Disputatio XIII: De Intensione et Modeling Linguae Theologicae

On Intension and the Modeling of Theological Language

Intensio in theologia non est mera conceptio mentis, sed forma participationis, qua sermo fidelis participat in re ipsa de qua loquitur. Modeling theologicum est interpretatio huius intensionalis structurae intra ordinem entis, quo verbum fidei inseritur in veritatem ontologicam causatam a Spiritu.

Intension in theology is not merely a mental conception but a mode of participation by which faithful speech shares in the very reality it names. Theological modeling is the interpretation of this intensional structure within the order of being, through which the word of faith is inserted into the ontological truth caused by the Spirit.

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Thesis

The intension of theological language expresses the way in which meaning and being coinhere through participation. Modeling is the act by which these intensional forms are interpreted within ontological structures, so that theology’s speech corresponds to divine reality. Thus, intensionality grounds the realism of theology’s models: words mean what they mean because they share, analogically, in what they signify.

Locus classicus

“My word that goes out from my mouth shall not return to me empty, but shall accomplish that which I purpose.” — Isaiah 55:11

Here the Word of God is not a sign that points to something absent, but a living act that accomplishes what it names. The divine Word is intensional in the highest sense: its meaning and its effect coincide. Theology’s task is to reflect this coincidence within the limits of human language.

Explicatio

In ordinary logic, intension refers to the content or concept of a term—what it signifies internally—while extension refers to the set of things to which it applies. In theology, however, intension cannot be reduced to mere conceptual content, for the meaning of divine terms arises from participation in the realities they signify.

When theology says “Deus est bonus” (“God is good”), the term bonus has an intension that differs fundamentally from its use in secular discourse. Its meaning is not abstracted from experience but given through participation in divine goodness itself. The Spirit mediates this participation, so that human predicates acquire analogical depth.

Let us represent this symbolically (and immediately explain):

• Let I(p) denote the intension of a theological predicate p—its interior content as informed by participation in divine reality.

• Let M(p) denote the modeling of that predicate—the interpretation of p within an ontological framework of being. The relation I(p) → M(p) expresses that theological modeling extends the meaning (intension) of language into ontology; what faith means, ontology makes real.

Hence, modeling theology is not constructing analogies externally but recognizing that the intensional life of faith’s language already participates in the realities to which it refers.

Theological predicates are therefore intensional in a deeper sense than philosophical ones: their meanings are not closed concepts but open participations. Each name of God carries within it a structural reference to divine causality. To speak truly of God is to allow the intension of language to become a site of encounter, where meaning and being converge.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. Aristotle and his scholastic heirs maintain the position of Aristotelian realism, the view that the meaning of predicates is exhausted by their extension to real things. Intension adds nothing to ontology. To analyze theological predicates intensionally—as if their sense exceeded their reference—is to introduce needless abstraction. The meaning of “God is good” is simply that God instantiates goodness; no intensional layer is needed.

Obiectio II. From the standpoint of empiricist verificationalism, all meaningful statements are either empirically verifiable or analytically true. Theological predicates refer to no empirically testable properties and therefore lack cognitive meaning. Model-theoretic “interpretation” of such terms merely disguises their non-referential status under formal symbols. To construct intensional models for theology is to rationalize what is semantically empty.

Obiectio III. Following later Wittgenstein, meaning arises from use within a linguistic form of life (Lebensform). To model theological language formally or intensionally is to misunderstand its grammar. The meaning of “grace,” “sin,” or “Spirit” lies in their practical employment within worship and life, not in their reference to divine properties or in hypothetical models. Modeling theology as if it described an external reality mistakes liturgical use for scientific representation.

Obiectio IV. Contemporary analytic semantics often treats meaning extensionally, defining reference via truth conditions over possible worlds. Since divine reality is not empirically accessible or multiply realizable across worlds, theological language cannot admit of model-theoretic interpretation without violating the principle of extensional adequacy. Theology should confine itself to moral or metaphorical discourse rather than claim intensional reference to the divine.

Obiectio V. George Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic model asserts that theological statements are true insofar as they cohere with the community’s grammar. There is no external domain into which they must be modeled. To introduce an intensional semantics for theology is to reintroduce representational realism and to confuse the performative, intra-ecclesial truth of faith with philosophical speculation.

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Responsiones

Ad I. Aristotelian realism rightly grounds meaning in real being but overlooks the form of participation by which finite predicates relate to divine reality. In theology, predication is not univocal: “God is good” does not signify an extensionally shared property but an analogical relation between divine perfection and finite concept. Intensional analysis captures this formal relation—it models the way predicates point beyond their finite instantiations toward infinite fulfillment. Thus, intensional semantics safeguards the analogia fidei: a structure of participation rather than mere attribution.

Ad II. Empiricist verificationism confuses empirical access with cognitive meaning. Theological terms are cognitively meaningful within the ontology of participation: they refer not by sense-data but by divine causality. Model-theoretic interpretation supplies the formal correlate of this claim. It shows that theological language can be given structured domains and interpretation functions consistent with its own rules of felicity. Intensional models do not disguise emptiness; they make explicit the structure of theological reference within divine reality.

Ad III. Wittgenstein’s insight that meaning depends on use is valid at the pragmatic level but incomplete. Theological use is itself grounded in divine authorization. The Spirit makes the Church’s grammar not merely functional but truth-bearing. Modeling theology intensionally does not deny use; it articulates the inner logic by which use participates in divine meaning. The grammar of faith is a finite surface of an infinite semantics. Without such modeling, theology remains descriptively sociological rather than truth-apt.

Ad IV. Extensional semantics suffices for empirical domains but not for theological ones, where reference involves hyperintensional distinctions between formally equivalent but ontologically distinct predicates (e.g., “Creator” and “Redeemer”). Theology must operate at the intensional level because divine properties relate analogically, not extensionally. Model-theoretic analysis extends semantics beyond possible worlds to the domain of divine possibility, the space of God’s communicative acts. Hence, intensional modeling is not optional but necessary for theology’s realism.

Ad V. Post-liberal coherence captures the communal form of theology but lacks the means to account for its truth. Theological language does not merely describe communal life; it claims participation in divine reality. Model-theoretic interpretation provides a way to express that claim rigorously. By mapping the formal language of theology (T) into an ontological domain structured by participation, it unites communal felicity (FT) with divine truth-conditions (TC). Intensionality here serves realism: it formalizes the link between faith’s grammar and God’s being.

Nota

Intensionality in theology reveals the deep correspondence between divine and human discourse. Just as the Word of God contains within itself both meaning and being—significatio et effectus—so theological speech, animated by the Spirit, partakes in that same structure.

In model-theoretic terms, theological language is not a static set of propositions but a living model in which predicates participate in the realities they denote. When theology says “Christ is Lord,” this is not a metaphor to be verified externally; it is a confession whose intension already shares in Christ’s lordship through the Spirit.

Modeling thus performs a theological epistemology of incarnation: finite words filled with infinite content, formal structure suffused with divine causality. In this sense, modeling does not invent theology’s truth but explicates it—it unfolds the internal participation already latent in theological meaning.

Hence, to study theology’s intension is to trace how language itself becomes sacramental: a sign whose signification and grace coincide.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Intension in theology signifies participation: the inward meaning of a theological term is its share in divine reality.

2. Modeling interprets these intensional forms within an ontological framework, revealing how language and being correspond through the Spirit.

3. The Spirit is the cause of this correspondence, uniting signification (intensio) and reality (veritas) without confusion.

4. Theological precision arises not from limiting meaning but from its right participation in the divine.

5. Therefore, the intension of theology’s language is itself a locus of revelation: the Word that makes meaning also makes being, and modeling is the act by which this unity is rendered intelligible.

Disputatio VI: De Causalitate Divina et Loquela Theologica

On Divine Causality and Theological Speech

Causalitas divina non est externa actio super mundum, sed interna ratio essendi et loquendi. Spiritus Sanctus, qui est amor subsistens, causat non solum esse rerum sed etiam recte loqui de Deo. Sic omnis loquela theologica est participatio in causatione divina.

Divine causality is not an external action imposed upon the world but the inner reason both for being and for speaking. The Holy Spirit, who is subsistent love, causes not only the existence of things but also the right speaking of them. Every theological utterance is thus a participation in divine causality itself.

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Thesis

The Spirit’s causality extends from being to language. The God who causes things to exist also causes them to be spoken truly. Hence, theological language is not merely a human representation of divine acts but itself a divinely caused act of participation in those same realities.

Locus classicus

“For it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure.” — Philippians 2:13

Here Paul affirms that divine causality penetrates human willing and acting. The same holds for speech: God works in us not only to do but to say according to His good pleasure.

Explicatio

In the preceding Disputationes, we established that theological speech (T) is syntactically ordered, Spirit-authorized, and rendered true through its correspondence with divine reality. Yet this correspondence itself presupposes a causal link: the reality that theology names exists only because God brings it into being, and the speech that names it exists only because God causes it to be spoken.

Divine causality therefore operates on two planes:

1. Ontological causality, whereby God gives being to creatures.

2. Linguistic causality, whereby God gives utterance to truth-bearing speech.

Both forms of causation are united in the Holy Spirit, the divine causa principalissima — the first and inner cause through whom all other causes act.

To express this relation in our earlier symbolism:

• Let D_G represent a property belonging properly to God (for example, divine wisdom).

• Let D represent the creature’s participated share in that property (human wisdom given by grace).

When theology speaks of “wisdom,” its words participate in the same causal current by which divine wisdom communicates itself to creatures. Thus, the correspondence D_G → D (read: “from God’s wisdom to creaturely wisdom”) does not indicate a metaphor but a causal transmission—the Spirit’s act of sharing divine properties across the Creator–creature divide.

Accordingly, theology’s language is not neutral description but theophysical communication—a speech that exists because God causes it to exist as part of His ongoing self-disclosure.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. According to Aristotelian naturalism, divine causality, operates only through the natural order as its first cause. Human speech, being a voluntary act of rational creatures, belongs to the realm of secondary causes. To make God the cause of theological language would collapse creaturely agency and render human discourse a mere divine puppet show.

Obiectio II. According to late medieval nominalist voluntarism, God’s will alone determines what is true, but human language cannot share in that causality. The words of theology are human signs that express obedience, not divine acts themselves. To attribute causal efficacy to them confuses sign with thing and diminishes God’s absolute freedom.

Obiectio III. If God directly causes every act as in occasionalism, then human beings contribute nothing real to theological speech. But if humans truly speak, then divine causality cannot determine their words without destroying their freedom. The doctrine of divine causation in theological discourse thus faces an insoluble dilemma: either language is divine and not human, or human and not divine.

Obiectio IV. Contemporary analytic philosophy of language regards meaning as determined by social-linguistic conventions and intentions, not metaphysical causes. “Causality” has no place in semantic explanation. To describe divine causality in theological speech is therefore a category mistake, a misuse of causal vocabulary in the domain of meaning.

Responsiones

Ad I. Aristotle’s distinction between primary and secondary causes provides the very structure theology must preserve. The Holy Spirit acts as the primary cause of theological language, not by replacing human agency but by enabling it. Just as God moves creatures to act according to their own natures, so the Spirit moves theologians to speak according to their own intellects and tongues. Divine causality grounds, rather than negates, the freedom of theological speech.

Ad II. Nominalism rightly guards divine sovereignty, yet by confining causality to decree it denies God’s intimate presence in creation. The Spirit’s causality in theological language is not competitive but participatory: divine agency establishes the very possibility that human words can signify God. Theological language is not deified but divinely grounded—the Spirit makes creaturely signs transparent to divine reality without abolishing their created nature.

Ad III. The dilemma between occasionalism and autonomy arises only when divine and human causality are conceived as rival forces within the same ontological plane. In theology, however, divine causality is in esse—it grounds the creature’s act without competing with it. The human theologian truly speaks, yet that speech is what it is by virtue of the Spirit’s enabling presence. Divine causality does not override secondary causes but constitutes their being and efficacy.

Ad IV. Analytic semantics rightly locates meaning within communal use, but this use itself presupposes a deeper ontological ground. In theology, the relation between word and referent is not purely conventional but pneumatic: the Spirit causes words to bear determinate reference to divine reality. Theological meaning therefore involves both human convention and divine causation—the Spirit as the transcendent condition of linguistic signification in the domain of revelation.

Nota

The connection between causality and language clarifies theology’s realism. If “to be is to have causal powers,” as philosophers often say, then to speak truly of God requires that theological terms participate in divine causal power. The Spirit ensures this participation by joining word and world in a single act of communication.

We might say that felicity is the form of divine causality in speech. When the Spirit authorizes an utterance within T, He does more than declare it permissible; He makes it effective as a bearer of divine power. The felicitous word, therefore, is not merely correct but causal—it accomplishes what it signifies because it lives in the Spirit’s energy.

This understanding also guards against theological irrealism. A theology that speaks of God without causal reference—without affirming that God’s acts truly bring about what is said—would empty divine predicates of power. The Spirit, as cause of both being and saying, guarantees that theological truth is not detached commentary but participation in divine action.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Divine causality operates not only in the order of being but also in the order of speaking.

2. The Holy Spirit is the principal cause of all felicitous and truthful theological utterance.

3. To speak truly of God is to participate causally in God’s own self-communication; theology is therefore a theophysical act.

4. Felicity represents the formal aspect of divine causality in language, while truth represents its ontological fulfillment.

5. The Spirit thus binds ontology and discourse in a single causal order: the God who causes being to exist also causes His praise to be spoken.

Disputatio III: De Spiritu Sancto et Finitudine Felicitatis

On the Holy Spirit and the Boundary of Felicity

Spiritus Sanctus est ille qui determinat fines sermonis theologicis, discernens inter locutiones quae intra linguam fidei (T) feliciter cadunt et eas quae extra eam iacent. Finis felicitas non est defectus, sed confessio quod sermo de Deo manet in gratia eius dependens.

The Holy Spirit determines the boundaries of theological speech, discerning between utterances that fall felicitously within the language of faith T and those that lie beyond it. This boundary of felicity is not a defect but a confession that all speech about God remains dependent upon grace.

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Thesis

The Holy Spirit is the formal and causal condition for theological felicity; it is the divine source by which expressions are included within or excluded from the language of faith. The Spirit’s presence sets both the possibility and the limit of theological discourse: it authorizes what can be said rightly, and by that very act, defines what cannot.

Locus classicus

“No one can say ‘Jesus is Lord’ except in the Holy Spirit.” — 1 Corinthians 12:3

Saint Paul reminds us that even the simplest confession of faith is not a human achievement but a divine act. True speech about God depends upon the Spirit who enables it; theology’s grammar is itself pneumatological.

Thesis

The Holy Spirit is the formal and causal condition for theological felicity; it is the divine source by which expressions are included within or excluded from the language of faith. The Spirit’s presence sets both the possibility and the limit of theological discourse: it authorizes what can be said rightly, and by that very act, defines what cannot.

Explicatio

In the previous Disputationes, theology was described first as a language T and then as interpreted through models that connect it to being. But not only does every language require grammar and meaning, it requires authorization as well. Someone must say when speech is fit to be uttered.

In theology, that authorizing agent is not the Church alone, nor is it human reason. It is the Spiritus Sanctus, the Holy Spirit, who determines which expressions belong within T, the Church’s living language of faith.

When we speak of felicity, we mean the condition under which a statement can be rightly spoken in the Spirit. In formal terms, we call these the felicity conditions of T, written FT. These include internal order (logical consistency, coherence, and entailment) and external authorization (the Spirit’s activity discerned through Scripture, confession, and ecclesial life).

The Spirit thus functions as the boundary condition of theology. Like a grammatical rule that both permits and prohibits, the Spirit allows speech that participates in divine life and excludes speech that contradicts it.

To say that theology has a finitude of felicity is to acknowledge that its authorized speech, though real and truthful, nonetheless remains partial. No expression in T exhausts divine truth, for the Spirit never ceases to exceed the words He inspires.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. Karl Barth and other revelation theologians maintain that the act of divine self-disclosure is infinite in origin and scope. To speak of a finite felicity of the Spirit’s operation is to divide the one act of revelation into infinite and finite parts, reducing divine grace to creaturely measure. If the Spirit is truly God, then His activity cannot be characterized as finite without denying His divinity.

Obiectio II. Immanuel Kant would argue that felicity, insofar as it implies union with the divine, cannot be an object of theoretical knowledge. Human reason is bounded by phenomena; divine reality remains noumenal and inaccessible. “Theological felicity” can therefore be at most a moral or regulative idea, guiding action but not describing an ontological state wrought by the Spirit.

Obiectio III. Following Ludwig Wittgenstein, felicity pertains to the successful performance of language within a given form of life. To call a theological utterance “felicitous” means that it fits the grammar of the believing community. Finitude and infinitude are grammatical categories, not metaphysical ones. The Spirit adds nothing beyond the community’s own rule-governed practices of meaning.

Obiectio IV. From a Hegelian standpoint, Spirit (Geist) is infinite self-consciousness realizing itself through the overcoming of finitude. If the Holy Spirit is truly Spirit, then its work in human life must sublate finitude rather than affirm it. To insist on the “finitude of felicity” is to arrest the dialectical movement of Spirit toward the Absolute, leaving theology mired in limitation and incompleteness.

Responsiones

Ad I. The Spirit’s operation is infinite in essence but finite in mode. The same act that is infinite in God becomes finite in the creature through the very generosity of divine condescension. Finitude here does not denote defect but form—the determinate condition under which the infinite communicates itself. The Spirit’s work is not measured by human limits but expressed through them. The finitude of felicity is the medium by which divine reality becomes communicable and effective within history.

Ad II. Kant’s critique of speculative reason rightly identifies the limits of human cognition, yet theology does not seek theoretical knowledge of God but participation in divine communication. Felicity is not a concept but an event: the Spirit’s act of rendering finite speech and understanding proportionate to divine truth. Within this act, finitude becomes the very space of grace. The theological subject remains bounded, but those bounds are filled with divine presence; the finite becomes transparent to the infinite.

Ad III. Wittgenstein correctly locates felicity within the use of language, but he omits its ontological ground. The Church’s grammar is not self-originating; it is constituted and sustained by the Spirit’s act. The felicity of theological language is thus not merely communal correctness but pneumatological authorization. A sentence is felicitous not because the Church says so but because the Spirit speaks through it. Finitude here names not the limit of meaning but the site where divine meaning takes flesh in human words.

Ad IV. Hegel’s dialectic perceives rightly that Spirit and finitude are related, but wrongly that their relation can be expressed as sublation. The Holy Spirit does not abolish finitude but indwells it. The infinite does not return into itself through the finite; it abides with the finite as love. The finitude of felicity thus expresses the perfection proper to creaturely participation—the creature remains itself yet becomes radiant with divine life. Spirit’s infinity is shown not by transcending finitude but by transforming it into communion.

Nota

The distinction between inclusion and exclusion in T may be described symbolically as T_in and T_out.

• T_in designates those expressions that the Spirit renders felicitous, language consistent with Scripture, creed, and the ongoing life of the Church.

• T_out refers to expressions that fail these tests, either through contradiction, incoherence, or lack of spiritual authorization.

This symbolic division simply formalizes what theologians have always practiced in discernment. The Spirit is both the “grammar” and the “breath” of theology: grammar, because He gives order; breath, because He gives life.

To put it differently, the Spirit is the condition of theological intelligibility. Without Him, theology would become a dead syntax,  correct perhaps in structure but devoid of life. With Him, speech about God becomes participation in the very life it names.

Thus, the finitude of felicity marks theology’s humility. It confesses that human language, even when sanctified, cannot contain the infinite. The Spirit authorizes theology’s words and simultaneously guards them from presumption.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. The Holy Spirit is the divine ground of theological felicity; He is the One who renders certain expressions speakable within faith.

2. The Spirit’s authorization has both internal criteria (coherence, consistency, right entailment) and external criteria (Scriptural consonance, ecclesial reception, discernible fruits).

3. The boundary of felicity is not a limitation imposed from without but the inner grace by which human speech remains ordered to God.

4. To say that theology is finite in felicity is to acknowledge that its language, though true, is never exhaustive of divine mystery.

5. The Spirit’s dual act of including and excluding establishes theology’s form as a living language: finite in utterance, infinite in source.

Disputatio II: De Theologia ut Systemate Modelorum

On Theology as a System of Models

Theologia, ut veritatem habeat, interpretanda est intra systema modelorum, quibus expressiones syntacticae linguae fidei referuntur ad statum rerum a Deo constitutum. Sic veritas theologica est consonantia inter linguam divinitus datam et esse ab eodem Deo productum.

For theology to bear truth, it must be interpreted within a system of models, through which the syntactical expressions of faith’s language are related to states of affairs constituted by God. Theological truth is thus the harmony between divinely given language and divinely created being.

Locus classicus

“By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and by the breath of his mouth all their host.” — Psalm 33:6

In this verse, divine speech and divine creation coincide. The Word that speaks is the same power that brings everything into being. In theological modeling, we rediscover this coincidence: truth arises when language and reality meet in the act of God.

Thesis

Theology, once established as a formally consistent language T, becomes truth-bearing only when its expressions are interpreted within models, structured descriptions of reality that specify what exists and how what exists relates to God. Accordingly, modeling connects theology’s syntactical order to ontological reference, showing how speech about God corresponds to being as given by God.

Explicatio

If Disputatio I taught that theology must first be syntactically consistent and coherent, Disputatio II teaches that coherence alone does not suffice for truth. A language of faith, no matter how precise, remains incomplete until it is interpreted, until it is “modeled” within an ontological environment. 

In the language of logic, a model is a way of assigning meaning to expressions so that sentences can be true or false. In theology, a model serves a similar role but in a more profound sense: it is a structured account of the world as it stands before God. To say that theology requires modeling is to say that the words of faith must point beyond grammar to existence.

Let T again represent the language of faith: its prayers, confessions, and doctrines. Let M stand for a model, a depiction of the real order of creation, redemption, and consummation. To “interpret T in M” means that theological expressions are linked to the realities they describe. For example, the statement “Christ is risen” in T is modeled in M by the ontological claim that the crucified Jesus truly lives, an event and state of affairs that obtains within God’s causally ordered creation.

Theological modeling, then, is not speculation added to faith but the faithful translation of what God has done into the structures of thought and being. It allows the Church’s language to be both confessional and truthful, to say not merely what is believed but what is.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. Immanuel Kant maintains that theoretical knowledge is limited to phenomena structured by the categories of human understanding. Theology, if it is to remain rational, must confine itself to moral postulates and practical reason. To speak of “models” relating faith’s language to divine reality exceeds the bounds of possible knowledge and reintroduces metaphysics.

Obiectio II. Following Martin Heidegger, phenomenology exposes ontology itself as the history of metaphysical forgetfulness. To “model” God within any structure of being risks reducing the divine to a presence among beings, an onto-theological idol. Authentic theology should remain apophatic, letting Being speak rather than constructing models.

Obiectio III. Logical empiricism and early analytic philosophy (e.g., A.J. Ayer, the early Carnap) hold that statements are meaningful only if empirically verifiable or tautological. Theological models cannot be tested or falsified; they are, therefore, pseudo-propositions disguised as metaphors.

Obiectio IV. Cultural-linguistic theology (e.g., George Lindbeck) argues that religious language functions like grammar within a community’s form of life. To “model” theology implies an external reference to a shared reality, contrary to the communal coherence that actually gives theology meaning. Theology should interpret its grammar, not seek models beyond it.

Obiectio V. In Whitehead and Hartshorne’s process thought, God and world form a single dynamic continuum. To construct fixed “models” is to freeze divine becoming into static metaphysical forms. A truly relational theology must renounce models in favor of open-ended process description.

Responsiones

Ad I. Kant rightly insists upon the limits of speculative reason, but theology operates within a different horizon. The limits Kant identifies are epistemic, not ontological. Revelation transcends those limits by grounding knowledge in divine communication rather than human intuition. Modeling theology does not transgress the Critique but extends it analogically: it interprets faith’s language within the structure of being already constituted by the divine Word. The Spirit mediates between language and ontology where pure reason cannot.

Ad II. Heidegger’s concern to avoid onto-theology guards a genuine danger, yet his alternative leaves God silent within the withdrawal of Being. Christian theology confesses not an abstract presence but a personal act—the Word made flesh. Modeling theology does not capture God within being but describes being as participation in God’s speaking. The model functions not as enclosure but as vessel, transparent to the mystery it bears.

Ad III. Empiricist verification collapses under its own criterion: its principle is itself unverifiable. Theological models, by contrast, are verifiable within the domain of faith’s ontology—through coherence with revelation, consistency with confession, and transformative efficacy in the believer. Their truth is pneumatic, not laboratory truth. Theology’s models are judged by whether the Spirit bears witness within them.

Ad IV. Post-liberal theology rightly recovers the communal and grammatical dimensions of faith, yet it risks self-enclosure. Modeling does not impose external realism upon the Church’s grammar but explicates its inherent referential capacity. Scripture and creed speak not merely about communal practice but about divine reality. Theological models make explicit the ontological assumptions that faith already lives by implicitly.

Ad V. Process thought perceives the dynamic relation between God and world but mistakes relationality for mutability. The theological model can express relation without surrendering divine immutability: it portrays creation’s participation in God’s eternal act. Models are not static mechanisms but formal patterns of dependence—diagrams of divine causality.

Nota

To model theology is to seek understanding within faith. It is to recognize that divine revelation, though sovereign and gracious, speaks into a world structured by God’s own rational order. Modeling translates theological language from the level of grammar into the level of ontology, from how we may speak to what there is to be spoken of.

Thus, if T represents the syntactical system of theology and FT its felicity conditions (the rules that make its speech rightly ordered), modeling is the process by which these expressions are joined to TC, their truth conditions. In short:

FT + Modeling = TC. In words: the Spirit’s authorization of language (felicity) combined with its right interpretation within reality (modeling) produces theological truth.

A model is not a cage for divine mystery but the space where divine truth becomes shareable. It lets theology speak with both rigor and reverence, preserving the realism of faith without collapsing it into mere symbol or sentiment.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Theological language T, though divinely authorized, remains incomplete without ontological modeling.

2. Modeling interprets the syntax of faith in light of divine reality, ensuring that theology’s words correspond to what God has made and done.

3. The Holy Spirit is both the author of T and the mediator of its interpretation, guaranteeing that modeling remains participatory, not autonomous.

4. The plurality of models signifies the richness of divine truth as refracted through creation, not its fragmentation.

5. Theology’s formal coherence and ontological adequacy converge in modeling, where speech about God is joined to being before God.

Disputatio I: De Expressionibus Theologicis ut Syntacticis, cum Proemio et Praefatione

Proemium ad Disputationes Theologicas

Why the Scholastic Form Is Employed

The scholastic form—thesis, locus classicus, explicatio, objectiones, responsiones, nota, determinatio—is not revived here as academic archaism, nor as nostalgic homage to a vanished intellectual culture. It is recovered because it uniquely embodies a logic of theological clarity and order. When rightly understood, the scholastic disputation is not the triumph of dialectic over faith but the grammar of faith’s own rational articulation.

The disputatio theologica begins in humility. It assumes that theological truth, being divine, cannot be possessed in a single act of assertion. Truth must instead be approached through the ordered interplay of affirmation, objection, and resolution. The structure itself—thesis followed by counter-statement and reconciliation—mirrors the polarity of revelation: Deus absconditus and Deus revelatus. The form of disputation therefore becomes a formal analogue of the cross, where contradiction is not suppressed but redeemed in higher unity.

Moreover, the scholastic method corresponds to the ontology of truth presupposed throughout these writings. Truth is not a mere property of propositions but participation in divine self-communication. For that reason, theology cannot be purely descriptive or expressive; it must be formally structured. The disputational form enacts that structure. It forces theology to move from surface assertion to internal coherence, from confession to understanding.

This method also allows theology to remain both rigorous and contemplative.

• Rigorous, because every claim must withstand formal objection and be expressed in a grammar of precision.

• Contemplative, because every resolution finally returns to the mystery of God who exceeds dialectic.

In this way, the scholastic disputatio becomes the proper vehicle for what these writings call model-theoretic theology: a discipline that seeks to relate the formal language of faith (T) to the ontology of divine being. Each disputation, while logically disciplined, remains theological in motive and eschatological in horizon. The thesis states what can be confessed; the objectiones test its intelligibility; the responsiones disclose its inner coherence; the nota unfolds its broader theological meaning; the determinatio seals the act of understanding in doxology.

Historical Continuity

The use of the disputatio situates these essays consciously within the intellectual lineage of the Church. Luther, Melanchthon, and their students at Wittenberg employed the disputationes not as scholastic mimicry but as instruments of evangelical clarity. The form was not opposed to Reformation insight; it was its chosen discipline. The Disputationes Heidelbergae (1518), Melanchthon’s Loci Communes, and the later Lutheran scholastic systems of Gerhard, Calov, and Quenstedt all employed structured reasoning to preserve the unity of truth and faith.

By retrieving this form, the Disputationes Theologicae affirm that theology’s rational vocation remains valid. The contemporary theologian, no less than the medieval master or the Reformation doctor, must think within ordered form if he is to think at all. The scholastic discipline reminds theology that truth is not spontaneous expression but participation in divine Logos. In an age of intellectual fragmentation and performative discourse, the disputatio restores theology’s proper seriousness: its commitment to clarity, coherence, and communion.

A Theological Rationale

This recovery of form also serves a deeper purpose. The model-theoretic vision that animates these disputations holds that theology’s task is to interpret faith’s formal language within the ontological reality of divine being. That interpretive process requires structure.
The disputatio provides that structure by mapping theology’s logical, semantic, and ontological movements:

1. from syntax (faith’s given grammar),

2. through semantics (modeling within being),

3. to truth (participation in divine reality).

The scholastic method thus becomes a theological necessity: the visible form of theology’s internal logic. Its ordered movement from assertion to resolution mirrors theology’s own participatory logic — from Word to understanding, from faith to vision.

Conclusion

The scholastic method, then, is not a relic but a realism: a structure adequate to a world in which language, thought, and being are ordered by the same divine Logos. The Disputationes Theologicae employ it to demonstrate that theology, even in an age of disintegration, can still think truthfully because the Spirit who once breathed through the schools continues to speak through the Church’s ordered speech.

To think theologically in this form is therefore itself a confession: that divine truth, though transcendent, has chosen to dwell in the grammar of human words.

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Praefatio

Deus loquitur, et fit veritas
(God speaks, and truth comes to be)

These eight disputationes explore how theology, understood as Spirit-formed discourse, bears truth. They trace the inner order of theological reason from its linguistic beginnings to its ontological and eschatological fulfillment. Each disputatio isolates one dimension of that order. Together they constitute a continuous movement—an ordo theologiae—in which language, being, and grace converge.

While the method employed is scholastic in form, it is clearly model-theoretic in aim. Following the medieval structure of thesis, objectiones, responsiones, nota, and determinatio, the disputationes develop theology’s formal and ontological logic without appeal to system or school. In what follows, I do not try to defend inherited conclusions, but rather attempt to display the structure of theological intelligibility itself: how divine speech becomes human language and how human language, by grace, becomes true.

The first three disputationes concern the formal conditions of theological discourse, theology's syntax, its modeling, and its felicity. Theology begins as a rule-governed language T, whose sentences become meaningful only when interpreted within ontological models specifying the reality to which they refer. These models are not arbitrary constructions but confessional interpretations of revelation’s given world. Within this world, speech is governed by the Spirit’s authorization, which defines theology’s felicity conditions and determines what can be said in Spiritu Sancto.

The middle disputationes (IV–VII) investigate the ontological and causal ground of theology’s truth. Truth appears in two forms: internal, as the Spirit’s realization of felicity and external, as the adequacy of theological expression to divine being. This double structure is secured by the Spirit’s causal act, through which human language participates in the being of divine truth. The Spirit’s causality is constitutive; it makes theological language to be what it is. By this act of causation, human speech becomes an instrument of divine communication, and the believer’s being is reconstituted in the form of participation, or theosis.

The final disputation VIII) carries this argument to its eschatological and linguistic horizon. The full coincidence of internal felicity and external adequacy is eschatological, for the Spirit’s authorization of language and the reality it names will one day coincide without remainder. Theology’s truth is therefore both realized and awaited, present as participation by awaiting future manifestation. The last disputatio considers the nova lingua of theology, the “strange language” that arises from the Incarnation. Drawing on Luther’s insight that faith requires a new grammar in which God speaks under opposites, this disputatio shows that theology’s form is necessarily incomplete while its logic is cruciform. The Word’s embodiment inaugurates a language that is finite in form yet infinite in meaning, a language that points beyond itself to the divine Logos who alone is Truth.

These eight disputationes together propose a theological epistemology of participation. Theology is neither empirical or metaphysical description nor pure symbol; it is rather the Spirit’s own discourse rendered through human words. Its language is formal because it is given structure by grace; its truth is real because it shares in the being it confesses. From syntax to theosis, from felicity to truth, from grammar to glory, the disputationes seek to make intelligible the single mystery of revelation: God’s Word, having entered human speech, makes human speech an instrument of divine knowledge.

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On Theological Expressions as Syntactical

Theologia primum tractatur sub ratione syntactica, qua structura locutionis ipsam formam veritatis interius constituit et praebet fundamentum posterioris interpretationis.

Theology is first treated under its syntactical aspect, wherein the structure of utterance itself constitutes the inner form of truth and provides the foundation for later interpretation.

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Thesis

Theological expressions—here denoted T, meaning the total language of faith as it is spoken, written, and confessed—must first be regarded as syntactical: governed by formation and inference rules that secure coherence before questions of meaning or truth arise. Only when this system of expressions is interpreted within a model—that is, placed in relation to what exists—do meaning and truth properly emerge.

Locus classicus

“For the word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and spirit, of joints and marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of the heart.” — Hebrews 4:12

Divine speech, according to the Apostle, is living—yet its life is not chaotic but articulated, “piercing” and discerning. The Word’s vitality is inseparable from its intelligible form.

Explicatio

Before theology can claim truth, it must possess disciplined language. Every theological expression belongs to a larger body of speech, the lingua fidei or language of faith, symbolized by T. This T is like a formal system in logic: its sentences must be well-formed, consistent, and properly related to one another before they can be said to express truth.

In logic, syntax refers to the internal structure of a language—how sentences are put together—while semantics refers to their meaning in relation to a world. Similarly, theology’s syntax orders the words of revelation before interpretation. Within this syntactical horizon, what matters is not whether a proposition is true or false but whether it can be rightly spoken—whether it fits the grammar of faith authorized by the Spirit.

For example, the statement “Christ is truly present in the Eucharist” is not yet about metaphysical presence when viewed syntactically; it expresses a well-formed confession that belongs to a network of statements derived from Scripture, creed, and liturgy. To violate that network’s grammatical order—say, by detaching the statement from the Eucharistic context or from Christ’s promise—is to lose what Luther calls felicity, the Spirit-given rightness or legitimacy of speech (bene dicere in Spiritu Sancto).

Thus, theology’s first task is grammatical. It secures the coherence of divine speech once it has entered human words. Only after this grammatical integrity is achieved can theology responsibly advance to the next level—modeling—where its expressions are related to being and thus acquire truth-conditions.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. Karl Barth and the dialectical theologians contend that theology begins with divine self-revelation, not with the formal analysis of language. To start with syntax is to subordinate the immediacy of God’s address to human categories of logic and grammar. If God speaks, the structure of that speech must be received, not constructed.

Obiectio II. According to the later Wittgenstein, meaning is determined by use within a “form of life.” Theological expressions, therefore, have sense only within the lived practice of the Church. To formalize them syntactically is to abstract them from their communal context and distort their function. Theology should describe language-games, not engineer systems.

Obiectio III. Jacques Derrida and postmodern theorists insist that language is characterized by indeterminacy and différance: every sign refers to another sign, never to stable presence. A divinely ordered syntax would reinstate the metaphysics of presence. Theology should dwell within the play of meaning, not claim a fixed grammar of divine speech.

Obiectio IV. Friedrich Schleiermacher and the liberal theological tradition maintain that theology arises from the inward feeling of absolute dependence. Faith expresses itself symbolically but resists propositional form. To impose syntactical order upon religion is to betray its essence as life and feeling.

Obiectio V. Analytic and empiricist philosophers of religion argue that theological statements, lacking empirical verification, are not propositions in any meaningful sense. To speak of a “syntax” of faith’s language is to confer logical structure upon utterances that are neither factual nor falsifiable.

Responsiones

Ad I. The dialectical theologian rightly insists that revelation precedes all theological discourse, yet revelation comes clothed in human words. Syntax, in this sense, is not construction but preservation. The Spirit who gives the Word also gives the grammar by which the Church may speak it intelligibly. To attend to syntax is to attend to the order of revelation’s communicability, not to impose alien form upon it.

Ad II. Wittgenstein’s insight that meaning is rule-governed and communal remains invaluable; nevertheless, theology’s “form of life” differs from empirical practice in that its rules are Spirit-given, not conventionally negotiated. Formal analysis of theological syntax does not abstract language from life but clarifies the divine order that sustains it across times and cultures. The lingua fidei is a living grammar, not a sociological dialect.

Ad III. Deconstruction rightly unmasks the instability of autonomous sign systems, yet theology never claimed autonomy for language. Its signs refer not because they are self-grounding but because they are Spirit-grounded. Theological syntax confesses the presence of the Logos who anchors signification within grace. The Spirit’s rule of speech secures openness to mystery without collapsing into chaos.

Ad IV. The liberal tradition’s appeal to inner experience perceives an essential dimension of faith, but experience without grammar quickly dissolves into solipsism. The Spirit who kindles faith also orders confession. Syntax renders faith communicable; it enables the Church to speak one faith with many tongues. Grammar, in theology, is the sacramental form of life’s interior truth.

Ad V. Empiricism confuses the scope of verification with the scope of meaning. Theological sentences are not empirical hypotheses but covenantal assertions within a distinct order of reference. Their syntax marks that order. The absence of empirical reducibility does not entail meaninglessness; it reveals participation in a different ontology—one defined by God’s speech, not by sensory data.

Nota

The study of theology as syntactical is not an idle formalism. At the Institute of Lutheran Theology and beyond, this concern for grammar defines how the Church, the academy, and public reason preserve the intelligibility of faith. Where Christian discourse forgets its grammar—whether in preaching, scholarship, or popular devotion—confession decays into sentiment and doctrine into opinion.

The renewal of theological language therefore depends upon communities capable of grammatical fidelity:

• schools that teach precision in the use of sacred terms,

• churches that guard the patterns of sound words handed down, and

• scholars who render the faith publicly intelligible without diluting its form.

Every age must recover its grammar of belief, lest the gospel be spoken in tongues no longer understood.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Like all object languages, theological discourse T is syntactical before it is semantical; its form precedes its reference.

2. The Spirit grants the Church a rule-governed language whose coherence must be secured prior to interpretation.

3. What we call FT—the felicity conditions of T—are the marks of Spirit-given coherence (consistency, entailment, and authorization).

4. Only when T is joined to an ontological model—a structured account of what is real—do we obtain TC, its truth conditions. In symbolic shorthand, FT + Modeling = TC,
   which means: the Spirit’s authorization of speech, combined with its proper relation to being, yields theological truth.

5. This syntactical priority ensures both theology’s autonomy from empirical reduction and its dependence upon divine address.

To speak theologically, therefore, is to inhabit a grammar already constituted by God’s self-communication and to let that grammar shape every truthful word about God.