Disputatio LIV: De Hyperintensionalitate Divinae Operationis:

 

On the Hyperintensionality of Divine Action

Quaeritur

Utrum actus divini, quoad identitatem, formam, et rationem essendi, non possint explicari per extensionalem aequivalentiam, modalem necessitationem, vel possibilia mundorum, sed sint essentialiter hyperintensionales; et utrum veritas theologica requirat talem hyperintensionalitatem ut Deus cognoscatur secundum actum, non secundum eventum.

Whether the identity and form of divine acts can be explained by extensional equivalence, modal necessity, or possible-world semantics, or whether they are essentially hyperintensional; and whether theological truth requires such hyperintensionality so that God is known according to the act God performs, not merely according to an outcome.

Thesis

Divine acts are hyperintensional. By this we mean that the identity of a divine act cannot be captured by any framework in which acts are considered the same whenever they yield the same outcomes, share the same extension, or hold necessarily across all possible worlds. A divine act is not defined by its effects, nor by the set of circumstances under which it occurs, nor by its modal profile. Instead, a divine act is individuated by its formal identity within the Logos, by the specific constitutive act through which the Logos brings a res into being or presence, and by the Spirit’s concrete donation of that act to creatures.

Thus, extension does not capture divine identity,modal equivalence does not capture divine identity, and possible-world semantics is too coarse-grained to describe divine agency. A hyperintensional account alone preserves the theological conviction that God’s acts are personal, irreducible, and internally differentiated modes of the one divine life.

Locus Classicus

1. Exodus 3:14 — אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה

“I AM WHO I AM.”

This is not a definition, but an identity of act. Being itself is hyperintensional, for it names a unique form of divine acting, not a property instantiated across possible worlds.

2. John 5:19 — ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ

“Whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise.”

The divine act is not duplicated or numerically separable. Rather, its identity is internal to the Trinity, not extensionalized in effects.

3. Athanasius, Contra Arianos I.21

ὁμοούσιος οὐ κατὰ θέλησιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν.
“Of one being not by will but by nature.”

The divine act is identical with divine being; it is an identity finer than any modal equivalence.

4. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium

Οὐ τὰ γινόμενα, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἐνεργείας τὴν διαφοράν ποιεῖ.
“It is not the outcomes, but the manner of operation that makes the distinction.”

This is a classical statement of hyperintensionality clearly stating that the manner by which something obtains profoundly matters.

5. Luther, WA 40/III, 343

“Deus non est causa sicut causae creatae.”
“God is not a cause as created causes are causes.”

Thus God cannot be modeled extensionally.

Explicatio

1. Why extensional identity is inadequate

Extensional identity holds when two expressions apply to precisely the same set of objects. If two predicates pick out exactly the same individuals, classical extensional logic treats them as equivalent. For example, if every creature that is forgiven is also elected, and every creature that is elected is also justified, then these predicates are extensionally equivalent: they have the same extension.

Formally, if for all x, x is forgiven ↔ x is elected and x is elected ↔ x is justified, then the predicates forgiven, elected, and justified are coextensive.

Similarly, in the Spirit’s work, if for all x, x speaks in the Spirit ↔ x has been given the Spirit, and x has been given the Spirit ↔ the Spirit dwells in x, then Spirit-speaking, Spirit-giving, and Spirit-indwelling are extensionally equivalent expressions.

But extensional equivalence tells us nothing about what distinguishes these divine actions in God Himself. Forgiving is not the same divine act as electing, nor is electing the same divine act as justifying. Likewise, the Spirit’s giving, indwelling, and speaking are not identical divine operations simply because they coincide in the believer. Extensional identity collapses formally distinct divine works into a single undifferentiated outcome and therefore cannot serve as the framework for a theology that seeks to speak truthfully of God’s own acting.

2. Why modal equivalence is insufficient

A second temptation is to appeal to modal identity. Accordingly, if two acts occur in every possible world in which God acts toward creatures, or if one cannot conceive God performing one without the other, then they are treated as identical.

Creation and preservation offer a clear example. Classical theology holds that God’s preserving of the creature is nothing other than the continued giving of being. Because no creature could exist for a moment apart from God’s sustaining act, creation and preservation are necessarily coextensive: wherever one occurs, the other is already taking place.

So too with incarnation and redemption. In the Christian confession, the Son becomes incarnate for our salvation, and His incarnate life is unintelligible apart from His redeeming work. One cannot separate them modally, for in every possible description of God’s salvific activity, incarnation and redemption occur together.

Yet modal inseparability does not entail formal identity. Creation and preservation differ in their reason, because one brings being into existence, while the other maintains that being in existence. Incarnation and redemption differ likewise, for one is the assumption of human nature, the other is the reconciling act performed in that nature. Modal equivalence cannot register these distinctions because it treats any necessarily co-occurring acts as identical, thereby losing the finer structure of God’s activity that theology must retain.

3. Why divine acts require hyperintensional individuation

If theology is to speak truthfully, it must be able to say why this particular divine act grounds this theological statement. In our broader account, a theological utterance is true because the Logos performs a determinate act—Λ ⊨* Tₜ. But determinate truth requires determinate action. If divine acts could not be distinguished except by their extensions or modal profiles, then the truthmaker for any theological statement would be some undifferentiated divine activity, and doctrinal distinctions would lose their ontological grounding.

By hyperintensional identity I mean that divine acts differ not by their outcomes or by their modal placement but by their internal form in the Logos—the determinate way God is acting here and not otherwise. This internal form cannot be captured by appeal to effects, extensions, or modal profiles; it belongs to the act as God performs it. Forgiving is formally distinct from electing because each expresses a different aspect of the divine life, even when the same creature receives both. The Spirit’s indwelling is formally distinct from the Spirit’s giving because each arises from a different manner of divine self-communication. Hyperintensionality preserves the integrity of these differences.

4. The Spirit’s donation is hyperintensional

The Spirit does not donate to creatures a general divine presence or a generic divine favor. Instead, the Spirit donates the specific act that God is performing toward the believer. In one moment, this may be forgiveness; in another, consolation; in another, empowerment. The specificity of the Spirit’s donation presupposes a finely articulated structure of divine action in God Himself. Without this specificity, divine presence would become conceptual rather than real, and theology would lose the concreteness of God’s address.

5. Felicity is indexed to particular divine acts

A theological assertion is felicitous only if it corresponds to the act God is performing here and now—an act that is already individuated in God with a hyperintensional precision. The Spirit authorizes not theological grammar in general but this particular word because this particular divine act is being given. Thus the intelligibility of theology depends on a hyperintensional account of divine acting.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to classical extensionalism if two divine acts produce the same effects, they are the same act. If this is so, there is o need for hyperintensional identity.

Ob II: Modal realism holds that if God necessarily performs A and B, then He performs A and B in all possible worlds, and thus A = B. Therefore, modal equivalence suffices in individuation.

Ob III: Thomism claims that since God is simple, all divine actions are identical and distinctions collapse.

Ob IV: Deflationism asserts that hyperintensionality describes linguistic distinction, not metaphysical difference.

Ob V: Postliberalism holds that since all distinctions arise from use within the community, divine action adds nothing.

Responsiones

Ad I: Effects underdetermine cause. Divine acts differ in their formal ratio, not merely in outcome (Gregory of Nyssa). Thus, extension collapses personal identity.

Ad II: Possible-world semantics assumes shared structure with creaturely action. But divine acts exist outside modal ontology; they ground modality rather than inhabit it. God is not a node in a modal structure but its creator.

Ad III: While implicity entails no composition in God, it does not follow that divine acts lack distinct formal identities. The Fathers held simplicity alongside real distinctions of operation.

Ad IV: Hyperintensionality is not linguistic fineness but metaphysical precision. Divine act identity is not a function of language but of participation in the Logos.

Ad V: While usage explains how we talk, it does not identify what God does. Without hyperintensional divine action, grammar loses its anchor in reality.

Nota

Hyperintensionality is the ontological form of God’s personal action. We have seen that constitutive causation (L) requires fine-grained identity; that real presence (LI) is specific, not generic; that donation (LII) concerns a particular res, and that felicity (LIII) authorizes a particular act of creaturely speech. If theological semantics were simply extensional or modal, the Trinity collapses into one role, the sacrament collapses into symbol, revelation collapses into a proposition, grace collapses into an effect, and Christology collapses into monism.

Regarding the Trinity, hyperintensionality preserves the distinction of the trinitarian persons, Christ’s unique acts, sacramental specificity, and the performative depth of divine truth. Simply put, hyperintensionality is not an analytic embellishment but a theological necessity. Without it, we could not preserve the conviction that God acts personally and decisively for the creature, nor could we maintain the integrity of the Gospel’s claim that God’s work is addressed to us in its fullness and specificity.

Determinatio

We have determined that:

1. Divine acts are intrinsically hyperintensional, distinct in their internal form even when extensionally identical.

2. Neither extensional equivalence nor modal necessity suffices to individuate divine action.

3. Hyperintensional identity flows from the Logos’ constitutive act (L) and is made present (LI), donated (LII), and authorized (LIII).

4. Theological truth (Λ ⊨* Tₜ) requires such hyperintensional grounding.

5. Therefore, theology must employ a hyperintensional semantics to speak truly of God.

Transitus ad Disputationem LV: De Intentione Divina et Identitate Actuum in Deo

Having established hyperintensionality in divine action, we proceed to the related question as to how divine intentions are related to divine acts, and how the Logos unifies them without collapsing distinctions. 

Thus, we turn to Disputatio LV: De Intentione Divina: Utrum Intentiones Dei Sint Actus et Quomodo Unitas in Logō Constituitur, where we shall inquire as to whether God’s intentions are identical with His acts, and how the Logos grounds their unity and distinction.

Disputatio LIII: De Felicitate Theologica: Utrum Spiritus Sit Auctor Locutionis Fideli

 On Theological Felicity: Whether the Spirit is the Author of Faithful Speech

Quaeritur

Utrum felicitas locutionis theologicae, id est, rectitudo, auctoritas, et veritas performativa sermonis fidei, non ex intentione vel peritia humana oriatur, sed ex ipso Spiritu Sancto qui loquentem informat, linguam fidei custodiens, purgans, et in Verbo ordinans.

Whether the felicity of theological speech—its rightness, authority, and performative truth—arises not from human intention or rhetorical skill but from the Holy Spirit, who forms the speaker, guards the language of faith, and orders it to the Word.

Thesis

Theological felicity is Spirit-authored rightness of speech. A theological utterance is felicitous not merely when it is grammatically correct or doctrinally sound, but when the Spirit authorizes the speech-act so that the donated referent (Disp. LII), the real presence of the Logos (Disp LI), and the constitutive truth (Disp. L) are joined to the creaturely utterance in one act of fidelis locutio.

Thus: Felicity just in case Spiritus + donatio rei + conformitas ad Verbum. The creature speaks truthfully because the Spirit speaks in, with, and through the creature.

Locus Classicus

1. 1 Corinthians 12:3 — οὐδεὶς δύναται εἰπεῖν· Κύριος Ἰησοῦς, εἰ μὴ ἐν Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ

“No one can say ‘Jesus is Lord’ except in the Holy Spirit.”

Since the simplest and most central Christian confession is impossible without the Spirit, felicity is pneumatic.

2. Romans 8:26 — τὸ Πνεῦμα συναντιλαμβάνεται τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ ἡμῶν

“The Spirit helps us in our weakness… He intercedes with groanings too deep for words.”

The Spirit perfects our speech when our words fail.

3. John 14:26 — ἐκεῖνος διδάξει ὑμᾶς πάντα

“The Spirit will teach you all things and remind you of all that I have said.”

Speech becomes felicitous when it is brought under the teaching and remembrance of the Spirit.

4. Augustine, De Trinitate XV.19

“Spiritus est nexus amoris quo redimus ad Verbum.”
“The Spirit is the bond of love through whom we return to the Word.”

The Spirit links the human speaker to the Word He speaks.

5. Luther, WA 10/3, 14

“Spiritus Sanctus est verus doctor verbi.”
“The Holy Spirit is the true teacher of the Word.”

Preaching is felicitous only as the Spirit’s work.

Explicatio

Disputation LII established that reference is donation, that the Spirit gives the res. But a donated referent is not yet a felicitous assertion because etween having the referent and speaking the truth, another act is required: authorization.

1. Felicity as Pneumatic Authorization

In theological speech, felicity is not merely correctness of syntax, or accuracy of doctrinal formulation, or sincerity of the speaker, or even conceptual clarity. Rather it is the Spirit’s act authorizing the finite speaker to speak in the Word’s order.

2. The Structure of Felicity

Felicity occurs if and only if: 

1. The Logos is present (LI),

2. The Spirit donates the res (LII),

3. And the Spirit authorizes the creaturely utterance so that it properly bears the res.

This is why Paul says:

“We speak not in words taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit” (1 Cor 2:13).

3. Felicity and the Operator Λ ⊨* Tₜ

We must distinguish truth-through-the-Logos (Λ ⊨* Tₜ) and felicity as the Spirit’s ensuring that T is a proper vehicle for Tₜ. 

Thus, a felicitous theological assertion occurs just in case there is a Spirit-gifted word that bears the donated res of the Logos’ presence.

4. Felicity as Participation

To speak felicitously is to participate in the Logos’ act (L), the Logos’ presence (LI), and the Spirit’s donation (LII). Accordingly, human speech is grafted into divine speech.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to the speech act theory of Austin and Searle, felicity conditions are human conventions. Accordingly, no Spirit is needed.

Ob II: Classical Protestant orthodoxy assumes that speech is felicitous when it conforms to orthodox doctrine. If this is so, divine authorization appears unnecessary.

Ob III: Liberal Protestantism claims that truthful speech arises from the authenticity of the speaker’s self-expression. If so, felicity does not require external divine agency.

Ob IV: Contemporary linguistic philosophy supposes that felicity resides in correct rule-following within linguistic practice. Thus, no Spirit is needed for proper language-use.

Ob V: Barthian Theology declares that since human speech is incapable of bearing divine truth, only God’s own speech is true. Therefore, talk of “Spirit-authorized human felicity” is incoherent.

Responsiones

Ad I: Theological felicity cannot be reduced to human convention. The Spirit is not a pragmatic condition but the agent who unites human speech to divine reality, transforming finite utterance into a bearer of the infinite Word.

Ad II: Orthodoxy is necessary but not sufficient. One may confess correct propositions without the Spirit’s life. Felicity requires authorization, not merely accuracy.

Ad III: Authenticity is indexical to the self; felicity is ordered to the Logos. Theological speech is not self-expression but participation in divine speech.

Ad IV: Grammar governs internal form; felicity concerns divine empowerment.The Spirit gives a speech-act not only correctness but truth-bearing capacity.

Ad V: Barth rightly insists that God alone reveals—but the Spirit makes human words vehicles of that revelation. Felicity is the mode in which God’s speech becomes creaturely speech without ceasing to be divine in origin.

Nota

Felicity is the Spirit’s bridging act between the donated reference of Disp. LII, and the truthful assertions of Disp. L. It is the pneumatic fitting of human speech to divine being. Thus, we can claim the following about the Trinity: 

• The Father constitutes truth.

• The Son is present as truth.

• The Spirit donates the res and authorizes the word.

Felicity is the Spirit’s signature on human speech because without felicity doctrine becomes mere abstraction, the sacrament becomes only a symbol, preaching is only exhortation, and theology remains only grammar. However, with felicity doctrine becomes light, the sacrament becomes communion, preaching becomes divine address, and theology becomes true participation.

Determinatio

We determine that:

1. Felicity is Spirit-authored, not humanly achieved.

2. A theological utterance is felicitous when the Spirit authorizes it to bear the donated referent.

3. Felicity unites presence, donation, and truth, completing the semantic-ontological structure of theological meaning.

4. The Spirit’s act is the condition of faithful, truthful, and effective theological speech.

5. Thus: The Spirit makes human speech a participation in divine discourse.

Transitus ad Disputationem LIV: De Hyperintensionalitate Divinae Operationis

Having established that the Spirit authorizes speech to carry the divine res, we now turn to the final structural element of our semantic theory and ask as to why divine acts require a hyperintensional semantics.

Thus, we proceed to Disputatio LIV: De Hyperintensionalitate Divinae Operationis: Utrum Actus Dei Non Sint Reducibiles ad Extensiones vel Possibilia, in which we ask whether divine acts differ in such a fine-grained manner that no extensional or modal semantics can capture their truth.

Disputatio LII: De Donatione Referentiae per Spiritum: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus Donet Rem Theologicam

 On the Donation of Reference by the Spirit: Whether the Holy Spirit Gives the Theological Referent

Quaeritur

Utrum referentia in theologicis non per designationem humanam sed per donationem divinam constituatur; et utrum Spiritus Sanctus sit ille qui rem ipsam quae per linguam fidei significatur creaturae largitur, ita ut verbum theologicum referat quia res donatur.

Whether reference in theological language is constituted not by human designation but by divine donation; and whether the Holy Spirit is the one who bestows the very reality signified by the language of faith, so that a theological word refers because the res is donated.

Thesis

In theology, reference is not designation but donation. A theological expression does not gain its referent through human intention, mental representation, or linguistic convention, but through the Spirit’s act of giving the res that the expression signifies.

Thus:

1. The Logos constitutes being and truth, that is, the Logos is the truthmaker for theological language: Λ ⊨* Tₜ.  

2. The Logos is present as the truth-for-us as we saw in Disputatio LI. 

3. The Spirit donates the referent of theological language by linking word to real presence.

Hence, theological reference just is the Spirit-given participation in the reality of the Logos.

Locus Classicus

1. John 16:14 — ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήμψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν

ἐκεῖνος ἐμὲ δοξάσει, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήμψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν.
“He will glorify Me, for He will take what is Mine and declare it to you.”

The Spirit takes (λήμψεται) and gives (ἀναγγελεῖ). This is precisely donation: the res is received from Christ and given to the believer.

2. Romans 8:16 — αὐτὸ τὸ Πνεῦμα συμμαρτυρεῖ

“The Spirit Himself bears witness with our spirit.”

Witness is thus not designation but granted participation. The referent is given, not inferred.

3. 1 Corinthians 2:12 — τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ χαρισθὲν ἡμῖν

“We have received the Spirit… that we might know the things freely given to us by God.”

Knowing follows giving. The referent precedes the concept.

4. Augustine, De Magistro

“Nemo docet nisi interior magister.”
“No one teaches except the inner Teacher.”

The Spirit gives the res to the mind; language alone cannot.

5. Luther, WA 40/1, 360

“Spiritus est qui dat intellectum verbi.”
“The Spirit is the one who gives the understanding of the Word.”

Understanding presupposes reference. Thus, the Spirit gives the referent by giving the thing signified.

Explicatio

While Disputation L established constitutive truth -- the Logos makes being -- and Disputation LI established presential truth -- the Logos is present as truth-for-us -- Disputation LII establishes semantic truth, for the Spirit gives the referent of theological language.

1. The Problem of Reference in Theology

While ordinary semantics treats reference as a human designation, that is, a word refers because a subject intends it, in theology the following holds: 

• the subject cannot circumscribe God,

• the mind does not contain the res,

• signs do not determine their own referents.

Accordingly, designation fails. This suggests that only donation can ground reference.

2. Donation as the Ontological Form of Reference

The Spirit gives the referent by uniting:

• the human word to divine reality,

• the signifier to the Logos’ presence,

• the finite knower to the infinite known.

This act is therefore neither intellectual nor linguistic but ontological.

3. Donation and the Operator Λ ⊨* Tₜ,

We must distinguish these:

• Λ ⊨ T : truth in a model

• Λ ⊨* Tₜ : truth through the Logos

• donation as the Spirit’s act of linking T to Tₜ

Thus, while designation → Λ ⊨ T, donation → Λ ⊨* Tₜ.  Accordingly, donation is the movement from linguistic form to divine act.

4. Donation and Participation

Accordingly, to have a referent in theology is to participate in the reality of Christ. The Spirit grants this participation and thus grants reference.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to the Fregean theory of reference, reference is determined by sense or descriptive content. No Spirit is needed.

Ob II: For the Kripkean direct reference theory, terms refer rigidly independent of mental or divine acts, and therefore donation is unnecessary.

Ob III: Postliberalism claims that theological reference occurs within the grammar of Christian usage, and thus metaphysical donation is superfluous.

Ob IV: The Phenomenological critique declares that if God transcends objecthood, He cannot be referred to. Thus, donation is conceptually impossible.

Ob V: Constructivist Hermeneutics argues that reference is constructed within interpretive communities and that donation is an illusion.

Responsiones

Ad I: Since God exceeds conceptual capture, reference cannot be mediated by sense. Thus, the Spirit must donate the reality in excess of description.

Ad II: Rigid designation works only when the designator is already in causal contact with the referent. But the creature has no such causal access to God apart from divine initiative. Thus, rigid designation presupposes donation.

Ad III: Grammar governs felicity, not ontology. Revealed truth requires that the referent be real and given, not merely textual. Thus, without donation, theology becomes semiotic idealism.

Ad IV: Donation is not the giving of God as object but the giving of participation in divine presence. Accordingly, the Spirit gives mode of access, not objectification.

Ad V: Interpretation does not entail construction. Donation is the metaphysical act by which meaning precedes interpretation, and meaning is received because the res is given.

Nota

Donation is the semantic form of participation.

• In Disputatio L, the Logos constitutes being and truth.

• In Disputation LI, the Logos is present as truth-for-us.

• In Disputation LII, the Spirit donates the referent so that theological language participates in this presence.

Thus, theological semantics unfolds as:

1. Constitutive Ground because the Logos makes truth. 

2. Real Presence since the Logos is truth-for-us. 

3. Donated Reference because the Spirit gives the res of the word. 

4. Felicity since the Spirit authorizes the creature’s act of speaking.

5. Participation because truth becomes ours. 

Without donation, theology collapses into:

• designation as in analytic theory,

• symbolism as with Zwingli,

• grammar as postliberalism holds, 

• and construction as hermeneutics attempts. 

With donation, theology becomes:

• ontologically grounded,

• presential,

• pneumatologically mediated,

• hyperintensional,

• participatory,

• and true.

Determinatio

We determine:

1. Reference in theology is donation, not designation;

2. The Spirit donates the res of theological language, enabling participation in the Logos;

3. Reference is grounded in presence, not sense or convention;

4. Donation is the semantic form of the Spirit’s interpretive act;

5. Thus, theological language refers truly because the Spirit gives what it says.

Transitus ad Disputationem LIII: De Felicitate Theologica

Having established that reference is a divine donation, we now turn to the complementary question: How does the Spirit authorize the human act of speaking so that donated reference becomes felicitous utterance?

Thus we proceed to Disputatio LIII: De Felicitate Theologica: Utrum Spiritus Sit Auctor Locutionis Fideli where it will be asked whether the felicity of theological language arises from the Spirit’s co-action with the human speaker, rendering theological assertions valid, trustworthy, and performatively true.

Disputatio L: De Causatione Constitutiva: Utrum Actus Divinus Ipsum Verum Efficiat

 On Constitutive Causation: Whether the Divine Act Makes Truth Itself

Quaeritur

Utrum divina actio non solum efficiat res esse, sed etiam efficiat verum esse; et utrum veritas theologiae consistat formaliter in actu Logos constituente ipsum ordinem entis, ita ut “truth through the Logos” sit constitutiva veritas, non tantum correspondentia.

Whether the divine act not only brings things into being but also brings truths into being, and whether theological truth formally consists in the Logos’ constitutive act that establishes the very order of being—so that “truth through the Logos” is constitutive truth, not mere correspondence.

Thesis 

Divine action is constitutive of theological truth. The Logos does not merely correspond to an independently existing world, but He makes the world, and thereby makes the truth about the world. Thus, theological truth is not simply descriptive adequation but constitutive adequation: truth obtains because the Logos acts. The Holy Spirit effects the union between statement and reality, such that the felicity of theological language and the ontological grounding of its truth coincide.

Therefore, Truth = Divine Constitutive Act + Spirit-Authorized Assertion. Metaphysically, God makes truth by making being, and the Spirit binds word to being.

Locus Classicus

1. John 1:3 — πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο

πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν.
“All things came to be through Him, and without Him not one thing came to be.”

Creation is not merely production of being but production of the order of being. Thus the Logos is not a truth-teller but a truth-maker: all truths about creatures depend on the act that constitutes them.

2. Hebrews 1:3 — φέρων τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως

“He upholds all things by the word of His power.”

The ongoing reality and truth of all things is constituted by the Logos’ sustaining act. Verum is continually performed by the divine act.

3. Augustine, De Trinitate XV.2

“Veritas est ipse Deus in quo nihil mutabile, nihil mendax.”
“Truth is God Himself, in whom there is nothing changeable or false.”

Truth is identical with God’s actus essendi. Thus, creaturely truths are true by participation in divine truth.

4. Athanasius, Contra Gentes 41

ὁ Λόγος τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσι δίδωσιν.
“The Word gives being to the things that are.”

To give being is to give truth conditions. The Logos constitutes essence and therefore constitutes truth.

5. Martin Luther, WA 40/III, 342

“Deus dicendo facit.”
“God, by speaking, makes.”

Luther’s ontology of the Word grounds a strong truthmaker principle and thus divine speech is not annotation but creation.

Explicatio

While in XLVIII we distinguished internal and external truth, in XLIX we argued that external truth requires truthmakers, which are hyperintensional divine acts. Now we articulate the deeper principle: The truthmaker for any theological proposition is the Logos’ constitutive causation.

1. Constitutive vs. Efficient Causation

While classical efficient causation claims that A causes B, theological constitutive causation declares that A is the very ground of B’s existence, identity, order, and truth.

Since the Logos constitutes 1) the being of things, 2) the structure of their relations, 3) the intelligibility through which truths are possible, and 4) the order that statements answer to, divine causation is thus truth-making, not merely world-making.

2. Why Theology Requires Constitutive Causation

1. Theology’s claims depend on the identity of God’s actions, not merely on worldly states of affairs.

2. Only constitutive causation can explain why distinct divine acts yield distinct truths.

3. The Spirit’s role in felicity (XLVIII) requires grounding in ontological acts, not merely representation.

4. The incarnation shows that God’s act is the truthmaker of salvation (John 1:14).

3. Constitutive Truth vs. Correspondence

Correspondence is derivative while constitutive causation is primary. This entails both that statement S is true because God has acted such that the world corresponds to S, and that the “correspondence” is a manifestation of constitutive causation, not its origin. Hence theology’s fundamental truth relation is:

Λ ⊨** T

The Logos constitutively satisfies T.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to Thomistic epistemical realism -- "Truth is adequation alone” - truth resides in the intellect, and adequation requires only that statements match being, not that being be caused by God for that purpose.

Ob II:  Classical Analytic Metaphysics claims that truths supervene on the distribution of properties across the world. Thus, no hyperintensional divine acts are needed.

Ob III: Neo-Barthian theology declares that God reveals truth in Christ but does not ontologically ground all truths through constitutive act.

Ob IV: Process theology argues that divine causation is only persuasive and thus not constitutive.  Accordingly, truths arise cooperatively through divine-creaturely synergy.

Ob V: Postliberal Linguistic Theology tells us that theological truth is intra-textual, and thus it concerns the shape of Christian discourse, not metaphysical grounding.

Responsiones

Ad I:  Adequation requires a ground of being. Since God constitutes being, He constitutes the order in which adequation is possible. Thus constitutive causation underwrites, not replaces, adequation.

Ad II: Supervenience explains dependence but not grounding. Truth requires a because—a reason for being thus. Divine constitutive act supplies this grounding, not merely the extensional pattern.

Ad III: Revelation is not separable from ontology because to reveal the Father, the Son must be eternally begotten, and thus He must be the primal constitutive act. Revelation presupposes ontology, not vice versa.

Ad IV: Persuasion cannot alone constitute truth. Theology requires more. Indeed, the object of faith must be ontologically able to make truths true. Constitutive causation is required for realism.

Ad V: Grammar governs internal truth (felicity), but external truth requires a real God who grounds the being spoken of. Without constitutive causation, theology collapses into performance without ontology.

Nota

Constitutive causation solves the problem raised in XLVIII–XLIX. Accordingly, internal truth as Spirit-authorized assertion and External truth as Logos-constituted reality coincide because the Spirit unites the word to the act by which the Logos grounds truth.

Thus theological truth is neither sheer correspondence, sheer grammar, nor sheer experience, but it is rather participation in the constitutive act of the Logos.

Determinatio

We determine:

1. Truth in theology is grounded in the Logos’ constitutive act, which gives being, order, and intelligibility.

2. Constitutive causation is hyperintensional, because divine acts differ in internal form, not merely in effect.

3. Correspondence is a derivative effect of constitutive causation, not its replacement.

4. The Spirit is the mediating principle, uniting linguistic felicity with ontological grounding.

5. Christ is the paradigm of constitutive truth, for in Him the truthmaker and truth coincide.

Thus: Theology speaks truly because God makes truth, and God makes truth because He is the One who makes being.

Transitus ad Disputationem LI: De Verbo Realiter Praesente

Having established that the Logos constitutes truth through constitutive causation, we now proceed to the next question: How does the constitutive act of the Logos relate to the real presence of the Word in revelation, sacrament, and ecclesial proclamation? For if truth is constituted by divine act, then the presence of the Logos is the mode by which truth becomes accessible to creatures.

Thus we move to: Disputatio LI: De Verbo Realiter Praesente: Utrum Praesentia Logi Sit Conditio Omnis Veritatis Revelatae where we shall examine how constitutive causation becomes manifest presence, binding ontology to revelation.

Disputatio XLIX De Veritate Facienda: De Truthmakeribus et Hyperintensionalitate Theologica

 On the Making of Truth: Truthmakers and Theological Hyperintensionality

Quaeritur

Utrum veritas theologiae requirat veritatem facientia (truthmakers) quae non tantum determinent extensionem enuntiationum sed ipsam rationem, modum, et causam secundum quam enuntiationes theologicae verae sunt; et utrum haec veritatem facientia sint hyperintensionalia, id est, finioris resolutionis quam illa quae per modum possibilitatis vel extensionis explicari possunt.

Whether the truth of theology requires truthmakers that determine not only the extension of theological claims but the very reason, manner, and cause by which such claims are true; and whether these truthmakers must be hyperintensional, that is, finer-grained than any account reducible to modal or extensional equivalence.

Thesis

In theological discourse, two claims may share an extension yet differ in truth because Spiritus Sanctus determines felicity and actus Dei determines truth. Thus truthmakers in theology must be more fine-grained than possible-world semantics or classical extensional identities.

Locus Classicus

1. “Ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο” — John 1:14

Ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν.
“The Word became flesh and dwelt among us.”

This is a paradigmatic case of truthmaking: the claim “God is with us” is true because God has acted, not because of a description of the world’s extension. No possible world analysis captures the ontological fact that God has joined Himself to flesh. The truthmaker is the very event of incarnation, not a set of worldly facts.

2. “Fiat lux. Et facta est lux.” — Genesis 1:3

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהִי אוֹר וַיְהִי־אוֹר‎
“God said ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light.”

Here divine speaking is truthmaking: verbum is res. The statement “light exists” is true because of a specific divine act. Not all causes producing the same extension could be the truthmaker of this theological claim.

3. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate 1.1

“Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus.”

But in theology, the adequation is not passive comparison; it is acheived through divine causation: adaequatio fit per actum Dei constituens ipsum esse rei.

4. Cyril of Alexandria, In Joannis 1.9

Ὁ λόγος ἀληθεύει τὰ ῥητὰ ποιῶν.
“The Word makes true what is spoken.”

A direct witness to theological truthmaking.

Explicatio

While XLVIII distinguished internal truth (felicity of faith’s language) and external truth (adequation to divine reality), XLIX specifies the metaphysical principle by which external truth occurs, that is, that truth is made true by divine acts.

Why Theological Truth Requires Truthmakers

In theology:

1. A proposition’s extension does not fix its truth.

   • “God forgives” and “God elects” may apply to the same set of saved persons yet differ profoundly in reality.

2. The causal grounding matters:

   • Forgiveness is a specific act of mercy, not merely an outcome.

3. The mode of divine presence matters:

   • Christ’s Eucharistic presence is not interchangeable with omnipresence, though extensionally both may involve presence.

4. The source of felicity matters:

   • Statements authorized by the Spirit differ even if extensionally identical with statements not authorized.

This yields a hyperintensional truth-structure.

Hyperintensionality Explained

A context is hyperintensional when:

• substitution of co-referential terms changes truth,

• substitution of necessarily equivalent propositions changes truth,

• grounding, not just extension, determines truth.

Theology is hyperintensional because:

1. Divine acts differ in their inner form, not only in outcome.

2. Participation is specific and non-interchangeable 

3. Felicity (Spirit-authorization) cannot be replaced by mere semantic equivalence.

4. Truth is identical with being only in God, not creatures.

5. Revelation determines the mode of truth, not merely the result.

Thus theology inevitably operates at a finer semantic grain than any modal logic.

Objectiones

Ob I. Truthmaking violates divine simplicity by treating divine acts as distinct truthmakers.

Ob II. Hyperintensionality undermines classical semantics and threatens coherence. Truth should depend only on the world, not on modes of presentation.

Ob III. Scripture itself often speaks extensionally: “Your faith has saved you.” Why therefore introduce metaphysical machinery alien to the biblical text?

Ob IV. If truth requires divine acts as truthmakers, we risk collapsing into occasionalism or voluntarism.

Ob V. Truthmaking presumes metaphysical realism incompatible with postliberal grammar models of theology.

Responsiones

Ad I. Divine simplicity is not violated, for the truthmaker is God as acting, not “a part” of God. The distinction is one of formal expression, not ontological composition.

Ad II. Hyperintensionality does not threaten coherence, but rather it protects the specificity of divine revelation. Theology cannot collapse distinct divine acts into one extension without losing referential integrity.

Ad III. Scripture’s economy of language does not negate metaphysics. The biblical claim is hyperintensional in that faith saves because it unites one to Christ, not because of abstract extension.

Ad IV. Truthmaking is not voluntarism. It is the grounding of truth in divine being. While voluntarism posits an arbitrary divine decree,  truthmaking anchors truth in God’s eternal act.

Ad V. Grammar models (Lindbeck) explain internal felicity but not external reality. Truthmakers bridge that gap without collapsing theology into metaphysics or vice versa.

Nota

Truth in theology cannot be reduced to any of these:

• correspondence

• coherence

• pragmatic usefulness

• communal grammar

• modal possibility

This is the case because none of these capture the specificity of divine causation. Thus, Truth = Felicity + Divine Fact-making. The Spirit authorizes what the Father and Son accomplish. This, however, requires a semantics richer than extension or modality; it requires a hyperintensional semantics grounded in ontological participation.

Determinatio

We determine that:

1. Theological propositions require truthmakers in the form of divine acts, not merely worldly facts.

2. Truthmakers in theology are hyperintensional, because divine actions differ not only in effect but in internal form.

3. The Spirit mediates truth, ensuring that felicity (internal truth) and divine causation (external truth) coincide.

4. Theology requires a semantics beyond the modal, for God cannot be captured extensionally.

5. Christ Himself is the supreme truthmaker, for in Him every divine act is both form and fulfillment.

Transitus ad Disputationem L: De Causatione Constitutiva

Having shown that divine acts are truthmakers and that theology is hyperintensional, we now ask how such truthmaking occurs in actu, such that a theological statement becomes true through God.

Thus we proceed to Disputatio L: De Causatione Constitutiva: Utrum Divina Actio Ipsum Verum Efficiat where we inquire as to whether the Logos not only makes truths true but constitutes the very ontology in which theological truth obtains.