Disputatio X: De Revelatione et Cognitione Dei

On Revelation and Knowledge of God

Revelatio est actus ipsius Dei se manifestantis, non per deductionem rationis sed per communicationem Spiritus. Cognitio Dei non oritur ex speculatione humana, sed ex participatione in Verbo revelato. Hic actus cognoscendi est simul passio et donum: Deus cognoscitur in ipso actu quo se revelat.

Revelation is God’s own act of self-manifestation—not the result of human deduction but the gift of the Spirit’s communication. Knowledge of God does not arise from human speculation but from participation in the revealed Word. This act of knowing is at once reception and grace: God is known in the very act by which He reveals Himself.

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Thesis

True knowledge of God (cognitio Dei) occurs only within revelation. Revelation is not the transmission of information about God but the divine act in which God gives Himself to be known. Hence, theology is not reflection upon an object but participation in a subject—the divine Word who both reveals and knows Himself.

Locus classicus

“No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.” — Matthew 11:27

Here the Lord Himself locates all knowledge of God within His own life: revelation is reciprocal communion between Father, Son, and those brought into that communion by the Spirit. To know God is to share in God’s own knowing.

Explicatio

Revelation and cognition in theology are not parallel processes but one act viewed from two sides. When God reveals, He does not merely disclose propositions; He grants participation in His own self-understanding.

In the natural order of knowing, the subject apprehends an object. In revelation, the human knower is taken up into the act of divine self-knowledge. This is why revelation cannot be grasped through detached speculation. To know God is to be drawn into God’s own interpretive act—the Son’s eternal vision of the Father made present by the Spirit.

We may express this structurally (and then explain it):

• Let R represent revelation, the act of divine self-disclosure.

• Let K_h represent human knowledge of God, and K_d divine self-knowledge.
  The theological relation K_h ← R → K_d means: human knowing of God arises from and participates in divine knowing through revelation. The arrows indicate that revelation is the mediating act linking the two, not a neutral transmission.

Thus, the nova lingua theologiae (developed in Disputatio IX) is the very medium of revelation’s occurrence. God speaks in human words, and in those words He both gives Himself and illumines human understanding. This is why theology’s language must be both faithful to its divine source and humble in its human form—it carries the mystery of divine cognition within finite utterance.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. According to an empiricist epistemology, knowing God by revelation is impossible, because genuine knowledge requires sensory data or empirical verification. Since God is invisible and transcendent, a claim to divine revelation or cognition cannot meet the criteria of knowledge. Hence theology’s claim to knowledge of God is at best symbolic or metaphorical, not genuine cognition.

Obiectio II. If God is all-knowing, all-powerful and perfectly loving, then one would expect full clarity in divine revelation, so that human beings would know God unmistakably. Yet human experience is marked by ambiguity, dispute over revelation, and even ignorance of God’s being. Therefore the claim that God reveals Himself such that human cognition genuinely knows Him is doubtful.

Obiectio III. On the model of Karl Barth, revelation is not an object-of-knowledge but a divine event that confronts the human subject. One cannot therefore speak of “cognition of God” in the standard sense (as knowing a thing) when it comes to God. Theology must witness this event, not claim propositional knowledge. Thus the doctrine of cognition of God seems to import human epistemic categories into theology illegitimately.

Obiectio IV. Drawing on the apophatic tradition, one holds that God’s essence is utterly transcendent and beyond human concepts. Any attempt to speak of cognition of God risks projecting finite categories onto the infinite. Revelation may indicate God’s presence, but cognition of God qua God remains impossible. Theology must affirm unknowing rather than knowing.

Obiectio V. According to post-modern constructivist theology, our concepts of God are culturally, linguistically and historically conditioned. “Revelation” and “knowledge of God” are thus human constructions, not transcendent disclosures. To speak of cognition of God presumes universality of epistemic access which overlooks the diversity of human situatedness.

Responsiones

Ad I. While it is true that empirical knowledge depends on sensory input and verification, knowledge of God by revelation belongs to a different epistemic order, that of divine self-communication. God does not become an object among others but enters human cognition through the act of the Spirit. Thus revelation is not mere metaphor but the grounding of the cognitive relation: God authorises the knowing by revealing Himself. Human cognition remains finite and mediated, yet genuinely knows God insofar as it participates in the divine self-communication.

Ad II. The hiddenness of God and the ambiguity of human reception are real. Yet they do not negate that God reveals Himself; rather they indicate the finitude of human cognition and the mystery of divine freedom. Revelation is genuine, but its reception always occurs within historical, cultural, and existential constraints. Theology acknowledges the partiality of our knowledge (cf. “we see in a mirror dimly”) while affirming that cognition of God is possible because God discloses Himself. The fact that human cognition is limited does not show that cognition is impossible—instead it shows that the mode of cognition is participatory and mediated, not autonomous.

Ad III. Barth rightly emphasises revelation as event rather than object; theology is witness. Yet recognising revelation as event does not preclude cognition of God. The divine event triggers the cognitive relation: God speaks, human hearing occurs, understanding responds. Theology’s cognition of God is therefore event-grounded and relational rather than purely conceptual. The “object” known is not a thing outside but the living God who reveals. Thus knowledge of God remains propositional in one sense (we can speak truly of God) but always contextualised in the revelatory act.

Ad IV. The apophatic tradition protects the transcendence of God, but must be balanced with the cataphatic: God reveals Himself in ways we can know. The doctrine of cognition of God must affirm that while God’s essence remains ineffable, He reveals Himself truly in His acts and Word. Revelation does not exhaust God’s being but gives genuine knowledge of Him as He wills to be known. Theology holds that human cognition knows God analogically: we do not fully capture His essence, yet we know Him truly given His self-disclosure.

Ad V. Constructivism draws attention to the mediation of language and culture in theology—but revelation critiques and transcends those mediations. Knowing God by revelation means that human frameworks are not the origin of theology’s truth but the occasion for divine self-communication. Theology remains culturally embodied, yet its claim to knowledge is not simply human-constructed—it rests on God’s act of revealing. Therefore cognition of God is not eliminated by cultural mediation; instead it is enabled by the Spirit working within human contexts.

Nota

Revelation (revelatio) and knowledge (cognitio) form a single circle of divine communication. God reveals in order to be known, and He is known only in the revealing. This mutuality is the structure of the Trinitarian economy: the Father reveals through the Son; the Spirit causes that revelation to be received as knowledge within believers.

In the economy of faith, the Word that reveals becomes also the form of human knowing. Hence the ancient formula, fides quaerens intellectum (“faith seeking understanding”), describes not curiosity but participation: faith already contains understanding implicitly because it shares in the divine act of self-knowing.

If we recall earlier symbolic language, Tₙ, the “new language of theology,” is the linguistic body of revelation. Within this language, every true statement about God is a double movement:

• from God to man (revelation, grace descending), and

• from man to God (understanding, faith ascending).
  These two movements coincide in the Spirit, the living bridge of knowledge.

Thus, theology is not about God as distant object but about God in actu loquendi et cognoscendi—in the very act of speaking and knowing Himself within us.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Revelation is God’s own self-disclosure, not information about God but the communication of God Himself.

2. Knowledge of God (cognitio Dei) arises within this act of revelation as participation in divine self-knowing.

3. The Spirit mediates this communion, enabling the human mind to know God by sharing analogically in God’s own knowledge of Himself.

4. The nova lingua theologiae is the linguistic form of revelation—finite words rendered luminous by divine presence.

5. Therefore, theology’s cognitive act is not speculative but participatory: to know God is to dwell within the Word that both reveals and knows.

Thinking Truth Non-Propositionally

"I am the Way and the Truth and the Life."

I regard the statement as true.  As such, it is a  propositional truth.   Precisely how a  statement is a propositional truth is a matter of considerable debate, of course.   Some say it is true because regarding it so issues in desirable effects.  "Truth is what works," declares the confident pragmatist.

Others say it is true because it coheres appropriately with a wider class of statements.  It is consistent  with them, and it, and the wider class of statements, mutually presuppose each other so that there are no arbitrary and disconnected statements from which the statement is deducible.   Getting clear on the coherence theory of truth is never easy because it is not perspicuous what the precise boundaries of coherence are.  

Many say that the statement is propositionally true because it appropriately states what is the case.   Getting precision on what is the case apart from the statement, and what the appropriate way is in which the statement and the extra-linguistic states of affairs relate, is not altogether facile.  What constitutes the criterion by which to adjudicate when a statement appropriately states the case?  If there is an isomorphism between statement and the reality it depicts?  If so, what are the relata of the relations isomorphically obtaining?

In the absence of clear criteria which unfailingly picks out the truth of a putative propositional truth, some claim that the truth of propositional truth is primitive.  One need not have some elaborate theory of meaning which, when appropriately satisfied, delivers truth.   One could start with truth and discern that  meaning in some way is derivative upon that.

Whatever be one's theory, the notion that truth is propositional is standard fare in philosophical thinking.   A philosopher can give alternative accounts of how the truth of "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life" is true.  This much is certain.   But the philosopher runs into a brick wall when trying to think the content of the proposition in which  utterer is identified with Truth itself.  What could this mean?   How could truth be non-propositional?   How can truth be non-linguistic?  What does it mean to say that 'Jesus' is 'Truth'?

One might at this point say that 'truth' just means 'reality', and that Jesus is thus 'real'.   But this way of proceeding is fraught with much difficulty because to say 'Jesus is Truth' is clearly intended to say more than 'Jesus is real', for one would quite glibly say 'the ball is real', but never aver 'the ball is truth'.

There are two more promising steps forward, one Hegelian and one Heideggerian.   Hegel famously claimed, "Diese Gegenstaende sind wahr, wenn sie das sind, was sie sein sollen, d.h. wenn ihre Realitaet ihrem Begriff entspricht" ("Objects are true if they are as they ought to be, that is, when their reality corresponds to their notion."). [Enzyklopaedie, Wissenschaft der Logik (1830), 213, n. 127] Accordingly, Jesus is 'truth' in that he corresponds fully to the concept of what it is to be the God-man.  But is this "correspondence" really non-propositional?   Think what it would be to specify how a thing corresponds without using concepts expressible in language.  How could one thing not be another thing in the absence of that which differentiates?   And how can that which differentiates not finally be expressible in language?

Another way forward is Heideggerian.  Famously Heidegger argued that alethia (truth) is a unconcealing (Unverborgenheit) or as an Entbergung or "unveiling."   Early on Heidegger found the phenomenon of unveiling as the ontological ground for the possibility of truth.  However, later Heidegger admitted that die Frage nach der Unverborgenheit als solcher ist nicht die Frage nach die Wahrheit.  (Maybe he realized that if truth needed an ontological ground in unconcealing, falsity needed one in concealing.)   Whatever might be thought of Heidegger's turn away from truth as unconcealing in his Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens, he remained convinced that truth had something to do with correctness, and that correctness had everything to do with unveiling.  But how can one claim that the experience of unveiling ontologically grounds truth when this experience could as easily be described as truth's effect?

Given what has been said, how is it unquestionably possible for Jesus to be 'the Truth'?   Moreover, if Jesus is identified with God's self-revelation, then how can that revelation be true?   The standard move here is to distinguish between the objective, historical process of revelation and the subjective interpretation of that revelation.  (One might claim a la Pannenberg that a distinction holds between the "outer revelation" and the "inspiration" as the interpretation of these events in the Biblical witnesses.)  While the first is putatively non-propositional, the second is not.  But what is it to be a manifestation of God in and through historical events, that is, in and through particular things?  Furthermore, how could such a manifestation be non-linguistic?  If Stacia is a "true friend," but Bob is not, then what is it about Stacia that distinguishes her over and against Bob; what is that "it" that is not in principle capturable by language?

Twentieth century theology, in its effort to escape the "propositional theory of truth" with respect to divine revelation - - the generally-regarded spurious claim that divine revelation is an impartation of information -- seems to lurch into a semantic crevasse of vanquished lucidity.   Simply put, one  does not know what one is talking about when discoursing about a revelation that is in principle non-propositional.   That God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself could, after all, be true, but what is true is the fact that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.  A revelation that cannot be expressed as fact is finally too amorphous to be revelatory; such a revelation is ultimately a night in which all cows are black.