On Immanent Universals and Necessitation
Quaeritur utrum necessitas legum naturae sufficienter explicari possit per relationes reales inter universalia immanentia, an vero talis explicatio aut in regressum, aut in factum brutum, aut in participationem infiniti deveniat.
It is asked whether the necessity of natural law can be adequately explained by real relations among immanent universals, or whether such an explanation must ultimately collapse into regress, brute fact, or participation in the Infinite.
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Thesis
Immanent realism explains regularity by positing universals instantiated within things and connected by real relations of necessitation. Yet the nexus that binds one universal to another either becomes an infinite regress, a brute primitive, or an implicit participation in an Infinite unity. Thus, while immanent universals preserve realism, they cannot close the circle of explanation within the finite.
Locus Classicus
“He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.”
— Colossians 1:17
Patristic and scholastic theology interpreted this not as poetic hyperbole but as a metaphysical statement. Athanasius (Contra Gentes 41) held that creatures “stand fast by participation in the Word.” Aquinas, commenting on the same verse, wrote: “In ipso omnia constant, quia ipse est ratio essendi et ordinis in rebus.”(Super Colossenses I.17.) The order and interrelation of created forms thus depend upon the Logos as their unifying act.The attempt to ground such order solely in finite relations among universals severs form from source and leaves unity unexplained.
Explicatio
D. M. Armstrong, seeking a realist alternative to both Humean descriptivism and Platonic transcendence, developed a theory of immanent universals in What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983) and A World of States of Affairs (1997). For Armstrong, universals are not abstract entities existing apart from things but real features instantiated in rebus. A natural law is then a relation of necessitation between such universals:
N(F, G) means that every instance of F is necessarily also an instance of G.
For example, the law “All electrons repel each other” corresponds to a relation N (being an electron, repelling other electrons). This N-relation is itself a real universal connecting others, not a mere linguistic rule.
Armstrong’s system preserves a realist ontology, for lawfulness exists in the world, not in our descriptions. It also avoids Platonism by keeping universals immanent.Yet the decisive problem lies in the status of the necessitation relation itself.
If N is simply another universal, it must stand in further relations explaining how it binds F and G—relations such as N′(N, F, G)—and so on ad infinitum. If N is primitive, we are left with unexplained necessity. If N is grounded in the overall structure of being, that structure functions as a transcendent unity, in effect, a metaphysical participation in the Infinite.
Thus Armstrong’s account, while internally rigorous, cannot ultimately provide a self-sufficient finite explanation. It gives us the mechanics of law but not its metaphysical coherence. The problem is not empirical but ontological: what makes the system of immanent relations one and necessary rather than a contingent web of co-instantiated properties?
Obiectiones
Objiectio I. In 1983 David Armstrong argued that immanent universals provide the ontological structure science presupposes. The relation of necessitation N is real and sufficient. No further grounding is needed.
Objiectio II. Moderate realism claims that by positing universals in rebus rather than ante res, we respect the finitude of creation and avoid both Humean nominalism and Platonic abstraction.
Objiectio III. Scientific pragmatism holds that the theory of immanent universals aligns well with scientific practice, which operates by discovering relations among properties, not by appealing to transcendent causes.
Objiectio IV. Empiricists argue that an infinite ground multiplies entities beyond necessity. The unity of laws is a consequence of the shared structure of matter and fields, not of any higher participation.
Objiectio V. The theologicus cautus ("cautious theologian") opines that to require an infinite explanation of finite order threatens to erase the integrity of secondary causes and the natural autonomy of creation.
Responsiones
Ad I. To say that N(F, G) is real explains that the relation exists, not why it obtains. Unless N itself is grounded, the account halts in primitive necessity. A brute tie between universals is no advance over the brute law it replaces.
Ad II. Immanent universals are indeed within things, yet their coordination across all things remains unexplained.The in rebus does not by itself yield the per se unity of the real. Participation in a higher act of being is required for coherence among universals.
Ad III. Scientific adequacy differs from metaphysical sufficiency.
Empirical inquiry describes how properties are correlated; metaphysics asks why such correlation is necessary. Armstrong’s ontology presupposes the unity it should explain.
Ad IV.
The claim that matter and fields explain law simply restates the problem at a lower level. For the structure of matter and fields is itself law-like and requires grounding. Invoking the material order as ultimate converts contingent structure into absolute necessity without reason.
Ad V.
Participation in the Infinite does not annul finite autonomy but establishes it. Only what is grounded in the Infinite can act coherently according to its own nature. The Spirit’s causal presence secures the creature’s integrity by making its lawfulness possible.
Determinatio
From the foregoing it is determined that:
Armstrong’s immanent realism preserves ontology but not ultimacy. The N-relation that ties universals together is either another universal (regress), an unexplained primitive (brute fact), or a reflection of a deeper unity (participation).
Finite relations cannot ground universal coherence. The multiplicity of universals demands a unifying act that is not itself one among them. Without such an act, law remains accidental coordination.
The appeal to the Infinite is not extrinsic but intrinsic. The very notion of “necessitation” implies participation in an unconditioned ground of necessity. The Infinite is the metaphysical horizon within which immanent universals receive their order.
The participation of universals in the Infinite corresponds to the theological doctrine of the Logos. As the eternal form of all forms, the Logos is the ratio essendi and ratio ordinis of finite properties. Law, in this light, is the reflection of divine intelligibility within creation.
Hence, immanent realism, while the most sophisticated of finite explanations, points beyond itself. Its internal coherence is the sign of participation, not self-sufficiency. In the Infinite Word, the many relations of the finite find their unity; in the Spirit, they find their continuous actuality.
Therefore, the necessity of natural law cannot rest in the N-relations of universals alone but requires the participation of all finite forms in the Infinite act of being — in ipso omnia constant.
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