Disputatio XVII: De Modeling et Veritate Theologica

On Modeling and Theological Truth

Modeling theologicum est actus interpretationis, quo lingua fidei (T) inseritur in ordinem entis per Spiritum, ut veritas divina in forma creata repraesentetur. Veritas theologica non est solum correspondentia, sed participatio: modelum est locus in quo significatio finita communicat cum veritate infinita.

Theological modeling is the act of interpretation by which the language of faith T is inserted into the order of being through the Spirit, so that divine truth is represented in created form. Theological truth is not mere correspondence but participation: the model is the site where finite meaning communicates with infinite truth.

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Thesis

Modeling in theology mediates between the formal structure of faith’s language and the reality of divine being. It is the Spirit’s interpretive act by which finite expressions are rendered adequate to divine truth. Thus, theological truth arises when the language of faith is modeled within ontological participation—when speech and being converge under the causality of the Spirit.

Locus classicus

“Your word is truth.” — John 17:17

Christ’s prayer identifies divine Word and truth as one. The Word does not describe truth; it is truth. Theological modeling, therefore, is the interpretive participation of human language in this divine Word — the act by which theology’s finite words are aligned to the infinite truth they confess.

Explicatio

The term modeling in theology designates the act of relating T, the formal language of faith, to its referent in divine reality.
Earlier disputationes established that:

• T (Disputationes I–V) is syntactical and governed by felicity,

• divine causality (VI–VII) ensures the real participation of creaturely being in God, and

• divine intentionality (X–XVI) grounds meaning and language in God’s own communicative act.

Modeling now unites these strands. It is the Spirit’s work of translation from grammar to ontology, from faith’s finite speech to divine being.

To model theology is not to construct analogies from below but to interpret forms given from above. Every theological model is a finite schema through which divine truth is made intelligible without being exhausted.

Formally (and then explained):

• Let T = the language of faith.

• Let M = the ontological model interpreting T.

• Let FT = the felicity conditions under which speech is rightly ordered.

• Let TC = the truth conditions under which that speech corresponds to being.

The structural relation:

FT + M → TC means that when faith’s language is interpreted within a Spirit-formed ontological model, its felicity becomes truth. In simpler terms: theological modeling is the Spirit’s way of making language true.

This makes theology’s truth participatory rather than merely propositional. A model does not “mirror” God as a copy but “shares” in God as a participation. Its adequacy is analogical: it communicates divine truth in finite mode.

Thus, the veritas theologica is always twofold — immanent within the model and transcendent beyond it. No model contains God, yet each true model signifies and participates in God’s truth.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. According the the logical positivist tradition of Ayer and Carnap, theological models cannot, by definition, be verified or falsified by experience. They are neither analytic nor synthetic propositions but expressions of emotion or moral attitude. Modeling such language formally only disguises its non-cognitive nature. To call theological models “true” is to misuse the word “truth.”

Obiectio II. According to George Lindbeck and post-liberal theology, 
religious language functions like grammar within a community of faith. Modeling theology in reference to divine reality reintroduces an outdated representationalism. Theological statements are true when they coherently express the community’s faith, not when they correspond to an external metaphysical domain. Truth is intra-linguistic, not ontological.

Obiectio III. The analytic realism of Alston or Swineburn would likely argue that model-theoretic semantics, by abstracting theological assertions into formal systems, actually removes them from their epistemic grounding in revelation and evidence. Theology must rest on propositional revelation and rational inference, not on semantic or metaphysical models. Modeling may aid clarity but cannot determine truth.

Obiectio IV. The process and open theism of Hartshorne might object that modeling presupposes static ontology and determinate truth conditions, but God and creation exist in dynamic relation. If the divine reality itself is temporal and evolving, theological models that aim for determinate truth are conceptually obsolete. Truth in theology should be relational and open-ended, not formalized and fixed.

Obiectio V. Postmodern constructivism, e.g., Jean-François Lyotard and Mark C. Taylor argues that all models are human constructs reflecting power, history, and language. Theological “models” therefore reveal only the imagination of believers, not divine reality. There is no metalanguage of truth, only competing narratives. To speak of Spirit-grounded modeling is to mask human construction in theological authority.

Responsiones

Ad I. Logical positivism’s verification principle undermines itself, being neither analytic nor empirically verifiable. Theological models, by contrast, are truth-apt within the ontological domain established by revelation. They are not empirical hypotheses but formal articulations of divine causality and participation. Truth here is not observational but metaphysical—an adequation between language and the divine act of being. The Spirit secures this adequation by constituting reference: the link between the finite symbol and the infinite reality it signifies.

Ad II. Post-liberal coherence captures the communal form of theology but not its referential depth. The Church’s grammar is Spirit-constituted, not self-enclosed. Modeling theology does not abandon grammar; it explicates how grammatical felicity opens onto truth.
Theological statements are true not merely because the community authorizes them but because the Spirit interprets them into ontological reality. Modeling thus bridges communal coherence (felicity) and divine correspondence (truth).

Ad III. Analytic realism is correct in affirming propositional truth, but theological propositions derive their meaning from participation, not mere correspondence. Model-theoretic structure preserves formal rigor while accommodating the transcendence of its referent.
Revelation supplies the data; modeling orders it logically and ontologically. Truth in theology is not confined to human inference but extends to divine causation: the Spirit ensures that models do not merely describe revelation but participate in its act.

Ad IV. Process theology rightly emphasizes relationality, but divine relationality is not temporal becoming; it is the eternal act of self-communication. The Spirit’s causality is continuous, not evolutionary.
Theological models do not freeze divine life into static concepts; they describe stable relations of participation within the dynamic plenitude of God. Truth in theology remains determinate because God’s being is faithful—unchanging in love though living in relation.

Ad V. Postmodern constructivism exposes the finitude of all discourse, but theology interprets this finitude as the very site of divine communication. The Spirit’s presence does not negate historical contingency but transfigures it.Theological models are indeed human in form, yet divine in authorization. Their truth is pneumatic: God speaks in and through finite structures of meaning.To deny all meta-language is itself a meta-linguistic claim; theological realism acknowledges limitation without surrendering truth. The Spirit makes human language capable of transcendence.

Nota

Modeling theology is the grammar of divine realism. It allows theology to speak truthfully of God without collapsing into empiricism or fideism. Each formal model M interprets the language of faith within an ontological environment of participation, where the believer’s predicates correspond to divine correlates:

D_G → D, where D_G denotes a divine property (e.g., goodness in God) and D its participated correlate in the believer.

This relation, mediated by the Spirit, ensures that theology’s language does not float above reality but is anchored in divine causation. Hence, modeling is not speculative construction but a mode of communion: the structured correspondence of word and being within divine speech itself.

The Church, as communitas interpretans, lives within this modeling process. Its doctrine, liturgy, and confession are the Spirit’s ongoing interpretation of divine truth into the finite forms of history.
Theology’s models thus evolve not by invention but by the Spirit’s continual translation of the one Word into ever-new horizons of intelligibility.

In this sense, the entire economy of revelation can be described as a divine modeling of truth in time — the Word becoming flesh, history, and sacrament.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Modeling in theology is the Spirit’s act of relating faith’s language T to divine being, rendering it true through participation.

2. Theological truth is participatory, not merely representational: the model is a locus of communion between finite meaning and infinite reality.

3. The multiplicity of models reflects the analogical fullness of divine truth, not its relativism.

4. The Spirit mediates all modeling, ensuring coherence between felicity (right speaking) and truth (real being).

5. Theology thus achieves realism without idolatry: its words do not replace God but share in His communication.

Disputatio XIV: De Intensione et Intentione in Discurso Theologico

On Intension and Intention in Theological Discourse

In theologia, intensio designat participationem sermonis in veritate quam significat; intentio autem exprimit motum Spiritus quo sermo et cognoscens ordinantur ad Deum. Utraque, intensio et intentio, constituunt duplicem structuram loquelae theologicae: formam significationis et actum directionis.

In theology, intension designates the participation of speech in the truth it signifies, while intention expresses the motion of the Spirit by which speech and knower are directed toward God. Together, intension and intention constitute the dual structure of theological discourse: the form of meaning and the act of orientation.

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Thesis

Theological discourse is doubly ordered: by intension, which expresses the participation of language in divine meaning, and by intention, which expresses the Spirit’s orientation of that language toward its divine referent. The integrity of theology depends on the harmony of these two—form and direction—so that what theology says and why it says it coincide in one act of faith.

Locus classicus

“We have the mind of Christ.” — 1 Corinthians 2:16

The Apostle here unites cognition and orientation. To have the “mind of Christ” is not merely to possess concepts but to be inwardly directed by the Spirit toward God’s will. Theology’s truth lies not only in the content of its assertions but in the intention that animates them.

Explicatio

In Disputatio XIII, we described intension as the participatory depth of theological meaning—language sharing in what it signifies. Here we extend that insight to the act of speaking and knowing. For theology, meaning without intention is incomplete: truth must be not only known but loved.

In scholastic logic, intensio and intentio are etymologically linked: both derive from intendere, “to stretch toward.” Yet they differ by aspect. Intensio describes the form or structure of meaning—the way predicates are “stretched” around their content. Intentio describes the movement of the mind and will toward the object known.

In theology, these two are inseparable because language itself is pneumatic—it exists as motion toward God. The Spirit not only grants meaning but directs that meaning toward its divine end.

Formally, we may represent this (and then explain it):

• Let I(p) denote the intension of a theological predicate p, its form of meaning through participation in divine reality.

• Let T(p) denote the intention of that same predicate, its pneumatic direction toward God as ultimate referent.

• The relation I(p) → T(p) means: the Spirit completes meaning by drawing it toward God; the truth of theology depends not only on what a term means but on the divine orientation of its use.

Thus, theological language is teleological: it moves from signification to communion, from word to worship. To speak theologically is to let the Spirit align one’s words and will toward the divine horizon.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. In Cartesian mentalism, meaning and intention are properties of individual minds. Intension is the concept contained within thought; intention is the mind’s act of directing that concept to an object. To introduce the Holy Spirit as the cause of either collapses epistemic autonomy. Theological intention should be understood psychologically, not metaphysically.

Obiectio II. According to empiricist semantics, language functions through public usage, not inner intention. Meaning is determined by observable linguistic conventions, not by subjective acts. Theological appeals to “Spirit-inspired intention” introduce unverifiable metaphysical claims that add nothing to semantic explanation.

Obiectio III. According to Wittgensteinian use theory, within the community of faith, intention is simply conformity to use: the believer “means” what the Church means. Talk of divine authorization or participation misrepresents grammar as metaphysics. Theological statements gain their sense from practice, not from invisible intentions.

Obiectio IV. Kantian moral theology holds that intention belongs to the moral will, not to cognition. Theology confuses ethical intention—obedience to the moral law—with epistemic intention, directedness of thought. Revelation does not supply new cognitive content but moral motivation. Therefore, intention in theology should be understood ethically, not cognitively or ontologically.

Obiectio V. In postmodern deconstruction every act of meaning is contaminated by différance; intention never coincides with expression. To claim that in theology, intention and intension converge through the Spirit, is to reassert the metaphysics of presence. Divine authorization cannot close the gap between saying and meaning without abolishing the play of signification that makes language possible.

Responsiones

Ad I. Cartesian mentalism confines meaning to private consciousness, but theology begins not with the isolated mind but with the communicative act of God. The Spirit does not override cognition but grounds it: divine causality constitutes the possibility of theological intention. The human mind does not direct itself toward God; it is drawn. The Spirit is not a competitor to thought but the condition under which finite intentionality becomes genuinely God-directed.

Ad II. Empiricism rightly demands public criteria for meaning, yet the Church’s public language is itself the manifestation of divine causality. The Spirit’s work is not a hidden supplement to convention but the ontological ground of convention’s truth. Without the Spirit, the same words remain grammatically correct but theologically empty. Pneumatological intention is therefore the difference between talking about God and being addressed by God in one’s speech.

Ad III. Wittgenstein’s insight—that the grammar of faith determines the sense of theological language—is essential, but the Church’s grammar is not self-sustaining. The Spirit animates its use, converting communal form into divine act. Intention in theology is not reducible to usage; it is the Spirit’s actualization of use as confession. Grammar defines possibility; the Spirit realizes actuality.

Ad IV. Kant separates moral from cognitive intention, but in revelation the two are one: to know God is to will the good, and to will the good is to participate in God’s knowing. The Spirit unites intellect and will in a single movement of faith. Theological intention is thus both moral and epistemic—a mode of participation in divine self-knowledge.

Ad V. Deconstruction rightly reveals the instability of finite language, but theology interprets this not as nihilism but as sign of creaturely dependence. The Spirit does not erase différance but sanctifies it, making difference the very medium of communion. The Word becomes flesh not by annihilating finitude but by filling it. In theological discourse, intention and intension coincide not by closure but by grace: finite language becomes true without ceasing to be finite.

Nota

The dual structure of theological discourse mirrors the Incarnation itself. Just as the Word assumes human nature without destroying it, so divine meaning assumes human intention without abolishing freedom.

The intensio of theology ensures formal integrity: its words participate truly in divine realities. The intentio ensures final orientation: those same words are directed toward praise and communion.

We can imagine this schematically:

Intensio → Intentio → Gloria
meaning leads to direction, direction to glorification.

Thus, theology is not only a science of statements but a discipline of sanctified desire. Its language must mean truly and move rightly. Where intension is severed from intention, theology becomes formalism; where intention eclipses intension, it becomes enthusiasm. Only the Spirit holds the two in unity.

This unity also resolves the ancient tension between speculative and practical theology. The speculative intellect (intensio) contemplates truth; the practical will (intentio) seeks the good. In the Spirit, contemplation and love converge. To know God is to be oriented toward God; to be oriented toward God is already to know Him.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Theological discourse possesses a double structure: intensio, the participatory form of meaning, and intentio, the pneumatic orientation of that meaning toward God.

2. These are distinct yet inseparable: the Spirit who gives form to meaning also directs it to its divine end.

3. The truth of theology lies not merely in the correctness of propositions but in the sanctity of their direction—their being spoken toward God.

4. Human reason and will participate in this double causality: reason shares in divine truth, and will shares in divine charity.

5. Thus, theology is both contemplative and doxological: to understand God rightly is already to be drawn into the praise of God.

Disputatio XIII: De Intensione et Modeling Linguae Theologicae

On Intension and the Modeling of Theological Language

Intensio in theologia non est mera conceptio mentis, sed forma participationis, qua sermo fidelis participat in re ipsa de qua loquitur. Modeling theologicum est interpretatio huius intensionalis structurae intra ordinem entis, quo verbum fidei inseritur in veritatem ontologicam causatam a Spiritu.

Intension in theology is not merely a mental conception but a mode of participation by which faithful speech shares in the very reality it names. Theological modeling is the interpretation of this intensional structure within the order of being, through which the word of faith is inserted into the ontological truth caused by the Spirit.

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Thesis

The intension of theological language expresses the way in which meaning and being coinhere through participation. Modeling is the act by which these intensional forms are interpreted within ontological structures, so that theology’s speech corresponds to divine reality. Thus, intensionality grounds the realism of theology’s models: words mean what they mean because they share, analogically, in what they signify.

Locus classicus

“My word that goes out from my mouth shall not return to me empty, but shall accomplish that which I purpose.” — Isaiah 55:11

Here the Word of God is not a sign that points to something absent, but a living act that accomplishes what it names. The divine Word is intensional in the highest sense: its meaning and its effect coincide. Theology’s task is to reflect this coincidence within the limits of human language.

Explicatio

In ordinary logic, intension refers to the content or concept of a term—what it signifies internally—while extension refers to the set of things to which it applies. In theology, however, intension cannot be reduced to mere conceptual content, for the meaning of divine terms arises from participation in the realities they signify.

When theology says “Deus est bonus” (“God is good”), the term bonus has an intension that differs fundamentally from its use in secular discourse. Its meaning is not abstracted from experience but given through participation in divine goodness itself. The Spirit mediates this participation, so that human predicates acquire analogical depth.

Let us represent this symbolically (and immediately explain):

• Let I(p) denote the intension of a theological predicate p—its interior content as informed by participation in divine reality.

• Let M(p) denote the modeling of that predicate—the interpretation of p within an ontological framework of being. The relation I(p) → M(p) expresses that theological modeling extends the meaning (intension) of language into ontology; what faith means, ontology makes real.

Hence, modeling theology is not constructing analogies externally but recognizing that the intensional life of faith’s language already participates in the realities to which it refers.

Theological predicates are therefore intensional in a deeper sense than philosophical ones: their meanings are not closed concepts but open participations. Each name of God carries within it a structural reference to divine causality. To speak truly of God is to allow the intension of language to become a site of encounter, where meaning and being converge.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. Aristotle and his scholastic heirs maintain the position of Aristotelian realism, the view that the meaning of predicates is exhausted by their extension to real things. Intension adds nothing to ontology. To analyze theological predicates intensionally—as if their sense exceeded their reference—is to introduce needless abstraction. The meaning of “God is good” is simply that God instantiates goodness; no intensional layer is needed.

Obiectio II. From the standpoint of empiricist verificationalism, all meaningful statements are either empirically verifiable or analytically true. Theological predicates refer to no empirically testable properties and therefore lack cognitive meaning. Model-theoretic “interpretation” of such terms merely disguises their non-referential status under formal symbols. To construct intensional models for theology is to rationalize what is semantically empty.

Obiectio III. Following later Wittgenstein, meaning arises from use within a linguistic form of life (Lebensform). To model theological language formally or intensionally is to misunderstand its grammar. The meaning of “grace,” “sin,” or “Spirit” lies in their practical employment within worship and life, not in their reference to divine properties or in hypothetical models. Modeling theology as if it described an external reality mistakes liturgical use for scientific representation.

Obiectio IV. Contemporary analytic semantics often treats meaning extensionally, defining reference via truth conditions over possible worlds. Since divine reality is not empirically accessible or multiply realizable across worlds, theological language cannot admit of model-theoretic interpretation without violating the principle of extensional adequacy. Theology should confine itself to moral or metaphorical discourse rather than claim intensional reference to the divine.

Obiectio V. George Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic model asserts that theological statements are true insofar as they cohere with the community’s grammar. There is no external domain into which they must be modeled. To introduce an intensional semantics for theology is to reintroduce representational realism and to confuse the performative, intra-ecclesial truth of faith with philosophical speculation.

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Responsiones

Ad I. Aristotelian realism rightly grounds meaning in real being but overlooks the form of participation by which finite predicates relate to divine reality. In theology, predication is not univocal: “God is good” does not signify an extensionally shared property but an analogical relation between divine perfection and finite concept. Intensional analysis captures this formal relation—it models the way predicates point beyond their finite instantiations toward infinite fulfillment. Thus, intensional semantics safeguards the analogia fidei: a structure of participation rather than mere attribution.

Ad II. Empiricist verificationism confuses empirical access with cognitive meaning. Theological terms are cognitively meaningful within the ontology of participation: they refer not by sense-data but by divine causality. Model-theoretic interpretation supplies the formal correlate of this claim. It shows that theological language can be given structured domains and interpretation functions consistent with its own rules of felicity. Intensional models do not disguise emptiness; they make explicit the structure of theological reference within divine reality.

Ad III. Wittgenstein’s insight that meaning depends on use is valid at the pragmatic level but incomplete. Theological use is itself grounded in divine authorization. The Spirit makes the Church’s grammar not merely functional but truth-bearing. Modeling theology intensionally does not deny use; it articulates the inner logic by which use participates in divine meaning. The grammar of faith is a finite surface of an infinite semantics. Without such modeling, theology remains descriptively sociological rather than truth-apt.

Ad IV. Extensional semantics suffices for empirical domains but not for theological ones, where reference involves hyperintensional distinctions between formally equivalent but ontologically distinct predicates (e.g., “Creator” and “Redeemer”). Theology must operate at the intensional level because divine properties relate analogically, not extensionally. Model-theoretic analysis extends semantics beyond possible worlds to the domain of divine possibility, the space of God’s communicative acts. Hence, intensional modeling is not optional but necessary for theology’s realism.

Ad V. Post-liberal coherence captures the communal form of theology but lacks the means to account for its truth. Theological language does not merely describe communal life; it claims participation in divine reality. Model-theoretic interpretation provides a way to express that claim rigorously. By mapping the formal language of theology (T) into an ontological domain structured by participation, it unites communal felicity (FT) with divine truth-conditions (TC). Intensionality here serves realism: it formalizes the link between faith’s grammar and God’s being.

Nota

Intensionality in theology reveals the deep correspondence between divine and human discourse. Just as the Word of God contains within itself both meaning and being—significatio et effectus—so theological speech, animated by the Spirit, partakes in that same structure.

In model-theoretic terms, theological language is not a static set of propositions but a living model in which predicates participate in the realities they denote. When theology says “Christ is Lord,” this is not a metaphor to be verified externally; it is a confession whose intension already shares in Christ’s lordship through the Spirit.

Modeling thus performs a theological epistemology of incarnation: finite words filled with infinite content, formal structure suffused with divine causality. In this sense, modeling does not invent theology’s truth but explicates it—it unfolds the internal participation already latent in theological meaning.

Hence, to study theology’s intension is to trace how language itself becomes sacramental: a sign whose signification and grace coincide.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Intension in theology signifies participation: the inward meaning of a theological term is its share in divine reality.

2. Modeling interprets these intensional forms within an ontological framework, revealing how language and being correspond through the Spirit.

3. The Spirit is the cause of this correspondence, uniting signification (intensio) and reality (veritas) without confusion.

4. Theological precision arises not from limiting meaning but from its right participation in the divine.

5. Therefore, the intension of theology’s language is itself a locus of revelation: the Word that makes meaning also makes being, and modeling is the act by which this unity is rendered intelligible.

Disputatio X: De Revelatione et Cognitione Dei

On Revelation and Knowledge of God

Revelatio est actus ipsius Dei se manifestantis, non per deductionem rationis sed per communicationem Spiritus. Cognitio Dei non oritur ex speculatione humana, sed ex participatione in Verbo revelato. Hic actus cognoscendi est simul passio et donum: Deus cognoscitur in ipso actu quo se revelat.

Revelation is God’s own act of self-manifestation—not the result of human deduction but the gift of the Spirit’s communication. Knowledge of God does not arise from human speculation but from participation in the revealed Word. This act of knowing is at once reception and grace: God is known in the very act by which He reveals Himself.

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Thesis

True knowledge of God (cognitio Dei) occurs only within revelation. Revelation is not the transmission of information about God but the divine act in which God gives Himself to be known. Hence, theology is not reflection upon an object but participation in a subject—the divine Word who both reveals and knows Himself.

Locus classicus

“No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.” — Matthew 11:27

Here the Lord Himself locates all knowledge of God within His own life: revelation is reciprocal communion between Father, Son, and those brought into that communion by the Spirit. To know God is to share in God’s own knowing.

Explicatio

Revelation and cognition in theology are not parallel processes but one act viewed from two sides. When God reveals, He does not merely disclose propositions; He grants participation in His own self-understanding.

In the natural order of knowing, the subject apprehends an object. In revelation, the human knower is taken up into the act of divine self-knowledge. This is why revelation cannot be grasped through detached speculation. To know God is to be drawn into God’s own interpretive act—the Son’s eternal vision of the Father made present by the Spirit.

We may express this structurally (and then explain it):

• Let R represent revelation, the act of divine self-disclosure.

• Let K_h represent human knowledge of God, and K_d divine self-knowledge.
  The theological relation K_h ← R → K_d means: human knowing of God arises from and participates in divine knowing through revelation. The arrows indicate that revelation is the mediating act linking the two, not a neutral transmission.

Thus, the nova lingua theologiae (developed in Disputatio IX) is the very medium of revelation’s occurrence. God speaks in human words, and in those words He both gives Himself and illumines human understanding. This is why theology’s language must be both faithful to its divine source and humble in its human form—it carries the mystery of divine cognition within finite utterance.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. According to an empiricist epistemology, knowing God by revelation is impossible, because genuine knowledge requires sensory data or empirical verification. Since God is invisible and transcendent, a claim to divine revelation or cognition cannot meet the criteria of knowledge. Hence theology’s claim to knowledge of God is at best symbolic or metaphorical, not genuine cognition.

Obiectio II. If God is all-knowing, all-powerful and perfectly loving, then one would expect full clarity in divine revelation, so that human beings would know God unmistakably. Yet human experience is marked by ambiguity, dispute over revelation, and even ignorance of God’s being. Therefore the claim that God reveals Himself such that human cognition genuinely knows Him is doubtful.

Obiectio III. On the model of Karl Barth, revelation is not an object-of-knowledge but a divine event that confronts the human subject. One cannot therefore speak of “cognition of God” in the standard sense (as knowing a thing) when it comes to God. Theology must witness this event, not claim propositional knowledge. Thus the doctrine of cognition of God seems to import human epistemic categories into theology illegitimately.

Obiectio IV. Drawing on the apophatic tradition, one holds that God’s essence is utterly transcendent and beyond human concepts. Any attempt to speak of cognition of God risks projecting finite categories onto the infinite. Revelation may indicate God’s presence, but cognition of God qua God remains impossible. Theology must affirm unknowing rather than knowing.

Obiectio V. According to post-modern constructivist theology, our concepts of God are culturally, linguistically and historically conditioned. “Revelation” and “knowledge of God” are thus human constructions, not transcendent disclosures. To speak of cognition of God presumes universality of epistemic access which overlooks the diversity of human situatedness.

Responsiones

Ad I. While it is true that empirical knowledge depends on sensory input and verification, knowledge of God by revelation belongs to a different epistemic order, that of divine self-communication. God does not become an object among others but enters human cognition through the act of the Spirit. Thus revelation is not mere metaphor but the grounding of the cognitive relation: God authorises the knowing by revealing Himself. Human cognition remains finite and mediated, yet genuinely knows God insofar as it participates in the divine self-communication.

Ad II. The hiddenness of God and the ambiguity of human reception are real. Yet they do not negate that God reveals Himself; rather they indicate the finitude of human cognition and the mystery of divine freedom. Revelation is genuine, but its reception always occurs within historical, cultural, and existential constraints. Theology acknowledges the partiality of our knowledge (cf. “we see in a mirror dimly”) while affirming that cognition of God is possible because God discloses Himself. The fact that human cognition is limited does not show that cognition is impossible—instead it shows that the mode of cognition is participatory and mediated, not autonomous.

Ad III. Barth rightly emphasises revelation as event rather than object; theology is witness. Yet recognising revelation as event does not preclude cognition of God. The divine event triggers the cognitive relation: God speaks, human hearing occurs, understanding responds. Theology’s cognition of God is therefore event-grounded and relational rather than purely conceptual. The “object” known is not a thing outside but the living God who reveals. Thus knowledge of God remains propositional in one sense (we can speak truly of God) but always contextualised in the revelatory act.

Ad IV. The apophatic tradition protects the transcendence of God, but must be balanced with the cataphatic: God reveals Himself in ways we can know. The doctrine of cognition of God must affirm that while God’s essence remains ineffable, He reveals Himself truly in His acts and Word. Revelation does not exhaust God’s being but gives genuine knowledge of Him as He wills to be known. Theology holds that human cognition knows God analogically: we do not fully capture His essence, yet we know Him truly given His self-disclosure.

Ad V. Constructivism draws attention to the mediation of language and culture in theology—but revelation critiques and transcends those mediations. Knowing God by revelation means that human frameworks are not the origin of theology’s truth but the occasion for divine self-communication. Theology remains culturally embodied, yet its claim to knowledge is not simply human-constructed—it rests on God’s act of revealing. Therefore cognition of God is not eliminated by cultural mediation; instead it is enabled by the Spirit working within human contexts.

Nota

Revelation (revelatio) and knowledge (cognitio) form a single circle of divine communication. God reveals in order to be known, and He is known only in the revealing. This mutuality is the structure of the Trinitarian economy: the Father reveals through the Son; the Spirit causes that revelation to be received as knowledge within believers.

In the economy of faith, the Word that reveals becomes also the form of human knowing. Hence the ancient formula, fides quaerens intellectum (“faith seeking understanding”), describes not curiosity but participation: faith already contains understanding implicitly because it shares in the divine act of self-knowing.

If we recall earlier symbolic language, Tₙ, the “new language of theology,” is the linguistic body of revelation. Within this language, every true statement about God is a double movement:

• from God to man (revelation, grace descending), and

• from man to God (understanding, faith ascending).
  These two movements coincide in the Spirit, the living bridge of knowledge.

Thus, theology is not about God as distant object but about God in actu loquendi et cognoscendi—in the very act of speaking and knowing Himself within us.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Revelation is God’s own self-disclosure, not information about God but the communication of God Himself.

2. Knowledge of God (cognitio Dei) arises within this act of revelation as participation in divine self-knowing.

3. The Spirit mediates this communion, enabling the human mind to know God by sharing analogically in God’s own knowledge of Himself.

4. The nova lingua theologiae is the linguistic form of revelation—finite words rendered luminous by divine presence.

5. Therefore, theology’s cognitive act is not speculative but participatory: to know God is to dwell within the Word that both reveals and knows.

Disputatio IX: De Nova Lingua Theologiae

On the New Language of Theology

Nova lingua theologiae orta est ex ipsa Incarnatione Verbi, qua Deus intravit humanam loquelam et eam in se assumpsit. Haec lingua, Spiritu Sancto sustentata, est finita forma veritatis infinitae, in qua sermo humanus efficitur instrumentum divinae communicationis.

The new language of theology arises from the Incarnation itself, in which God entered human speech and assumed it into Himself. Sustained by the Holy Spirit, this language is the finite form of infinite truth in which human words become the instrument of divine communication.

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Thesis

Theology speaks in a nova lingua, a new language born from the Incarnation and animated by the Holy Spirit. This language is finite in form yet infinite in meaning, because divine truth now dwells within human words. The nova lingua is therefore the linguistic expression of the Incarnation itself: the Word made flesh becomes the Word made speech.

Locus classicus

“And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth.” — John 1:14

The Incarnation is simultaneously an event of being and of language. The eternal Word does not merely assume human nature, but also assumes human speech. Through this act, the structure of human language is transfigured into a medium capable of bearing divine truth.

Explicatio

Theology’s language is not simply inherited from the old world but is reborn through the Word made flesh. In the old grammar of reason, contradiction signified error; in the new grammar of faith, contradiction becomes revelation. The nova lingua is thus a theological grammar where God is known sub contrario, under the sign of what appears its opposite.

Luther called this transformation a “new grammar” (nova grammatica), for one must learn to say that God is hidden in weakness, that death is life, that the cross is glory. This is not mere rhetoric but a new logic of being. In the nova lingua, the syntax of heaven passes into the phonemes of earth.

Formally, we can describe the change in this way: Let Tₒ denote the old language (the grammar of nature and reason) and Tₙ the new language (the grammar of faith). The transition Tₒ → Tₙ represents the Spirit’s act of translating finite speech into a vessel of divine meaning. This arrow does not mark replacement but transfiguration: what was merely human becomes theophanic through grace.

The nova lingua therefore bears within itself an inherent tension; it is simultaneously grammatical and miraculous. It possesses rules of form and order (syntax) yet overflows them through divine content (semantics). New wineskin is needed to hold new wine. To speak theologically is to live within this paradox of incarnation: finite speech filled with infinite truth.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. If theology requires a nova lingua, it implies that ordinary human language is inadequate to speak of God, making revelation unintelligible to natural reason.

Obiectio II. A “new grammar” seems to introduce irrationality into theology, reducing faith to paradox and contradiction.

Obiectio III. If God assumes human language, divine truth becomes bound to history and culture, losing universality.

Responsiones

Ad I. Ordinary language is not destroyed but assumed. The nova lingua transforms the old. The Incarnation does not render reason obsolete; it fulfills it, giving speech a deeper telos. The words of faith remain human, but their authorization comes from the Spirit, not from philosophical sufficiency.

Ad II. The new grammar is not irrational but hyper-rational. It is an order of meaning higher than human logic can generate. Paradox is not nonsense; it is sanctified tension, revealing the finite’s openness to the infinite. The “contradictions” of faith are signs that reason has touched mystery.

Ad III. The Word’s entry into history does not limit truth but universalizes it. By assuming particular speech, God redeems all speech. The universality of the gospel is secured precisely in its historical concreteness: the eternal speaks within the temporal.

Nota

The nova lingua of theology is not merely new vocabulary but new being-in-speech. It marks the union of divine causality and human language. To speak in this language is already to participate in God’s self-communication.

Its structure mirrors the Incarnation:

• Finite form: human grammar, word order, syntax.

• Infinite content: divine meaning, given by the Spirit.

• Mediating act: the Spirit’s authorization (felicity) that makes the finite capable of bearing the infinite.

Thus, each true theological statement is a microcosm of the Word made flesh. The finite (word) does not contain the infinite (God), yet it truly conveys it, because the Spirit joins them without confusion or separation.

The nova lingua does not function as a metalanguage standing above the old order of speech but as a new object language born within it. Through the Spirit, the old grammar of reason is inverted into the new grammar of faith. What was formerly sign of absence becomes sign of presence; what once denoted defeat now names victory. The nova lingua thus transforms rather than transcends the old: it is human speech re-created in the form of divine contradiction.

This linguistic participation is not accidental to theology; it is its very essence. Theology exists only because divine communication has entered human speech.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. The nova lingua of theology arises from the Incarnation, where divine meaning assumes human form.

2. This new language is finite in grammar yet infinite in signification, sustained by the Spirit’s act of authorization.

3. The grammar of faith (Tₙ) both fulfills and transfigures the grammar of reason (Tₒ), producing a linguistic structure in which opposites become sites of revelation.

4. The Spirit functions as the mediating cause of this transformation, making theological language both truthful and efficacious.

5. Theology’s nova lingua is thus the ongoing miracle of Pentecost—the continual creation of meaning whereby human words, caught up in grace, speak the infinite Word.