Disputation XIV: On Intentionality and Divine Knowing

Thesis

Intentionality—the directedness of thought or language toward what it signifies—is grounded not in human consciousness but in divine self-knowing. All finite intentionality participates analogically in the eternal act by which God knows Himself and all things in Himself.

Explicatio

“In Him we live and move and have our being.”
— Acts 17:28

Intentionality, classically defined, is the mark of the mental: every act of consciousness is of something. In theology, this “of-ness” was understood as the intentio animae, the mind’s assimilation to its object by receiving its form without its matter. In phenomenology, it becomes the structural relation between subject and object — consciousness as inherently relational.

Both traditions rightly discerned that knowledge and meaning are never self-contained: they are always oriented beyond themselves. Yet neither can explain why this orientation is possible at all. For the relation between knower and known, between sign and referent, presupposes a deeper unity—a prior intentional act in which both are held together.

Theology locates this unity in divine knowing itself. God’s self-knowledge is not one act among others; it is being itself known and knowing itself. The Father’s eternal knowledge of Himself in the Son, through the Spirit, constitutes the ontological prototype of all intentionality. This divine knowing is reflexive yet not closed: by knowing Himself perfectly, God knows all things that can exist in Him.

Thus, all finite intentionality—the directedness of human mind and language—is participatory, not self-originating. The Spirit causes the finite mind to be of something, not by imposing representations but by grounding the very structure of aboutness in divine life. Our intentional acts are not bridges we construct toward reality; they are participations in the eternal bridge between divine being and divine knowing.

Distinctiones Praeviae

To avoid confusion, three distinctions must be made:

1. Intentionality vs. Intention.

   • Intentionality is structural: the capacity or condition of being about something.

   • Intention is personal: the specific directed act of will or thought toward something.

2. Intentionality vs. Intension.

   • Intension concerns linguistic sense—the internal content of terms.

   • Intentionality concerns cognitive relation—the ontological link between mind and reality.

   • Every intension presupposes intentionality, for sense must already be “of” something to signify it.

3. Human vs. Divine Intentionality.

   • Human intentionality is receptive and finite, mediated by concepts, language, and the senses.

   • Divine intentionality is constitutive and infinite: God’s knowing is identical with being. His “object” is Himself, and creatures are known in Him as participations in that self-knowing.

These distinctions ensure clarity as we move between philosophical and theological reasoning.

Objectiones

Obiectio I. To ground intentionality in divine self-knowledge makes human cognition derivative and removes its autonomy.

Obiectio II. If divine knowing is identical with being, the Creator–creature distinction collapses: human knowing becomes part of the divine intellect.

Obiectio III. The analogy between divine and human intentionality violates the transcendence of God, implying a common genus of cognition.

Obiectio IV. The phenomenological account of intentionality as consciousness of phenomena suffices; theological appeal to divine knowing is unnecessary.

Responsiones

Ad I. Human cognition is derivative, but not diminished. Participation does not negate agency; it grounds it. The Spirit’s constitutive causality enables finite minds to act intentionally within their proper order. Autonomy is not destroyed but redeemed by dependence on divine truth.

Ad II. The Creator–creature distinction is maintained by analogia entis: human knowing shares in divine knowing not univocally but analogically. God’s self-knowledge is creative; ours is receptive. The likeness lies in form, not essence.

Ad III. The analogy of intentionality does not posit a common genus but a relation of participation. God’s knowing is the exemplar; ours the reflection. The Spirit mediates this analogy, ensuring both real relation and ontological asymmetry.

Ad IV. Phenomenology accurately describes intentionality’s structure but cannot explain its possibility. Theological realism asks the ontological question phenomenology leaves open: what grounds the unity of subject and object in the act of knowing? The answer lies in the divine act that makes relation itself possible.

Nota

This doctrine of intentionality integrates and elevates both the medieval and phenomenological traditions. The medievals saw intentionality as the formal presence of the known in the knower—knowledge as participation in the object’s form. Phenomenology rediscovered intentionality as relational structure, freeing it from representationalism. Theology unites these insights by grounding intentionality in the Trinitarian life of God: the Father knows Himself in the Son, and this knowledge, proceeding in the Spirit, is the source of every finite act of knowing.

Hence, every intentional relation in creation mirrors the eternal relation of knowing within God. The human mind, in its very capacity to mean, is already within the field of divine communication. To intend anything truly—to think ofsomething as it is—is to participate in the divine Word through whom all forms are known.

This also clarifies theological semantics. For language to have meaning, its expressions must be intentionally anchored in reality. That anchoring is not psychological but metaphysical: it is the Spirit’s causal act linking words and world, sense and being. Thus, theological realism depends upon intentional realism. Without divine intentionality, meaning dissolves into use; with it, theology regains its grounding in truth.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Intentionality is the fundamental “of-ness” of thought and language, the structural relation between knower and known.

2. Human intentionality presupposes divine intentionality, for only a self-knowing God can create minds capable of knowing.

3. Divine knowing is constitutive causality: God’s knowledge is identical with His being and is the source of all created intelligibility.

4. The Spirit mediates this participation, constituting the creature’s capacity to intend and understand.

5. Theological realism requires intentional realism: truth depends upon a real relation between intellect and being, grounded in divine causality.

6. The phenomenological account describes intentionality’s form; theology supplies its metaphysical ground in the Trinitarian act of knowing.

7. To intend God is to be drawn into the very act by which God intends Himself — the foundation of theological knowledge and the essence of beatific vision.

Therefore, intentionality is not an accidental feature of consciousness but the sign of our participation in the divine Logos. Every act of knowing is already a trace of God’s own self-knowledge: to know truly is to share, in measure, in the eternal act by which God knows Himself and all things in Himself.

Disputatio XIII: On Intension and Intention in Theological Discourse

Thesis

The distinction between intension and intention expresses two inseparable dimensions of theological meaning: intension as the Spirit-formed content of signification, and intention as the personal directedness of intellect and will toward God. The two converge when divine intentionality becomes the ground of all human understanding.

Explicatio

“Thou wilt show me the path of life; in thy presence is fullness of joy.”
— Psalm 16:11

Having treated the structure of theological intension, we must now distinguish it from intention, for the two are often confused.  Intension names the inner sense or form of an expression — the way in which it signifies what it signifies. Intention, by contrast, names the directedness of a mind or will toward something — the personal act of meaning.

In analytic terms, intension is a property of expressions; intention is a property of agents. In theological terms, intension corresponds to the grammar of divine communication; intention to the teleology of communion.  The former concerns the form of meaning; the latter, the movement of love and understanding toward the divine object.

Theological discourse unites them because its subject matter is not inert. To speak of God is to be drawn by God. The same Spirit who gives form to words (intension) directs hearts and minds toward their referent (intention). In the nova lingua, linguistic form and spiritual motion are not separate phenomena but two moments of one act: God both signifies and draws.

Philosophically, the tradition distinguishes these dimensions in different ways.

• In Aristotle and the scholastics, intention (intentio animae) denotes the mind’s assimilation to its object, the inner form through which knowing occurs.

• In phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger), intentionality signifies the structure of consciousness as always “of” something.

• Both traditions assume that meaning involves directedness; what theology adds is that this directedness itself is caused and sustained by divine intentionality.

God is the first and final Intender. Human intention participates analogically in the divine act of knowing and loving. The Spirit, as causa principalis of both theological speech and understanding, grounds this participation. Thus, every theological intention (human directedness toward God) is enfolded within divine intention (God’s directedness toward humanity in revelation).

Objectiones

Obiectio I. If intention is a property of agents and intension a property of words, their identification in theology confuses grammatical and psychological categories.

Obiectio II. To attribute intention to God anthropomorphizes the divine will; God’s being cannot involve directedness or striving.

Obiectio III. If human intention participates in divine intention, freedom collapses into determinism: human thought becomes mere echo.

Obiectio IV. The distinction between intension and intention is unnecessary; all meaning can be analyzed semantically without recourse to volition or teleology.

Responsiones

Ad I. The identification is analogical, not equivocal. Theological discourse unites both linguistic and personal meaning because its subject is personal communication. God’s Word is both speech and will; the Spirit causes language and desire together.

Ad II. Divine intentionality is not temporal striving but eternal act. God’s knowledge and love are perfectly identical with His being. When theology speaks of divine intention, it names this eternal self-determination of God toward creation and redemption, not a changeable purpose.

Ad III. Participation in divine intention does not erase freedom but constitutes it. Human intention is free precisely because it is grounded in the divine act that makes freedom possible. To be drawn toward God is to be liberated into one’s true telos.

Ad IV. A purely semantic account of meaning leaves theology mute. For theology, meaning is not only cognitive but moral and affective. Intention adds the dimension of love to understanding — a dimension absent from purely formal semantics. Knowledge of God is inseparable from desire for God.

Nota

This distinction between intension and intention clarifies the dual structure of theological realism. Theology’s truth depends not only on the coherence of its intensions but also on the right orientation of its intentions. Felicity is achieved when both coincide: when language signifies rightly and the heart wills rightly — when the grammar of meaning and the movement of love align in the Spirit.

Here, the theological and philosophical traditions meet:

• From the scholastics, theology receives the notion of intentional assimilation — the intellect’s form corresponding to the form of the known.

• From phenomenology, it inherits the insight that consciousness is always directed beyond itself.

• From revelation, it learns that both form and directedness are gifts of the Spirit, who “searches all things, even the depths of God.”

The Spirit thus mediates between intension (form of signification) and intention (movement of the soul), binding truth and love, sense and desire, cognition and communion. The nova lingua is born precisely at this junction: it is language whose intensions are vivified by intention — speech that not only says but also seeks, confesses, and loves.

Determinatio

From the foregoing it is determined that:

1. Intension designates the structured content of meaning; intention, the personal directedness toward what is meant.

2. The two coincide in theology because the object of knowledge (God) is also the source of knowing.

3. The Spirit is the causal mediator of this coincidence, forming the intensions of language and directing the intentions of persons.

4. Divine intentionality precedes and grounds human intentionality; the Word’s address constitutes the possibility of response.

5. Theological felicity arises when intension and intention converge — when the truth of words and the orientation of hearts are one in the Spirit.

6. This unity models the Incarnation itself: finite forms (intensions) filled with infinite purpose (intention).

7. Theology thereby becomes the exercise of intelligent love — the knowing that participates in the divine act of self-communication.

Therefore, the meaning of theology is double yet indivisible: its intensions are the grammar of truth, and its intentions are the movement of love — both caused and sustained by the Spirit who makes language and will participate in the divine Word.