Disputatio LX: De Providentia et Libertate

 On Providence and Freedom

Quaeritur

Utrum providentia divina possit ordinare historiam sine cohibitione vel dissolutione libertatis humanae, ita ut actus creaturae sint vere proprii et tamen intelligantur intra ordinem intentionalem Logi; et quomodo haec coexistentia voluntatis divinae et libertatis creaturae non resolvatur in determinismum aut in dualismum causarum.

Whether divine providence can order history without constraining or dissolving human freedom, such that creaturely acts are genuinely their own and yet intelligible within the intentional order of the Logos; and how this coexistence of divine will and creaturely freedom does not collapse into determinism or a dualism of causes.

Thesis

Providence is the eternal intention of God, articulated in the Logos, whereby history receives its intelligible order. Freedom is the creature’s finite participation in this order according to its own mode of agency. Divine and human agency do not compete because their modes of causality differ: the divine is constitutive, the human participatory. The act of God grounds the possibility of creaturely act but does not determine its content. Human freedom is therefore neither negated nor autonomous. It arises within the Logos-shaped field where providence provides the conditions of intelligibility for action.

Thus providence orders history without coercion, and freedom flourishes within providence without separation.

Locus Classicus

Psalm 139:16
In libro tuo scripti erant omnes dies.
“All the days ordained for me were written in your book.”

Providence frames the horizon of creaturely life.

Philippians 2:13
Deus est qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere.
“God is the one who works in you both to will and to act.”

Divine causality does not negate creaturely willing but grounds it.

Luther, WA 18, 636 (De servo arbitrio)
Deus est in omnibus operans, non ut violenter trahat, sed ut sustentet.
“God works in all things, not by drawing violently, but by sustaining.”

Providence is constitutive, not coercive.

Explicatio

1. Providence is constitutive, not competitive, causality

Providence is not a secondary cause among causes. It is the intelligible ground of all finite acts. To say that God governs history is to say that every temporal event receives its possibility, its field of intelligible relations, and its metaphysical coherence from the Logos. Thus, providence does not intervene from without, nor does it supersede creaturely action. It is the deep structure within which creaturely causes operate as causes.

If two painters work upon one canvas, their strokes compete. If God and a creature act, their modes of causation do not inhabit the same plane. This is the error of competitive metaphysics. But Providence is not a rival to freedom. It is the condition for its existence.

2. Freedom as finite participation in divine intentionality

Freedom is not spontaneity detached from order. It is the creature’s capacity to enact meaning within the Logos-shaped horizon of possibility. A free act is an act that arises from the creature’s own powers. However, those powers themselves arise from divine act. Thus freedom is not independence from God but the creature’s participation in the meaningful field God sustains.

For Luther, bondage of the will concerns the incapacity to enact righteousness, not the absence of agency. Creatures choose, deliberate, and act. Their acts are genuine because their agency is real. But agency is always grounded in providence.

3. Providence and freedom do not divide the act

A single human act is not partially divine and partially human. Rather, it is wholly divine as to its being and possibility, and wholly human as to its moral quality and intention. This avoids the metaphysical mistake of partitioning causality. God does not cause the moral defect of actions and creatures do not sustain their own agency. Providence sustains the act as act and freedom shapes the act’s determination. Thus both modes of agency coexist in the same event without competition.

4. History is the ordered field of freedom

Because providence shapes history as meaningful order, creaturely freedom always occurs within a web of givens:

• a body,
• a culture,
• a time,
• a vocation, 
• and a moral horizon. '

These are not constraints but the very conditions under which freedom becomes intelligible. History is not a prison, but an arena of meaning. Freedom is not exemption from history, but a participation in its intelligible unfolding.

5. Rejection of determinism and dualism

Determinism arises when divine causality is construed as competitive. Dualism arises when creaturely causality is viewed as self-sufficient. Both follow from misunderstanding the metaphysical difference between Creator and creature. Providence is the sustaining intelligibility of the Logos and freedom is the creature’s participation in this intelligibility. Thus neither absorbs the other. Freedom without providence is chaos and Providence without freedom is fatalism. Luther affirms neither.

Objectiones

Ob I. If God ordains all things, human choices are predetermined.

Ob II. If creatures are genuinely free, divine providence cannot be exhaustive

Ob III. Providence sustaining every act implies that God is the cause of evil.

Ob IV. If freedom is participation, is it genuine freedom or derived necessity?

Ob V. Scripture sometimes depicts God changing his mind. Does this not imply contingency in providence?

Responsiones

Ad I. Providence ordains the horizon of action, not its specific moral content. God gives possibility; creatures fill it with intention. Possibility is not predetermination.

Ad II. Freedom is not a domain exempt from God but a mode of agency grounded in God. The fullness of divine providence does not require the emptiness of human agency.

Ad III. God sustains the act as act. The defect belongs to the creature’s intention. Sustaining is not identical with approving. Ontological support is not moral endorsement.

Ad IV. Participation does not negate autonomy but establishes it. A creature becomes itself through participation in divine act. Freedom is not diminished by derivation but constituted by it.

Ad V. Scriptural anthropomorphisms display the relational quality of divine action, not its contingency. Providence is eternal; its temporal enactment is relationally responsive without metaphysical change.

Nota

Providence and freedom coexist because their causal orders differ. Providence is the condition of agency. Freedom is agency exercised. The Logos provides intelligibility. The Spirit grants illumination. History becomes the field where divine and creaturely acts unfold without competition. This is theological realism: divine act grounds creaturely act without eliminating it.

Determinatio

We determine:

1. Providence is the constitutive grounding of all finite action.
2. Freedom is finite participation in the intelligible order that providence supplies.
3. Divine and human causality are not competitive but layered.
4. History is the arena where providence and freedom converge.
5. This view avoids determinism by preserving creaturely intention, and avoids dualism by preserving divine transcendence.

Thus providence orders without coercing, and freedom flourishes without severing.

Transitus ad Disputatio LXI

Having established providence as the structuring horizon of creaturely freedom, we now inquire how particular events may reveal divine intention in concrete form. If providence is the eternal order, special providence is the temporal manifestation.

We therefore proceed to Disputatio LXI: De Providentia Speciali et Revelatione in Eventibus Particularibus.