Disputatio LXI: De Providentia Speciali et Revelatione in Eventibus Particularibus

 On Special Providence and Revelation in Particular Events

Quaeritur

Utrum providentia specialis designet modum quo voluntas divina manifestatur in eventibus particularibus, ita ut eventus isti non sint merae contingentiae temporales sed loci in quibus Logos intentionaliter agit; et quomodo haec particularis manifestatio non confundat causam divinam et creatam nec redigat revelationem ad interpretationem humanam.

Whether special providence designates the mode by which the divine will manifests itself in particular events, such that these events are not mere temporal contingencies but loci where the Logos intentionally acts; and how such particular manifestation neither confuses divine and creaturely causality nor reduces revelation to human interpretation.

Thesis

Special providence is the enactment of divine intention within determinate historical events. It is not an intrusion upon natural processes nor an alternative causal chain. It is the Logos’ intentional ordering of specific occurrences so that they bear the form of divine act. Such events become revelatory when the Spirit illumines them as manifestations of divine purpose.

Special providence does not violate creaturely freedom, for it operates at the level of constitutive intelligibility, not at the level of coercive determination. Nor does it collapse into general providence, for it concerns the particular specification of divine agency within concrete history. Thus special providence is the personal articulation of divine intention within the temporal order.

Locus Classicus

Genesis 50:20
Vos cogitastis de me malum, Deus autem cogitavit in bonum.
“You meant evil against me, but God meant it for good.”

A single event bears two intentions without competition.

Acts 17:26–27
ἐποίησέν τε ἐξ ἑνὸς πᾶν ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων κατοικεῖν ἐπὶ παντὸς προσώπου τῆς γῆς,
ὁρίσας προστεταγμένους καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁροθεσίας τῆς κατοικίας αὐτῶν,
ζητεῖν τὸν Θεόν, εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὕροιεν,
καί γε οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἡμῶν ὑπάρχοντα. 

"He made from one every nation of humankind to dwell on all the face of the earth, having determined their appointed times and the boundaries of their habitation, that they would seek God."

Luther, WA 10 III, 35
Deus gubernat omnia non solum in universali, sed in particulari.
“God governs all things not only in general but in particular.”

Explicatio

1. Special providence is not a narrower form of general providence

General providence concerns the constitutive order of all things: the intelligibility of history and the sustaining power of the Logos. Special providence concerns the specific articulation of divine intention within determinate events. To use an image: general providence is the grammar of history; special providence is the sentence God speaks within it. Thus, special providence is not a separate kind of causation but a more determinate mode of divine intentionality operating within the field general providence provides.

2. A particular event becomes revelatory when illumined

Every event possesses its own creaturely causal history. Special providence does not abolish this but brings it into relation with divine intentionality. An event becomes revelatory not because a different kind of cause appears but because the Spirit grants the event to be perceived according to its deeper meaning in the Logos. Thus revelation is not a doubling of events but an unveiling of the intention that grounds them. Accordingly, the Red Sea crossing, the call of Abraham, the Damascus road encounter: each is a historical occurrence whose revelatory character derives from divine intentionality perceived under illumination.

3. Special providence does not negate creaturely agency

A single event can bear both divine and creaturely intentions without contradiction because:

• divine intention grounds the event’s being and meaning,

• creaturely intention grounds its moral and temporal content.

Joseph’s brothers intend evil. God intends good. These intentions coexist because divine intentionality does not operate on the same causal register as creaturely intention. God does not coerce their act; he situates its meaning within the broader narrative of salvation.This is neither compatibilism nor libertarianism, but enjoins a participatory causality.

4. Special providence is intelligible only within a participatory ontology

If divine and creaturely causes occupy the same plane, special providence becomes indistinguishable from determinism or interventionism. But when the Logos is understood as the intelligible ground of all finite processes, special providence becomes the specification of divine intention within a concrete finite form. Thus natural and divine causes do not compete. Divine action sustains natural causality even as it uses it. Luther’s language of God working “in and under” events reflects this metaphysical layering.

5. Revelation arises from divine act, not human interpretation

Special providence does not depend on human judgment. An event is revelatory because God acts, not because humans discern divine action. Illumination grants recognition but does not constitute the divine act. Thus the subjectivism of purely hermeneutical or postliberal models is avoided. What God does is real even before it is recognized. Interpretation follows illumination; illumination follows divine intention; and divine intention grounds the event.

Objectiones

Ob I. If special providence identifies divine intention in particular events, how can one distinguish revelation from coincidence?

Ob II. If God intends specific events, does this not collapse creaturely freedom?

Ob III. If revelation arises from illumination, is it not subjective

Ob IV. If God orders particular events, is God then responsible for evil?

Ob V. Special providence seems indistinguishable from miracle. Are they the same?

Responsiones

Ad I. Coincidence is a name for events lacking perceived intelligibility. Special providence is the intentional grounding of events by the Logos. Recognition requires illumination, but the reality does not depend on recognition.

Ad II. Divine intention provides the possibility and meaning of the event, not the moral content of the creaturely act. Freedom determines intention; providence establishes context. One does not negate the other.

Ad III. Illumination grants the truth of revelation to be known. It does not create the truth. Revelation is objective in divine act and participatory in creaturely apprehension.

Ad IV. God sustains the event as event but does not intend the creature’s evil. Providence orders evil toward good without causing the evil itself. The defect arises from the creature; the ordering arises from God.

Ad V. Miracle suspends ordinary natural processes. Special providence works through them. Both reveal God; they differ in mode, not in reality of divine action.

Nota

Special providence is the concrete specification of divine intentionality in history. It is not occasionalism, for it preserves creaturely agency; nor is it deism, for it recognizes divine presence in every event. It reveals God as the one whose eternal will becomes manifest in time without violence to freedom or nature.

This is theological realism: God acts, and events bear the form of that act.

Determinatio

We determine:

Special providence is the particular manifestation of divine intention in concrete historical events.
It does not abolish creaturely causality but situates it within divine purpose. Revelation in specific events arises from the Logos’ ordering and the Spirit’s illumination. Thus special providence is neither determinism nor hermeneutic projection. It is divine action in the concrete.

Transitus ad Disputationem LXII

Having shown that divine intention becomes manifest in particular events, we now turn to the event in which divine intention and creaturely nature are united in the most intimate form: the incarnation. For Christ is not merely a revelatory event but the ontological union of God and man.

We therefore proceed to Disputatio LXII: De Communicatione Idiomatum et Ontologia Participationis.

Disputatio LIX: De Historia Ut Loco Revelationis

 On History as the Locus of Revelation

Quaeritur

Utrum historia ipsa possit esse locus revelationis divinae, ita ut eventus historici non solum referant ad voluntatem Dei sed manifestent ipsam actionem eius; et quomodo haec revelatio historica non redigatur ad immanentem causalitatem neque confundatur cum nudis factis temporalibus.

Whether history itself can be a locus of divine revelation, such that historical events do not merely refer to the will of God but manifest the divine act itself; and how such historical revelation neither collapses divine action into immanence nor becomes indistinguishable from ordinary temporal events.

Thesis

History becomes a locus of revelation because the Logos, who is the intelligible articulation of divine act, shapes the order of created temporality as the field in which divine action is enacted. History is therefore not a neutral sequence of temporal occurrences. It is the sphere in which divine intelligibility enters time under forms suitable for human encounter.

The Spirit illumines historical events so that their Logos-shaped form becomes perceptible to the creature. Illumination does not alter history, but renders history transparent to divine intention.

Thus historical revelation is not merely a symbolic interpretation of past occurrences, but is rather the manifestation of divine action within the temporal order, an action grasped through the form constituted by the Logos and opened by the Spirit.

Locus Classicus

Galatians 4:4
ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου…
“When the fullness of time had come…”

Time is not homogeneous. It receives fullness when divine act enters it.

Acts 2:11
ἀκούομεν λαλούντων… τὰ μεγαλεῖα τοῦ Θεοῦ.
“We hear them declaring the mighty acts of God.”

The apostles interpret concrete historical events as divine acts, not merely as human occurrences.

Luther, WA 40 II, 90
Opera Dei sunt historiae.
“The works of God are histories.”

The divine act becomes narrative because it enters temporality.

Explicatio

History is not autonomous from divine intention. Modern historiography treats history as a closed temporal sequence governed by immanent causation. But revelation becomes, on this view, either a theological overlay or an interpretive projection. Accordingly, this view presupposes that history is self-sufficient and that divine action must be added to it from without. On the contrary, theological truth requires a different premise. History is the created field ordered by the Logos as the arena in which divine acts may occur. It is therefore intrinsically open to revelation.

Divine action in history is not an intrusion but fulfillment. To say that God acts in history is not to say that divine agency violates the temporal order. Rather, it is to say that the temporal order is constituted for participation in divine action. The incarnation shows this with the greatest clarity. Time does not resist the Logos but receives him. Similarly, redemption is not an exception to history but its completion. Thus, divine acts are not supernatural intrusions into an otherwise closed system. They are the realization of history’s deepest intelligibility.

Illumination makes historical acts revelatory.  History becomes revelation when the Spirit grants creatures to perceive its Logos-shaped form. Without this illumination, history is only asequence of events that bears no apparent reference to divine intention. However, with illumination, the same events manifest the structure of divine agency. This is not an interpretation imposed from without, but a recognition of the form given from within. Thus, revelation is not epistemic projection but an ontological disclosure.

There is a distinction between the event and revelation. A historical event may be the medium of divine action without yet being revelation for a creature. Revelation requires that the event be seen as the act it is. Although this seeing does not alter the event itself, it does alter the creature’s participation in its intelligibility. Therefore, revelation is not a second act added to history but the same act perceived in its divine depth through illumination.

We must thus reject reductive historicism.  While some theologies identify revelation wholly with historical process, divine action is not exhausted by such historical causation. Revelation is present in history because divine agency shapes history, not because divine agency is reducible to historical movement. While historicism collapses transcendence, theological realism insists that history becomes revelatory because God acts in it, not because history itself is divine.

Objectiones

Ob I. If history is a locus of revelation, does this not subject divine action to temporal limitation?

Ob II. If revelation requires illumination, how can historical events be objectively revelatory?

Ob III. If God acts in history, is this not indistinguishable from special providence?

Ob IV. If revelation depends on the Logos-shaped form of events, does this merely reduce history to a symbolic structure?

Ob V. If the Spirit grants perception of revelation, does this not make revelation dependent on subjective experience?

Responsiones

Ad I. Divine action is not limited by time because the Logos shapes time. The temporal manifestation of divine act does not restrict its eternal identity.

Ad II. Objective revelatory status arises from divine action, not from human perception. Illumination grants awareness of what is already true. Revelation is objective in its occurrence and subjective in its reception.

Ad III. Special providence describes divine governance of events. Revelation describes divine manifestation within events. These are distinct modes of divine relation to history, not identical functions.

Ad IV. Historical events are not symbols. They are the real media of divine action. Their form is intelligible because the Logos constitutes their order, not because they are figurative constructs.

Ad V. Revelation is not dependent on experience. It is dependent on divine agency. Experience becomes awareness of revelation only when illumined by the Spirit.

Nota

History is not merely the record of human deeds. It is the temporal field ordered by the Logos as the site of divine self-manifestation. The Spirit grants creatures to perceive this manifestation as revelation rather than as mere occurrence.

Thus revelation is neither outside history nor reducible to history. It is divine action in history, apprehended through illumination.

Determinatio

We therefore determine:

1. History becomes a locus of revelation because it is shaped by the Logos as the arena of divine action.
2. Divine acts in history are not interruptions but fulfillments of temporal order.
3. Illumination grants creatures to perceive historical events in their divine intelligibility.
4. Revelation is objective in occurrence and participatory in reception.
5. Historical revelation requires theological realism, for only if divine action is real can history mediate it.

Time thus becomes the sphere in which creatures encounter the intelligible form of God’s act.

Transitus ad Disputationem LX

Having established history as the locus of revelation, we now turn to the question of divine providence and human freedom. For if history becomes revelatory through divine action, one must ask how creaturely agency participates in or resists this action. 

We proceed therefore to Disputatio LX: De Providentia et Libertate, where we examine how divine intention orders history without dissolving the freedom and responsibility of human agents.

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Disputatio X: De Revelatione et Cognitione Dei

On Revelation and Knowledge of God

Quaeritur

Utrum cognitio Dei oriatur ex participatione in actu ipsius revelationis, ita ut Deus cognoscatur non per discursum rationis sed in ipso actu quo se revelat; et utrum hic actus revelationis sit constitutive duplex, simul exterior in Verbo proclamato et interior in Spiritu illuminante, per quos intellectus humanus capax fit veritatis divinae.

Whether knowledge of God arises through participation in the act of divine revelation itself, such that God is known not through discursive reason but within the very act by which He discloses Himself; and whether this revelatory act is constitutively twofold—external in the proclaimed Word and internal in the illuminating Spirit—by whom the human intellect is made capable of divine truth.

Thesis

True knowledge of God does not originate in human speculation. It arises only within revelation. Revelation is not chiefly the transmission of information about God but the divine self-giving through which God becomes knowable. In this act the eternal Word addresses the human intellect externally through the scriptural and proclaimed Word, while the Holy Spirit illumines the intellect internally, enabling participation in the truth revealed.

Thus theological cognition is a participatory reception of divine self-manifestation. It is neither autonomous reasoning nor passive impression. It is the Spirit-mediated union of the knower with the truth that reveals itself. In knowing God, the intellect becomes—by grace—an organ of divine manifestation.

Locus classicus

John 17:3
Haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, solum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum.
“And this is eternal life, that they know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent.”

1 Corinthians 2:12
Nos autem non spiritum mundi accepimus, sed Spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis.
“We have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we may understand the things freely given us by God.”

Augustine, De Trinitate IX.13
Non intratur in veritatem nisi per ipsam veritatem.
“One does not enter into truth except through Truth itself.”

These witnesses articulate a single insight: revelation both discloses divine reality and creates the capacity for its reception. Knowledge of God presupposes both the presence of the revealing Word and the illumination of the Spirit.

Explicatio

The inquiry into divine revelation must begin with the recognition that God is not an object within the world whose properties may be inferred from created effects. God is known only because God gives Himself to be known. Revelation is therefore not an epistemic supplement to natural inquiry but the condition under which knowledge of God becomes possible. In revealing Himself, God not only manifests the truth but also creates the horizon within which that truth can be apprehended.

Revelation is thus a single divine act with a twofold form. Externally, the Word addresses the creature through prophetic and apostolic testimony, through preaching, and supremely in the Incarnate Son. Internally, the Spirit illumines the intellect so that what is heard may be recognized as divine truth. These two operations are inseparable. The external Word is the objective presence of revelation; the internal illumination is its subjective reception. Without the Word, illumination lacks content. Without illumination, the Word is not savingly known. Revelation occurs only in the union of these acts.

This twofold structure safeguards the intellect from both rationalism and enthusiasm. Rationalism assumes that the mind can rise to divine truth by its own power; enthusiasm imagines that divine truth can be apprehended apart from the concrete forms of God’s address. But theological cognition arises only where the Spirit joins the intellect to the proclaimed Word and thereby renders the creature capable of divine truth. This elevation does not replace natural capacities; it perfects them. The intellect does not cease to reason; rather, it reasons within a light it does not generate.

In this sense revelation is not merely epistemic but ontological. It is the act in which God is present to the creature and the creature is drawn into that presence. The intellect knows God not by forming concepts that encompass the divine essence but by participating in the self-disclosure of the One who reveals Himself. The mode of knowing corresponds to the mode of being known. Because God reveals Himself personally, the creature knows personally; because God reveals Himself freely, the creature knows by grace; because God reveals Himself truly, the creature knows in truth, though not comprehensively.

The knowledge that arises from revelation is therefore hyperintensional in character. It cannot be reduced to predicative content or inferential structure. Its meaning exceeds the natural extension of its predicates because the truths they signify are grounded in God’s own presence. To confess that Christ is Lord, or that God is Father, is to speak within a horizon opened by the Spirit’s illumination—a horizon in which the predicate receives a depth of meaning that transcends its natural usage. Revelation not only informs language; it transforms the conditions under which language signifies.

Thus theological cognition is a form of participation. The intellect does not merely receive propositions but is joined to the truth they express. This union does not dissolve the creaturely mode of knowing; it fulfills it. The intellect remains finite, yet it becomes capable of knowing the infinite according to the measure of grace. Knowledge of God is therefore neither an achievement nor an absorption. It is a gift: apprehension without comprehension, union without confusion, presence without possession.

In this way revelation gives rise to a distinctive epistemic posture: wonder before the One who reveals, receptivity to the form of His address, and obedience to the truth disclosed. The knower is not sovereign; the object is not neutral; the act of knowing is not autonomous. Each is ordered by the divine initiative. Revelation is the light in which the intellect sees, and the light by which it becomes capable of seeing. In its deepest sense, revelation is the presence of God granting Himself to be known.

Objectiones

Ob I. If theological knowledge requires interior illumination, its certainty seems to rest on a private act that cannot be publicly verified. This appears to render theology subjective.

Ob II. If the finite intellect cannot know God except through participation in revelation, natural reason appears useless for theology, contradicting the tradition that assigns reason a genuine though limited role.

Ob III. If the intellect must be elevated to know God, then its natural capacities are insufficient. This suggests that either divine knowledge is impossible for finite beings or that nature is swallowed by grace.

Ob IV. If God is known only as He reveals Himself, then God becomes both the condition and object of knowing. This unity threatens to collapse the distinction between Creator and creature.

Responsiones

Ad I. Illumination is not a private inner certainty but an ecclesial event. The Spirit illumines through the public Word, not apart from it. What is grasped inwardly corresponds to what is proclaimed outwardly. The objectivity of revelation grounds the subject’s reception.

Ad II. Reason is neither negated nor replaced. Its natural operations remain indispensable for discerning meaning, testing coherence, and receiving revelation. What reason cannot do is generate knowledge of God. Grace perfects nature; it does not annul it.

Ad III. The intellect’s elevation is not a change of essence but a participation in divine light. Nature is neither destroyed nor absorbed. It becomes proportionate to the truth it receives through a relation of communion, not through ontological fusion.

Ad IV. Revelation unites knowing and being known without collapsing them. God is both Revealer and Revealed, yet the knower remains creaturely. Participation confers intimacy, not identity.

Nota

Disputatio X marks a structural turning point. Disputatio IX showed that divine speech transforms human language by assuming it into the expressive act of the Word. Disputatio X now shows that this same divine act transforms the intellect by illuminating it with the Spirit. The possibility of theology rests on this double assumption: the Word assumes human speech, and the Spirit assumes human knowing. Revelation is thus both the manifestation of divine truth and the creation of the capacity to receive it.

This insight prepares for what follows. If knowledge of God arises in revelation, and revelation is the presence of the Revealer in the act of revealing, then the next question must concern the mode of divine presence itself.

Determinatio

1. Knowledge of God arises only within divine revelation.

2. Revelation is intrinsically twofold: the external Word and the internal illumination.

3. The intellect becomes capable of divine truth through participation in the revelatory act.

4. Theological cognition is Spirit-mediated apprehension of divine self-disclosure.

5. Reason retains its natural dignity but is perfected, not displaced, by grace.

6. To know God is to participate in His presence: apprehensio sine comprehensione, unio sine confusione.

Transitus ad Disputationem XI

If knowledge arises only where God reveals Himself, then revelation presupposes a mode of divine presence in which God is genuinely encountered within finite forms. What is this presence? How does the infinite dwell amid the finite without displacement or division?

To answer this, we proceed to Disputatio XI: De Praesentia Dei, where the ontology of divine presence will be examined.

Thinking Truth Non-Propositionally

"I am the Way and the Truth and the Life."

I regard the statement as true.  As such, it is a  propositional truth.   Precisely how a  statement is a propositional truth is a matter of considerable debate, of course.   Some say it is true because regarding it so issues in desirable effects.  "Truth is what works," declares the confident pragmatist.

Others say it is true because it coheres appropriately with a wider class of statements.  It is consistent  with them, and it, and the wider class of statements, mutually presuppose each other so that there are no arbitrary and disconnected statements from which the statement is deducible.   Getting clear on the coherence theory of truth is never easy because it is not perspicuous what the precise boundaries of coherence are.  

Many say that the statement is propositionally true because it appropriately states what is the case.   Getting precision on what is the case apart from the statement, and what the appropriate way is in which the statement and the extra-linguistic states of affairs relate, is not altogether facile.  What constitutes the criterion by which to adjudicate when a statement appropriately states the case?  If there is an isomorphism between statement and the reality it depicts?  If so, what are the relata of the relations isomorphically obtaining?

In the absence of clear criteria which unfailingly picks out the truth of a putative propositional truth, some claim that the truth of propositional truth is primitive.  One need not have some elaborate theory of meaning which, when appropriately satisfied, delivers truth.   One could start with truth and discern that  meaning in some way is derivative upon that.

Whatever be one's theory, the notion that truth is propositional is standard fare in philosophical thinking.   A philosopher can give alternative accounts of how the truth of "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life" is true.  This much is certain.   But the philosopher runs into a brick wall when trying to think the content of the proposition in which  utterer is identified with Truth itself.  What could this mean?   How could truth be non-propositional?   How can truth be non-linguistic?  What does it mean to say that 'Jesus' is 'Truth'?

One might at this point say that 'truth' just means 'reality', and that Jesus is thus 'real'.   But this way of proceeding is fraught with much difficulty because to say 'Jesus is Truth' is clearly intended to say more than 'Jesus is real', for one would quite glibly say 'the ball is real', but never aver 'the ball is truth'.

There are two more promising steps forward, one Hegelian and one Heideggerian.   Hegel famously claimed, "Diese Gegenstaende sind wahr, wenn sie das sind, was sie sein sollen, d.h. wenn ihre Realitaet ihrem Begriff entspricht" ("Objects are true if they are as they ought to be, that is, when their reality corresponds to their notion."). [Enzyklopaedie, Wissenschaft der Logik (1830), 213, n. 127] Accordingly, Jesus is 'truth' in that he corresponds fully to the concept of what it is to be the God-man.  But is this "correspondence" really non-propositional?   Think what it would be to specify how a thing corresponds without using concepts expressible in language.  How could one thing not be another thing in the absence of that which differentiates?   And how can that which differentiates not finally be expressible in language?

Another way forward is Heideggerian.  Famously Heidegger argued that alethia (truth) is a unconcealing (Unverborgenheit) or as an Entbergung or "unveiling."   Early on Heidegger found the phenomenon of unveiling as the ontological ground for the possibility of truth.  However, later Heidegger admitted that die Frage nach der Unverborgenheit als solcher ist nicht die Frage nach die Wahrheit.  (Maybe he realized that if truth needed an ontological ground in unconcealing, falsity needed one in concealing.)   Whatever might be thought of Heidegger's turn away from truth as unconcealing in his Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens, he remained convinced that truth had something to do with correctness, and that correctness had everything to do with unveiling.  But how can one claim that the experience of unveiling ontologically grounds truth when this experience could as easily be described as truth's effect?

Given what has been said, how is it unquestionably possible for Jesus to be 'the Truth'?   Moreover, if Jesus is identified with God's self-revelation, then how can that revelation be true?   The standard move here is to distinguish between the objective, historical process of revelation and the subjective interpretation of that revelation.  (One might claim a la Pannenberg that a distinction holds between the "outer revelation" and the "inspiration" as the interpretation of these events in the Biblical witnesses.)  While the first is putatively non-propositional, the second is not.  But what is it to be a manifestation of God in and through historical events, that is, in and through particular things?  Furthermore, how could such a manifestation be non-linguistic?  If Stacia is a "true friend," but Bob is not, then what is it about Stacia that distinguishes her over and against Bob; what is that "it" that is not in principle capturable by language?

Twentieth century theology, in its effort to escape the "propositional theory of truth" with respect to divine revelation - - the generally-regarded spurious claim that divine revelation is an impartation of information -- seems to lurch into a semantic crevasse of vanquished lucidity.   Simply put, one  does not know what one is talking about when discoursing about a revelation that is in principle non-propositional.   That God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself could, after all, be true, but what is true is the fact that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.  A revelation that cannot be expressed as fact is finally too amorphous to be revelatory; such a revelation is ultimately a night in which all cows are black.