divina: Utrum Intentiones Dei Sint Actus et Quomodo Unitas in Logō Constituitur, where we shall inquire as to whether God’s intentions are identical with His acts, and how the Logos grounds their unity and distinction.

Disputatio LIII: De Felicitate Theologica: Utrum Spiritus Sit Auctor Locutionis Fideli

 On Theological Felicity: Whether the Spirit is the Author of Faithful Speech

Quaeritur

Utrum felicitas locutionis theologicae, id est, rectitudo, auctoritas, et veritas performativa sermonis fidei, non ex intentione vel peritia humana oriatur, sed ex ipso Spiritu Sancto qui loquentem informat, linguam fidei custodiens, purgans, et in Verbo ordinans.

Whether the felicity of theological speech—its rightness, authority, and performative truth—arises not from human intention or rhetorical skill but from the Holy Spirit, who forms the speaker, guards the language of faith, and orders it to the Word.

Thesis

Theological felicity is Spirit-authored rightness of speech. A theological utterance is felicitous not merely when it is grammatically correct or doctrinally sound, but when the Spirit authorizes the speech-act so that the donated referent (Disp. LII), the real presence of the Logos (Disp LI), and the constitutive truth (Disp. L) are joined to the creaturely utterance in one act of fidelis locutio.

Thus: Felicity just in case Spiritus + donatio rei + conformitas ad Verbum. The creature speaks truthfully because the Spirit speaks in, with, and through the creature.

Locus Classicus

1. 1 Corinthians 12:3 — οὐδεὶς δύναται εἰπεῖν· Κύριος Ἰησοῦς, εἰ μὴ ἐν Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ

“No one can say ‘Jesus is Lord’ except in the Holy Spirit.”

Since the simplest and most central Christian confession is impossible without the Spirit, felicity is pneumatic.

2. Romans 8:26 — τὸ Πνεῦμα συναντιλαμβάνεται τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ ἡμῶν

“The Spirit helps us in our weakness… He intercedes with groanings too deep for words.”

The Spirit perfects our speech when our words fail.

3. John 14:26 — ἐκεῖνος διδάξει ὑμᾶς πάντα

“The Spirit will teach you all things and remind you of all that I have said.”

Speech becomes felicitous when it is brought under the teaching and remembrance of the Spirit.

4. Augustine, De Trinitate XV.19

“Spiritus est nexus amoris quo redimus ad Verbum.”
“The Spirit is the bond of love through whom we return to the Word.”

The Spirit links the human speaker to the Word He speaks.

5. Luther, WA 10/3, 14

“Spiritus Sanctus est verus doctor verbi.”
“The Holy Spirit is the true teacher of the Word.”

Preaching is felicitous only as the Spirit’s work.

Explicatio

Disputation LII established that reference is donation, that the Spirit gives the res. But a donated referent is not yet a felicitous assertion because etween having the referent and speaking the truth, another act is required: authorization.

1. Felicity as Pneumatic Authorization

In theological speech, felicity is not merely correctness of syntax, or accuracy of doctrinal formulation, or sincerity of the speaker, or even conceptual clarity. Rather it is the Spirit’s act authorizing the finite speaker to speak in the Word’s order.

2. The Structure of Felicity

Felicity occurs if and only if: 

1. The Logos is present (LI),

2. The Spirit donates the res (LII),

3. And the Spirit authorizes the creaturely utterance so that it properly bears the res.

This is why Paul says:

“We speak not in words taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit” (1 Cor 2:13).

3. Felicity and the Operator Λ ⊨* Tₜ

We must distinguish truth-through-the-Logos (Λ ⊨* Tₜ) and felicity as the Spirit’s ensuring that T is a proper vehicle for Tₜ. 

Thus, a felicitous theological assertion occurs just in case there is a Spirit-gifted word that bears the donated res of the Logos’ presence.

4. Felicity as Participation

To speak felicitously is to participate in the Logos’ act (L), the Logos’ presence (LI), and the Spirit’s donation (LII). Accordingly, human speech is grafted into divine speech.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to the speech act theory of Austin and Searle, felicity conditions are human conventions. Accordingly, no Spirit is needed.

Ob II: Classical Protestant orthodoxy assumes that speech is felicitous when it conforms to orthodox doctrine. If this is so, divine authorization appears unnecessary.

Ob III: Liberal Protestantism claims that truthful speech arises from the authenticity of the speaker’s self-expression. If so, felicity does not require external divine agency.

Ob IV: Contemporary linguistic philosophy supposes that felicity resides in correct rule-following within linguistic practice. Thus, no Spirit is needed for proper language-use.

Ob V: Barthian Theology declares that since human speech is incapable of bearing divine truth, only God’s own speech is true. Therefore, talk of “Spirit-authorized human felicity” is incoherent.

Responsiones

Ad I: Theological felicity cannot be reduced to human convention. The Spirit is not a pragmatic condition but the agent who unites human speech to divine reality, transforming finite utterance into a bearer of the infinite Word.

Ad II: Orthodoxy is necessary but not sufficient. One may confess correct propositions without the Spirit’s life. Felicity requires authorization, not merely accuracy.

Ad III: Authenticity is indexical to the self; felicity is ordered to the Logos. Theological speech is not self-expression but participation in divine speech.

Ad IV: Grammar governs internal form; felicity concerns divine empowerment.The Spirit gives a speech-act not only correctness but truth-bearing capacity.

Ad V: Barth rightly insists that God alone reveals—but the Spirit makes human words vehicles of that revelation. Felicity is the mode in which God’s speech becomes creaturely speech without ceasing to be divine in origin.

Nota

Felicity is the Spirit’s bridging act between the donated reference of Disp. LII, and the truthful assertions of Disp. L. It is the pneumatic fitting of human speech to divine being. Thus, we can claim the following about the Trinity: 

• The Father constitutes truth.

• The Son is present as truth.

• The Spirit donates the res and authorizes the word.

Felicity is the Spirit’s signature on human speech because without felicity doctrine becomes mere abstraction, the sacrament becomes only a symbol, preaching is only exhortation, and theology remains only grammar. However, with felicity doctrine becomes light, the sacrament becomes communion, preaching becomes divine address, and theology becomes true participation.

Determinatio

We determine that:

1. Felicity is Spirit-authored, not humanly achieved.

2. A theological utterance is felicitous when the Spirit authorizes it to bear the donated referent.

3. Felicity unites presence, donation, and truth, completing the semantic-ontological structure of theological meaning.

4. The Spirit’s act is the condition of faithful, truthful, and effective theological speech.

5. Thus: The Spirit makes human speech a participation in divine discourse.

Transitus ad Disputationem LIV: De Hyperintensionalitate Divinae Operationis

Having established that the Spirit authorizes speech to carry the divine res, we now turn to the final structural element of our semantic theory and ask as to why divine acts require a hyperintensional semantics.

Thus, we proceed to Disputatio LIV: De Hyperintensionalitate Divinae Operationis: Utrum Actus Dei Non Sint Reducibiles ad Extensiones vel Possibilia, in which we ask whether divine acts differ in such a fine-grained manner that no extensional or modal semantics can capture their truth.

Disputatio XLIX De Veritate Facienda: De Truthmakeribus et Hyperintensionalitate Theologica

 On the Making of Truth: Truthmakers and Theological Hyperintensionality

Quaeritur

Utrum veritas theologiae requirat veritatem facientia (truthmakers) quae non tantum determinent extensionem enuntiationum sed ipsam rationem, modum, et causam secundum quam enuntiationes theologicae verae sunt; et utrum haec veritatem facientia sint hyperintensionalia, id est, finioris resolutionis quam illa quae per modum possibilitatis vel extensionis explicari possunt.

Whether the truth of theology requires truthmakers that determine not only the extension of theological claims but the very reason, manner, and cause by which such claims are true; and whether these truthmakers must be hyperintensional, that is, finer-grained than any account reducible to modal or extensional equivalence.

Thesis

In theological discourse, two claims may share an extension yet differ in truth because Spiritus Sanctus determines felicity and actus Dei determines truth. Thus truthmakers in theology must be more fine-grained than possible-world semantics or classical extensional identities.

Locus Classicus

1. “Ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο” — John 1:14

Ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν.
“The Word became flesh and dwelt among us.”

This is a paradigmatic case of truthmaking: the claim “God is with us” is true because God has acted, not because of a description of the world’s extension. No possible world analysis captures the ontological fact that God has joined Himself to flesh. The truthmaker is the very event of incarnation, not a set of worldly facts.

2. “Fiat lux. Et facta est lux.” — Genesis 1:3

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהִי אוֹר וַיְהִי־אוֹר‎
“God said ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light.”

Here divine speaking is truthmaking: verbum is res. The statement “light exists” is true because of a specific divine act. Not all causes producing the same extension could be the truthmaker of this theological claim.

3. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate 1.1

“Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus.”

But in theology, the adequation is not passive comparison; it is acheived through divine causation: adaequatio fit per actum Dei constituens ipsum esse rei.

4. Cyril of Alexandria, In Joannis 1.9

Ὁ λόγος ἀληθεύει τὰ ῥητὰ ποιῶν.
“The Word makes true what is spoken.”

A direct witness to theological truthmaking.

Explicatio

While XLVIII distinguished internal truth (felicity of faith’s language) and external truth (adequation to divine reality), XLIX specifies the metaphysical principle by which external truth occurs, that is, that truth is made true by divine acts.

Why Theological Truth Requires Truthmakers

In theology:

1. A proposition’s extension does not fix its truth.

   • “God forgives” and “God elects” may apply to the same set of saved persons yet differ profoundly in reality.

2. The causal grounding matters:

   • Forgiveness is a specific act of mercy, not merely an outcome.

3. The mode of divine presence matters:

   • Christ’s Eucharistic presence is not interchangeable with omnipresence, though extensionally both may involve presence.

4. The source of felicity matters:

   • Statements authorized by the Spirit differ even if extensionally identical with statements not authorized.

This yields a hyperintensional truth-structure.

Hyperintensionality Explained

A context is hyperintensional when:

• substitution of co-referential terms changes truth,

• substitution of necessarily equivalent propositions changes truth,

• grounding, not just extension, determines truth.

Theology is hyperintensional because:

1. Divine acts differ in their inner form, not only in outcome.

2. Participation is specific and non-interchangeable 

3. Felicity (Spirit-authorization) cannot be replaced by mere semantic equivalence.

4. Truth is identical with being only in God, not creatures.

5. Revelation determines the mode of truth, not merely the result.

Thus theology inevitably operates at a finer semantic grain than any modal logic.

Objectiones

Ob I. Truthmaking violates divine simplicity by treating divine acts as distinct truthmakers.

Ob II. Hyperintensionality undermines classical semantics and threatens coherence. Truth should depend only on the world, not on modes of presentation.

Ob III. Scripture itself often speaks extensionally: “Your faith has saved you.” Why therefore introduce metaphysical machinery alien to the biblical text?

Ob IV. If truth requires divine acts as truthmakers, we risk collapsing into occasionalism or voluntarism.

Ob V. Truthmaking presumes metaphysical realism incompatible with postliberal grammar models of theology.

Responsiones

Ad I. Divine simplicity is not violated, for the truthmaker is God as acting, not “a part” of God. The distinction is one of formal expression, not ontological composition.

Ad II. Hyperintensionality does not threaten coherence, but rather it protects the specificity of divine revelation. Theology cannot collapse distinct divine acts into one extension without losing referential integrity.

Ad III. Scripture’s economy of language does not negate metaphysics. The biblical claim is hyperintensional in that faith saves because it unites one to Christ, not because of abstract extension.

Ad IV. Truthmaking is not voluntarism. It is the grounding of truth in divine being. While voluntarism posits an arbitrary divine decree,  truthmaking anchors truth in God’s eternal act.

Ad V. Grammar models (Lindbeck) explain internal felicity but not external reality. Truthmakers bridge that gap without collapsing theology into metaphysics or vice versa.

Nota

Truth in theology cannot be reduced to any of these:

• correspondence

• coherence

• pragmatic usefulness

• communal grammar

• modal possibility

This is the case because none of these capture the specificity of divine causation. Thus, Truth = Felicity + Divine Fact-making. The Spirit authorizes what the Father and Son accomplish. This, however, requires a semantics richer than extension or modality; it requires a hyperintensional semantics grounded in ontological participation.

Determinatio

We determine that:

1. Theological propositions require truthmakers in the form of divine acts, not merely worldly facts.

2. Truthmakers in theology are hyperintensional, because divine actions differ not only in effect but in internal form.

3. The Spirit mediates truth, ensuring that felicity (internal truth) and divine causation (external truth) coincide.

4. Theology requires a semantics beyond the modal, for God cannot be captured extensionally.

5. Christ Himself is the supreme truthmaker, for in Him every divine act is both form and fulfillment.

Transitus ad Disputationem L: De Causatione Constitutiva

Having shown that divine acts are truthmakers and that theology is hyperintensional, we now ask how such truthmaking occurs in actu, such that a theological statement becomes true through God.

Thus we proceed to Disputatio L: De Causatione Constitutiva: Utrum Divina Actio Ipsum Verum Efficiat where we inquire as to whether the Logos not only makes truths true but constitutes the very ontology in which theological truth obtains.