Diaputatio XXVI: De Universalibus Immanentibus et Necessitatione

On Immanent Universals and Necessitation

Quaeritur utrum necessitas legum naturae sufficienter explicari possit per relationes reales inter universalia immanentia, an vero talis explicatio aut in regressum, aut in factum brutum, aut in participationem infiniti deveniat.

It is asked whether the necessity of natural law can be adequately explained by real relations among immanent universals, or whether such an explanation must ultimately collapse into regress, brute fact, or participation in the Infinite.

__________

Thesis

Immanent realism explains regularity by positing universals instantiated within things and connected by real relations of necessitation. Yet the nexus that binds one universal to another either becomes an infinite regress, a brute primitive, or an implicit participation in an infinite unity. Thus, while immanent universals preserve realism, they cannot close the circle of explanation within the finite.

Locus Classicus

“He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.”
— Colossians 1:17

Patristic and scholastic theology interpreted this not as poetic hyperbole but as a metaphysical statement. Athanasius (Contra Gentes 41) held that creatures “stand fast by participation in the Word.” Aquinas, commenting on the same verse, wrote: “In ipso omnia constant, quia ipse est ratio essendi et ordinis in rebus.”(Super Colossenses I.17.) The order and interrelation of created forms thus depend upon the Logos as their unifying act.The attempt to ground such order solely in finite relations among universals severs form from source and leaves unity unexplained.

Explicatio

D. M. Armstrong, seeking a realist alternative to both Humean descriptivism and Platonic transcendence, developed a theory of immanent universals in What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983) and A World of States of Affairs (1997). For Armstrong, universals are not abstract entities existing apart from things but real features instantiated in rebus. A natural law is then a relation of necessitation between such universals:

N(F, G) means that every instance of F is necessarily also an instance of G.

For example, the law “All electrons repel each other” corresponds to a relation N (being an electron, repelling other electrons). This N-relation is itself a real universal connecting others, not a mere linguistic rule.

Armstrong’s system preserves a realist ontology, for lawfulness exists in the world, not in our descriptions. It also avoids Platonism by keeping universals immanent.Yet the decisive problem lies in the status of the necessitation relation itself.

If N is simply another universal, it must stand in further relations explaining how it binds F and G—relations such as N′(N, F, G)—and so on ad infinitum. If N is primitive, we are left with unexplained necessity. If N is grounded in the overall structure of being, that structure functions as a transcendent unity, in effect, a metaphysical participation in the Infinite.

Thus Armstrong’s account, while internally rigorous, cannot ultimately provide a self-sufficient finite explanation. It gives us the mechanics of law but not its metaphysical coherence. The problem is not empirical but ontological: what makes the system of immanent relations one and necessary rather than a contingent web of co-instantiated properties?

Obiectiones

Objiectio I. In 1983 David Armstrong argued that immanent universals provide the ontological structure science presupposes. The relation of necessitation N is real and sufficient. No further grounding is needed.

Objiectio II. Moderate realism claims that by positing universals in rebus rather than ante res, we respect the finitude of creation and avoid both Humean nominalism and Platonic abstraction.

Objiectio III. Scientific pragmatism holds that the theory of immanent universals aligns well with scientific practice, which operates by discovering relations among properties, not by appealing to transcendent causes.

Objiectio IV. Empiricists argue that an infinite ground multiplies entities beyond necessity. The unity of laws is a consequence of the shared structure of matter and fields, not of any higher participation.

Objiectio V. The theologicus cautus ("cautious theologian") opines that to require an infinite explanation of finite order threatens to erase the integrity of secondary causes and the natural autonomy of creation.

Responsiones

Ad I. To say that N(F, G) is real explains that the relation exists, not why it obtains. Unless N itself is grounded, the account halts in primitive necessity. A brute tie between universals is no advance over the brute law it replaces.

Ad II. Immanent universals are indeed within things, yet their coordination across all things remains unexplained.The in rebus does not by itself yield the per se unity of the real. Participation in a higher act of being is required for coherence among universals.

Ad III. Scientific adequacy differs from metaphysical sufficiency.
Empirical inquiry describes how properties are correlated; metaphysics asks why such correlation is necessary. Armstrong’s ontology presupposes the unity it should explain.

Ad IV.
The claim that matter and fields explain law simply restates the problem at a lower level. For the structure of matter and fields is itself law-like and requires grounding. Invoking the material order as ultimate converts contingent structure into absolute necessity without reason.

Ad V.
Participation in the Infinite does not annul finite autonomy but establishes it. Only what is grounded in the Infinite can act coherently according to its own nature. The Spirit’s causal presence secures the creature’s integrity by making its lawfulness possible.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Armstrong’s immanent realism preserves ontology but not ultimacy. The N-relation that ties universals together is either another universal (regress), an unexplained primitive (brute fact), or a reflection of a deeper unity (participation).

2. Finite relations cannot ground universal coherence. The multiplicity of universals demands a unifying act that is not itself one among them. Without such an act, law remains accidental coordination.

3. The appeal to the Infinite is not extrinsic but intrinsic. The very notion of “necessitation” implies participation in an unconditioned ground of necessity. The Infinite is the metaphysical horizon within which immanent universals receive their order.

4. The participation of universals in the Infinite corresponds to the theological doctrine of the Logos. As the eternal form of all forms, the Logos is the ratio essendi and ratio ordinis of finite properties. Law, in this light, is the reflection of divine intelligibility within creation.

5. Hence, immanent realism, while the most sophisticated of finite explanations, points beyond itself. Its internal coherence is the sign of participation, not self-sufficiency. In the Infinite Word, the many relations of the finite find their unity; in the Spirit, they find their continuous actuality.

Therefore, the necessity of natural law cannot rest in the N-relations of universals alone but requires the participation of all finite forms in the Infinite act of being — in ipso omnia constant.

Flacius and Strigel Revisited

The question between Flacius and Strigel in 1557 was this: How deep is sinfulness in human beings? Flacius thought it was so profound that it determined the very substance of human being. Strigel did not go that far, believing that sin while inevitably present, was nonetheless merely accidental to human being. Much has been written about this controversy over the years. The Formula of Concord attempted to follow the spirit of Flacius, if not the letter of his claim, declaring: 

That original sin (in human nature) is not only this entire absence of all good in spiritual, divine things, but that, instead of the lost image of God in man, it is at the same time also a deep, wicked, horrible, fathomless, inscrutable, and unspeakable corruption of the entire nature and all its powers, especially of the highest, principal powers of the soul in the understanding, heart, and will, so that now, since the Fall, man inherits an inborn wicked disposition and inward impurity of heart, evil lust and propensity. (SD, I) 

The question as to the profundity of human sin, and the attempt to claim that it is of the very substance of human being, involves us quickly in modal claims -- claims about necessity, possibility and contingency. Aristotle famously held a "two tiered" notion of substance. Accordingly, there are certain properties the substance has which are necessary and sufficient for it to be the substance it is, and others that the possess that they might not have.

Unfortunately, the phrase "necessary and sufficient for it to be the substance it is" is ambiguous, trading between the following:

• Necessarily, it is the case that for any x, x is identical to individual i if and only if i instantiates a particular property group A.
• Necessarily, it is the case that for any x, x is a member of kind k if and only if x  instantiates a particular property group B.  

The first claims that there is an individual essence A which is instantiated just in case a particular individual i obtains; the second declares that a general essence B is instantiated when some individual or other of kind k obtains.  While Aristotle clearly held that an individual substance has a general essence, most believe he did not countenance individual essences.  Thus, while it is necessary and sufficient for the individual Socrates to possess the essence man, it is more dubious that the individual Socrates possesses an essence of Socrativity.  While more could be said about this, I will not say it here.  

In addition to the essential properties that make a substance the kind of substance it is, there are also properties of the substance that are not necessary for it to be the substance it is. While properties of the first type are essential to the subject, properties of the second type, are contingent and do not constitute the substantiality of the substance.  While the substance Socrates must have the property of being a human being or not be Socrates, Socrates can either be pale or not pale and yet still be Socrates.  Using the language of Aristotle's de Categoria,  'man' is "said of" Socrates, paleness is "present in" Socrates.  'Man' is thus essentially predicated of Socrates while 'pale' is only accidentally predicated.

But this is not the end of the matter.  According to Aristotle, since 'man' is "said of" Socrates, 'mammal' and 'animal' must be "said of" him as well.  These secondary sayings about Socrates form transitive relationships: If the general essence of Socrates is to be human, then in being human Socrates must also be a mammal, be an animal, be a living being, etc.  That is to say, Socrates could not be at all if Socrates were not a living (as opposed to non-living) being. Flacius was arguing, in effect, that sin is essentially predicated of man (human beings), that is, that any substance having the general essence of being human must also instantiate the property of being sinful.  Strigel, on the contrary, claimed that sin is only accidentally predicated of any individual that is a man.  That is to say, the property of being sinful is "present in" primary substances having the essence of being human, but is not "said of" those substances.  'Sin' is accidentally predicated of a particular human being, not essentially predicated. 

While Flacius was trying to emphasize the inevitability of sin in our actual world, his claim that sin is essentially predicated of man (human beings) actually denies the existence of a possible world in which humans do not sin. Since there is no possible world in which a human being does not sin, the notion of 'man' (human being) contains within itself the notion of sin. Thus, just as the notion of square excludes the notion of circle, so too does the notion of 'man' exclude the notion of not sinning. Just as it is inconceivable that a square could be a circle, so it is inconceivable that a man could not sin. None of this can be countenanced, of course, by the Christian holding that God's creation is good. 

But the contrary position that sin is accidental, seemingly suggests a superficiality to sin, as if human beings might not sin because they are not determined metaphysically to do so. The problem in the debate, as I see it, is simply that neither Strigel nor Flavius yet had the notion of a physical law which, on any non-Humean interpretation, determines the distribution of physical properties universally within nature without this distribution holding in all possible worlds.  Human nature is fixed and, as Luther declares, human beings inevitably sin.  Yet this determinate human nature need not obtain in all possible worlds. There are worlds in which human beings do not sin. This, in fact, is necessary for claiming that God's creation is good, and necessary as well for being able to imagine an original paradise from which man and women fell.  One might say, that Flacius' views presuppose the impossibility of the Fall, because they make impossible the existence of a state from which human beings have lapsed.  

The Christian story is that human nature which was made good -- contingently, not metaphysically so -- contingently became a determinately corrupt nature contingently fixing the spectrum of human behaviors and responses.  Just as the acceleration of earthly objects downward is 9.8 m/sec2 universally under standard conditions, so too is human nature universally sinful and cannot (physically or through human agency) free itself.  However, just as there are possible worlds with different laws of motion, so are there worlds in which human nature is not corrupt. The depravity of man is metaphysically contingent, but physically (or agentially) necessary. Total depravity does not extend to all possible worlds.

These simple distinctions show that Strigel was correct, no matter how much Flacius may have fumed otherwise.  Somebody might argue, of course, that the modal distinction I am drawing here is still somehow practically unimportant, that Flacius was right in spirit because he was rightly pointing out that for all x, if x is human, then x is sinful.  He was arguing that human beings are inescapably and inevitably sinful, and this physical necessity of each x to sin is the important matter.  So what if Flacius somehow used the language of essentiality.  Was this not all that he had at the time, and would not other language suggest that human beings might proudly somehow escape sin?  

I aver, however, that modal difference makes all the difference.  We now have a clear notion of physical law; we understand determinate causal chains underlying universal regularities in the actual world.  We now know that for something to be contingently so does not mean that it is somehow capriciously so, obtaining sometimes and not other times.  Simply put, we understand that necessities are of different kinds: There are logical necessities, conceptual necessities, metaphysical necessities, physical necessities, etc.  Just because something is physically necessary does not mean that it is metaphysically necessary.  While we may cringe at calling human sin a "physical necessity," it is indeed so: Each and every human being h has a set of dispositional properties such that were conditions x, y or z to obtain, h would act in u or v fashion, where u and v are instantiations of what theology has always identified as sin.  Since it is a fact of our world that conditions x, y, or z obtain, it is not possible for a human being to exist having the set of dispositional properties he/she has and not sin.  The fact that this dispositional properties do not hold in all possible worlds should not obviate the obvious: This dispositional set does indeed obtain in the actual world.  Thus, each and every human being necessarily sins given the metaphysically contingent fact of the universal human proclivity to sin.  That we all necessarily sin given this metaphysical contingency should be enough confidently to proclaim, "We are in bondage to sin and cannot free ourselves.  We have sinned against You in thought, word, and deed, by what we have done, and by what we have left undone."  What more is needed?  If the creation of the universe is a contingent fact given the freedom of God, surely the existence of a fallen universe is contingent as well.  

Some Questions about Divine Agency

As a college student thirty years ago I read John Wisdom's "Gods" and was struck by the the Parable of the Invisible Gardener. Twenty-five years ago as a Ph.D. student, I read Flew, Hare, and Mitchell on the conditions for the meaningfulness of theological language. Flew had used the example of Wisdom's Invisible Gardener to show how theological claims "die the death of a thousand qualifications." Any claim that is consistent with any way that the world might have gone is a claim without semantic content. What claim is made, after all, when one says that "an invisible gardener comes and tends this mountain meadow" and that "this gardener is invisible and wholly incapable of detection"? What claim is made when one says 'God loves the young girl" and yet the young girl is suffering from throat cancer and is in severe pain? What strange ways religious people use words! How can one apply 'love' meaningfully after one admits that divine love is wholly unlike human love?

Twenty-five years ago, I was convinced by Flew. In fact, I was still convinced by Flew five years ago. However, I am no longer convinced by Flew. He supposed that any claim consistent with any way the world might have gone is no claim at all. I no longer agree. In fact, if one thinks deeply enough about this, one would expect a claim about God to be consistent with any way the world might be. Why? Well, if God is not a contingent being like other contingent beings, then the relational and non-relational properties of God would not be assigned by the way properties are distributed in the actual world. The properties of a necessary being would be based upon the way properties distribute in all possible worlds.

We can, of course, distinguish many senses of necessity. Of interest here is not logical or conceptual necessity, but metaphysical necessity. Whereas logical and conceptual necessity governs how states of affairs must be in all possible worlds and is thus a priori, metaphysical necessity speaks about what states of affairs must obtain on the basis of finding some other state of affairs obtains. For instance, "I think, therefore I am" is not true in all possible worlds, because one can imagine thinking without there being one that things. (Sartre presumably accomplished this.) However, given the fact that one is thinking, one is clearly being. That is, given the a posteriori fact of one thinking, one cannot not be present to think. Similarly, given the contingent fact that gold has an atomic number of 79, gold cannot not have such an atomic number. When one finds that about a thing that cannot otherwise be if the thing is to be the thing, one has found what is metaphysically necessary about the thing.

The point is that if God should exist, God could not not have the divine nature that makes God, God. Just as gold could have not existed, but did with an atomic number of 79, so could God have not existed, but does with a divine nature of love. Just as it is metaphysically necessary for gold to have an atomic number of 79, it is metaphysically necessary for God to love His creation. Finally, just as gold having the atomic number of 79 is consistent with any way worlds with gold present might have been, so too God loving his creation is consistent with any way those worlds with God present might have been. If God necessarily loves, this loving should be expected to be consistent with any way that the world might have been. Far from dying the death of a thousand qualifications, claiming that God love's His creation is to say something like humans loving after all. The modal status of love should not confuse us into thinking that God does not love, rather it should instruct us as to look not at the "moves in the game" but rather " at the rules of the game." Divine love is to human love as the rules of the game are to moves in the game. Just as the rules of the game are consistent with any moves within the game, so too is divine love consistent with any spatio-temporal acts of loving. Finally, just as the rules of the game show the spectrum of possible moves in the game, so does divine loving show the range of possible occasions of concrete, earthly loving.

Perhaps we have been thinking about divine agency wrongly. Perhaps we should not expect to find such agency as moves within the game, but as rules promulgated for the game. If so, such agency might show the spectrum of possible occasions of concrete human agents doing certain things. Perhaps we have been bewitched into thinking divine agency a contingent matter, rather than a matter of metaphysical necessity. In all worlds in which God is, God cannot not be at work. His being at work creates the very possiblity for human agency.

It is the mark of a necessity that the necessary thing be in all possible worlds. If divine agency is metaphysically necessary, it is in all those worlds in which there is God, worlds distinguished by the distribution of their worldly, contingent events. Perhaps if we could detect divine love like we discern human love, we would not have divine love at all. Making a macro-move in a game does not change the way that the game is played. Maybe Flew has been wrong all of these years; perhaps a claim that is consistent with any way the world might have been is not a pseudo-claim, but a more profound kind of claim. Perhaps we are not expecting such a claim, because we can undersand no longer what it would be for God to be.