Disputatio LXIV: De Spe et Resurrectione

On Hope and Resurrection

Quaeritur

Utrum spes Christiana fundamentum habeat in ipsa structura participationis, ita ut resurrectio non sit extrinseca recompensatio sed consummatio participationis in vita Dei; et quomodo Spiritus identitatem personalem per mortem servet et restituat, ita ut resurrectio sit opus remembrance divinae potius quam naturae humanae.

Whether Christian hope finds its foundation in the very structure of participation, such that resurrection is not an extrinsic reward but the consummation of participation in the life of God; and how the Spirit preserves and reconstitutes personal identity through death, so that resurrection is an act of divine remembrance rather than a natural extension of creaturely being.

Thesis

Resurrection is the eschatological manifestation of participation. What is now hidden—participation in the crucified and risen Christ—will then be revealed as the definitive form of life. Hope is therefore not the anticipation of a future possibility but the confident trust that the Spirit who has begun participation will bring it to completion. The believer’s identity is preserved through death not by the persistence of a metaphysical substrate but by the fidelity of divine remembrance. Resurrection is God’s act of reconstituting the person in the fullness of life by the same power that raised Christ from the dead.

Thus the Christian does not hope for escape from finitude but for the transfiguration of finitude into glory.

Locus Classicus

1 Corinthians 15:20–22
νυνὶ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐγήγερται ἐκ νεκρῶν… ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιηθήσονται.
“Christ has been raised from the dead… for as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive.”

Romans 8:11
ὁ ἐγείρας Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν ζωοποιήσει καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος πνεύματος.
“He who raised Jesus will give life also to your mortal bodies through His indwelling Spirit.”

Luther, WA 10 I, 1, 45
Resurrectio est opus purum Dei, qui nos de nihilo iterum creat.
“Resurrection is the pure work of God, who creates us again out of nothing.”

Explicatio

1. Participation is the seed of resurrection

Participation is not merely moral renewal or spiritual elevation. It is the ontological union of the believer with the crucified and risen Christ through the Spirit. This participation is incomplete and hidden under the conditions of mortal life, but it bears within itself the form of its fulfillment. Resurrection is the revelation of what participation already is: life sustained by the Spirit, grounded in Christ, embraced by the Father.

Thus hope is not conjecture. It is the anticipation of what participation necessarily entails.

2. Death as the boundary at which creaturely agency ceases

Death is not merely the cessation of biological functions. It is the interruption of creaturely self-articulation. The creature can no longer enact its identity. All natural continuity fails. If the person is to persist, it must be through a form of identity not grounded in creaturely endurance but grounded in divine fidelity.

This is why hope is theological, for the creature cannot secure its own future. Only God can remember and reconstitute the creature.

3. Divine remembrance as the ground of personal identity

Identity is not an inert substance but a pattern of intelligibility sustained by the Spirit. In life, the Spirit shapes the believer into conformity with Christ. In death, the Spirit retains this pattern in divine remembrance. In resurrection, the Spirit reconstitutes the believer according to this remembered form.

Thus the believer’s identity does not persist by nature. It persists because the Spirit is faithful.

This is Luther’s insight: God remembers the person into being.

4. Resurrection as the consummation of cruciform participation

Because participation is cruciform—shaped by the humility and majesty of the crucified Christ—resurrection must be the revelation of this form in glory. Glory is not a reversal of the cross but its fulfillment. The wounds of Christ are not erased; they become radiant. In resurrection, creaturely life is purified of distortion but not stripped of finitude. The creature remains creature, yet its life is transfigured by union with the Logos.

5. Eschatological hope is grounded in the Spirit’s constitutive causality

Hope is not grounded in the autonomy of the soul but in the Spirit’s power to give life. Romans 8:11 is decisive: resurrection occurs διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος πνεύματος—through the indwelling Spirit.

Thus:

• Christ is the form of resurrection,

• the Spirit is the cause of resurrection,

• the Father is the source of resurrection.

Participation is therefore Trinitarian in its origin, structure, and consummation.

6. Resurrection is not the natural immortality of the soul

Natural immortality cannot sustain the theological hope of resurrection. It reduces eschatology to anthropology and empties the cross of its metaphysical significance. The Christian does not hope for the survival of a separable essence. The Christian hopes for the recreation of the person by the God who raises the dead. Thus Luther reminding us that God makes something out of nothing. Clearly, resurrection is precisely this nothing-from-something again.

Objectiones

Ob I. If identity depends on divine remembrance, does this not destroy continuity of person?

Ob II. If resurrection is pure divine act, how can the believer’s moral history matter?

Ob III. Does this not reduce eschatology to determinism?

Ob IV. How can the risen body be both continuous with the mortal body and glorified?

Ob V. Does the hope of resurrection undermine the seriousness of death?

Responsiones

Ad I. Divine remembrance is not recollection but constitutive fidelity. The person remains the same because God preserves the pattern of intelligibility that defines the person. Continuity is secured at the highest possible level.

Ad II. Moral history matters because God remembers the person as the person has been shaped in Christ. Resurrection does not erase moral history; it redeems and completes it.

Ad III. Resurrection is certain, but it is not deterministic. It is the consequence of divine promise, not metaphysical compulsion. Hope rests on fidelity, not necessity.

Ad IV. Continuity lies in identity; transformation lies in glory. The mortal body is raised immortal because the Spirit reconstitutes it according to its true form in Christ.

Ad V. The seriousness of death is intensified, not diminished. Death destroys every creaturely ground of hope so that hope may rest entirely in God.

Nota

Resurrection is the final act of the participatory ontology developed throughout these disputations. It is the Spirit’s definitive articulation of the believer in conformity to Christ. It is not the resumption of interrupted life but the gift of new life. Hope is therefore the posture of those who know that their future lies not in their own endurance but in the God who raises the dead.

Determinatio

We determine that resurrection is the eschatological fulfillment of participation in the life of God. Death cannot sever the believer from Christ because the Spirit preserves personal identity through divine remembrance. Resurrection is God’s reconstitution of the creature in glory, revealing the cruciform form of divine life in perfected clarity. Hope rests not in natural immortality but in divine fidelity. The final word of theology is therefore not abstraction but promise: the love that made us will remake us.

Finis

Epilogus: De Fine Theologiae et Forma Vitae

The sixty-four disputationes have traced a path across the full horizon of theological reason. We began with logic, not because theology is reducible to logical form, but because theology must speak intelligibly of what it confesses. We proceeded to ontology, not because metaphysics precedes revelation, but because divine revelation presses thought to articulate what it has seen. We turned to Christology, where intelligibility and being converge in the Logos who is both the form of God and the form of the servant. We explored the Spirit’s illumination, creaturely participation, providence, history, cruciformity, and finally the hope of resurrection.

Through all of these movements a single conviction has guided the work: theology speaks truly only because God acts. Theological speech is not the construction of a conceptual system, nor the refinement of human religious insight, nor the self-expression of a community. It is the response of reason awakened by divine presence. Theology is an act of participation: the mind caught up into what it cannot generate but can only receive.

Thus each disputatio—however analytic in method or metaphysical in structure—has aimed to keep before the reader the living center of theological truth: the God who gives Himself to be known. The Logos renders divine life intelligible. The Spirit renders this intelligibility accessible. The Father is the eternal source of both. Without this triune economy of self-giving, the work of theology collapses either into rationalization or despair.

The communicatio idiomatum stands at the heart of this vision, for in Christ God shows not only who He is but how He acts. The hypostatic union is not an isolated miracle but the grammar of all divine–human communion. It grounds the real presence in sacrament, the efficacy of the Word, the transformation of the believer, and the final hope of resurrection. What Christ is personally, believers become participatively. This is the shape of grace.

The cross reveals the form of this grace. Divine majesty appears in humility, not by contradiction but by nature of divine love. In the crucified Christ the character of God is made manifest: power exercised as mercy, glory revealed in self-offering. All genuine theological understanding must therefore pass through the cruciform horizon. Outside the cross, divine majesty becomes a metaphysical abstraction or an instrument of human pride. In the cross, majesty becomes the world’s redemption.

This is why the final disputatio turns to hope. Resurrection is not the compensation for suffering nor the restoration of natural capacities but the consummation of participation. What the Spirit has begun in the believer—conformity to the form of the Son—He completes in the act of divine remembrance. The Christian does not place hope in the durability of the soul but in the fidelity of God. To be remembered by the God who raises the dead is to live forever.

If these disputationes have any unity, it lies here: theology is the mind’s participation in God’s self-giving act. It proceeds from revelation, through illumination, into understanding, and finally to praise. Its method is disciplined, its language careful, its categories precise, but its end is doxological. Theology thinks because God speaks; theology understands because God gives; theology hopes because God remembers.

The disputationes end where theology always ends; they end in the confession that the love that made us will remake us and that the last word spoken over all creaturely life is not death but the Word Himself.

Soli Deo Gloria

Disputatio LIX: De Historia Ut Loco Revelationis

 On History as the Locus of Revelation

Quaeritur

Utrum historia ipsa possit esse locus revelationis divinae, ita ut eventus historici non solum referant ad voluntatem Dei sed manifestent ipsam actionem eius; et quomodo haec revelatio historica non redigatur ad immanentem causalitatem neque confundatur cum nudis factis temporalibus.

Whether history itself can be a locus of divine revelation, such that historical events do not merely refer to the will of God but manifest the divine act itself; and how such historical revelation neither collapses divine action into immanence nor becomes indistinguishable from ordinary temporal events.

Thesis

History becomes a locus of revelation because the Logos, who is the intelligible articulation of divine act, shapes the order of created temporality as the field in which divine action is enacted. History is therefore not a neutral sequence of temporal occurrences. It is the sphere in which divine intelligibility enters time under forms suitable for human encounter.

The Spirit illumines historical events so that their Logos-shaped form becomes perceptible to the creature. Illumination does not alter history, but renders history transparent to divine intention.

Thus historical revelation is not merely a symbolic interpretation of past occurrences, but is rather the manifestation of divine action within the temporal order, an action grasped through the form constituted by the Logos and opened by the Spirit.

Locus Classicus

Galatians 4:4
ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου…
“When the fullness of time had come…”

Time is not homogeneous. It receives fullness when divine act enters it.

Acts 2:11
ἀκούομεν λαλούντων… τὰ μεγαλεῖα τοῦ Θεοῦ.
“We hear them declaring the mighty acts of God.”

The apostles interpret concrete historical events as divine acts, not merely as human occurrences.

Luther, WA 40 II, 90
Opera Dei sunt historiae.
“The works of God are histories.”

The divine act becomes narrative because it enters temporality.

Explicatio

History is not autonomous from divine intention. Modern historiography treats history as a closed temporal sequence governed by immanent causation. But revelation becomes, on this view, either a theological overlay or an interpretive projection. Accordingly, this view presupposes that history is self-sufficient and that divine action must be added to it from without. On the contrary, theological truth requires a different premise. History is the created field ordered by the Logos as the arena in which divine acts may occur. It is therefore intrinsically open to revelation.

Divine action in history is not an intrusion but fulfillment. To say that God acts in history is not to say that divine agency violates the temporal order. Rather, it is to say that the temporal order is constituted for participation in divine action. The incarnation shows this with the greatest clarity. Time does not resist the Logos but receives him. Similarly, redemption is not an exception to history but its completion. Thus, divine acts are not supernatural intrusions into an otherwise closed system. They are the realization of history’s deepest intelligibility.

Illumination makes historical acts revelatory.  History becomes revelation when the Spirit grants creatures to perceive its Logos-shaped form. Without this illumination, history is only asequence of events that bears no apparent reference to divine intention. However, with illumination, the same events manifest the structure of divine agency. This is not an interpretation imposed from without, but a recognition of the form given from within. Thus, revelation is not epistemic projection but an ontological disclosure.

There is a distinction between the event and revelation. A historical event may be the medium of divine action without yet being revelation for a creature. Revelation requires that the event be seen as the act it is. Although this seeing does not alter the event itself, it does alter the creature’s participation in its intelligibility. Therefore, revelation is not a second act added to history but the same act perceived in its divine depth through illumination.

We must thus reject reductive historicism.  While some theologies identify revelation wholly with historical process, divine action is not exhausted by such historical causation. Revelation is present in history because divine agency shapes history, not because divine agency is reducible to historical movement. While historicism collapses transcendence, theological realism insists that history becomes revelatory because God acts in it, not because history itself is divine.

Objectiones

Ob I. If history is a locus of revelation, does this not subject divine action to temporal limitation?

Ob II. If revelation requires illumination, how can historical events be objectively revelatory?

Ob III. If God acts in history, is this not indistinguishable from special providence?

Ob IV. If revelation depends on the Logos-shaped form of events, does this merely reduce history to a symbolic structure?

Ob V. If the Spirit grants perception of revelation, does this not make revelation dependent on subjective experience?

Responsiones

Ad I. Divine action is not limited by time because the Logos shapes time. The temporal manifestation of divine act does not restrict its eternal identity.

Ad II. Objective revelatory status arises from divine action, not from human perception. Illumination grants awareness of what is already true. Revelation is objective in its occurrence and subjective in its reception.

Ad III. Special providence describes divine governance of events. Revelation describes divine manifestation within events. These are distinct modes of divine relation to history, not identical functions.

Ad IV. Historical events are not symbols. They are the real media of divine action. Their form is intelligible because the Logos constitutes their order, not because they are figurative constructs.

Ad V. Revelation is not dependent on experience. It is dependent on divine agency. Experience becomes awareness of revelation only when illumined by the Spirit.

Nota

History is not merely the record of human deeds. It is the temporal field ordered by the Logos as the site of divine self-manifestation. The Spirit grants creatures to perceive this manifestation as revelation rather than as mere occurrence.

Thus revelation is neither outside history nor reducible to history. It is divine action in history, apprehended through illumination.

Determinatio

We therefore determine:

1. History becomes a locus of revelation because it is shaped by the Logos as the arena of divine action.
2. Divine acts in history are not interruptions but fulfillments of temporal order.
3. Illumination grants creatures to perceive historical events in their divine intelligibility.
4. Revelation is objective in occurrence and participatory in reception.
5. Historical revelation requires theological realism, for only if divine action is real can history mediate it.

Time thus becomes the sphere in which creatures encounter the intelligible form of God’s act.

Transitus ad Disputationem LX

Having established history as the locus of revelation, we now turn to the question of divine providence and human freedom. For if history becomes revelatory through divine action, one must ask how creaturely agency participates in or resists this action. 

We proceed therefore to Disputatio LX: De Providentia et Libertate, where we examine how divine intention orders history without dissolving the freedom and responsibility of human agents.

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Disputatio LVIII: De Signo Theologico et de Forma Illuminationis

 On the Theological Sign and the Form of Illumination

Quaeritur

Utrum signum theologicum sit locus in quo intelligibilitas Logi efficitur praesens creaturis sub forma signi, ita ut revelatio non sit mera significatio sed manifestatio; et quomodo Spiritus efficit ut ista manifestatio fiat participabilis sine reductione signi ad nudam immanentiam.

Whether the theological sign is the locus in which the intelligibility of the Logos becomes present to creatures under the form of a sign, such that revelation is not mere signification but manifestation; and how the Spirit ensures that this manifestation is participable without reducing the sign to a merely immanent function.

Thesis

A theological sign is not a symbol that points beyond itself to a distant referent. It is a created form through which the Logos-constituted intelligibility of divine action becomes manifest in the finite. The sign is therefore not extrinsic to revelation but intrinsic to its economy.

The Spirit illumines the sign so that it becomes transparent to the divine act it mediates. Without the Spirit, the sign remains opaque, but with the Spirit, the sign becomes the medium of participation in the Logos’ intelligible presence.

Thus, theological signs do not merely convey information. They are the formal structures by which divine act becomes encounterable within creaturely horizons.

Locus Classicus

John 1:14
ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο.
“The Word became flesh.”

The incarnation is the archetype of all theological signs whereby a finite form makes the locus of divine manifestation.

Romans 10:17
ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς.
“Faith comes from hearing.”

The word heard is not a bare sound but a Spirit-illumined sign that mediates divine action.

Luther, WA 30 II, 552
Verbum Dei est signum et donum simul.
“The Word of God is both sign and gift.”

Theological signs participate in and deliver the reality they signify.

Explicatio

There is an insufficiency of semiotic models when detached from ontology. Modern accounts of signs often conceive signification as a relation between finite items: a signifier and a signified linked through convention or structure. While such accounts illuminate language, they cannot account for revelation. They lack a metaphysics of divine act and therefore reduce theological signs to linguistic functions. But revelation requires more than reference. It requires manifestation: the presence of divine intelligibility in a created medium. Thus the theological sign is not a semiotic function but a metaphysical participation.

The Logos is the form of every theological sign. Every divine act is intelligible because its form subsists in the Logos. Therefore every sign that mediates divine action must be a form shaped by the Logos. The sign does not merely refer to divine act but bears its intelligibility. Accordingly, the sign’s structure reflects the Logos’ form. Its content is not autonomous from divine initiative and its intelligibility is never self-standing but derivative upon the divine act. The incarnation is the paradigmatic case of this. But Scripture, sacrament, and promise share the same logic: each is a finite form bearing the intelligible presence of the Logos.

Illumination makes the sign participable. Without illumination, the sign remains closed. It does not disclose God, but merely displays creaturely form. Illumination opens the sign to become the medium of divine manifestation. This opening is not an epistemic alteration but an ontological donation. The Spirit grants creatures to encounter the divine act in and through the sign’s form. Knowledge arises because the sign becomes transparent to the Logos. Thus, illumination does not add meaning to the sign. It grants participation in the meaning the sign already bears.

The sign is an event rather than a static object. Theological signs are not static entities awaiting interpretation, but are rather events in which divine action becomes present. A sacrament is not an object but an enacted sign; Scripture is not merely text but living word; proclamation is not a speech-act alone but a site of divine address. The sign is therefore not exhausted by its linguistic or material properties. It is a finite locus of manifestation, rendered such by the Spirit who actualizes the Logos’ intelligibility within it.

The we must reject purely linguistic or immanent models. Postliberal theology sometimes construes revelation as emerging from within the grammar of the community. But the sign’s power does not lie in communal usage. It lies rather in divine action. The sign becomes revelation not when it is interpreted but when it is illumined. In this way, grammar orders discourse, while illumination grants reality. Thus, theological signs are not cultural artifacts whose meaning is negotiated, but are divine gifts that disclose.

Objectiones

Ob I. If signs mediate divine action, do we not reintroduce a created intermediary between God and creatures?

Ob II. If the Logos is the form of the sign and the Spirit the illuminator, is revelation split between form and access?

Ob III. If signs manifest divine act, does this collapse transcendence into immanence?

Ob IV. If illumination is necessary, how can signs retain objective meaning independent of subjective experience?

Ob V. If signs are events, does this undermine their stability or repeatability?

Responsiones

Ad I. Signs are not intermediaries but media. They do not stand between God and creatures but are the places where God acts. Their existence does not obscure God but reveal him.

Ad II. Revelation is not divided but ordered. The Logos shapes the sign’s intelligibility; the Spirit grants communion with this intelligibility. This expresses personal distinction, not division.

Ad III. Manifestation is not collapse. The finite does not contain the infinite. It is the locus where the infinite acts. Signs render God present without confining him.

Ad IV. Objective meaning arises from divine action, not from human consciousness. Illumination concerns reception, not constitution. The sign’s meaning is objective because its form is Logos-shaped.

Ad V. The sign’s repeatability arises from the constancy of divine intention. Its event-character does not eliminate stability but secures it: the same divine agent acts in each instantiation.

Nota

The theological sign is the place where divine intelligibility enters the finite economy under a form appropriate to creaturely reception. Its meaning lies neither in human interpretation nor in semiotic structures but in the Logos-shaped intelligibility that the Spirit illumines.

Thus theological signs cannot be reduced to texts, symbols, or practices. They are the finite forms through which God gives himself to be known.

Determinatio

We therefore determine:

1. Theological signs are finite forms made the loci of divine manifestation.
2. Their intelligibility is constituted in the Logos.
3. Their participability is granted by the Spirit.
4. Illumination does not alter the sign but opens it.
5. The sign mediates divine action not as representation but as presence.

Revelation is thus the event in which God’s intelligible act becomes manifest through a sign illumined by the Spirit.

Transitus ad Disputationem LIX

Having shown that theological signs mediate divine intelligibility through Spirit-illumined manifestation, we now turn to the economy of divine presence as it unfolds in history. For signs do not appear in abstraction but in a temporal order shaped by divine intention.

We proceed therefore to Disputatio LIX: De Historia Ut Loco Revelationis, where we consider how historical events become theological loci when illumined by the Spirit and formed by the Logos.

________

Quaestiones Analyticae Post Determinationem II

Q1. If a theological sign is a locus of manifestation rather than a semiotic relation, how does this relate to classical truth-conditional semantics?

Responsio

Truth-conditional semantics presumes propositional form. But theological signs precede propositional articulation. They provide the ontological ground upon which propositions can later be formed. The sign is not true or false; it is the site where divine action becomes manifest. Propositions about the sign acquire truth conditions only by referencing this manifestation.

Q2. Can theological signs be modeled within a hyperintensional semantics?

Responsio

Only analogically. Hyperintensionality captures distinctions finer than necessary equivalence, which is appropriate for theological signs whose meaning depends on participation, not extension. Yet signs exceed hyperintensional analysis because their identity lies not in conceptual structure but in divine act. Hyperintensional models can represent distinctions between interpretations but cannot constitute the reality they signify.

Q3. How does illumination relate to felicity conditions in theological discourse?

Responsio

Felicity pertains to the internal grammar of theological assertion. Illumination pertains to the external truth of what is asserted. A statement is felicitous when it accords with the grammar of faith; it is true when it corresponds to the Logos-constituted reality that the sign manifests. Illumination bridges the two by granting access to the reality that grounds felicity.

Q4. Do sacramental signs require a unique model-theoretic treatment?

Responsio

Yes. Sacramental signs are not merely designators but enactments. They cannot be captured by classical satisfaction (M ⊨ T). They require constitutive satisfaction (Λ ⊨* Tₜ), in which the divine act grounds both the sign and its efficacy. The model is not interpretive only; it is participatory.

Q5. If signs are events, does this eliminate the possibility of stable theological models?

Responsio

No. Events are stable insofar as the agent who performs them is stable. The constancy of divine intention grounds the repeatability of sacramental and scriptural signs. Stability in theology arises not from static forms but from the fidelity of the acting God.

Nota Finalis

This analytic section clarifies that theological signs occupy a space where ontology, semiotics, and logic converge. They resist reduction to any one of these domains. Their meaning is grounded in divine action, their form in the Logos, and their reception in the Spirit. This provides the conceptual foundation for the next disputation, where historical events become loci of revelation.

Disputatio LVII: De Spiritu Ut Luminatore Intelligibilitatis

On the Spirit as the Illuminator of Intelligibility

Quaeritur

Utrum Spiritus Sanctus sit ille qui creaturis dat participationem in intelligibilitate Logi, ita ut divina revelatio non sit mera cognitio sed ingressus in formam intelligibilem actus divini; et quomodo haec illuminatio neque confundat Logos cum Spiritu neque revelationem redigat ad nudam conceptualitatem.

Whether the Holy Spirit is the one who grants creatures participation in the intelligibility of the Logos, such that divine revelation is not mere cognition but entry into the intelligible form of divine act; and how this illumination neither confounds Logos and Spirit nor reduces revelation to conceptuality.

Thesis

As the Logos is the constitutive form of divine intelligibility, so the Spirit is the personal agent who grants creatures access to this intelligibility. The Spirit does not generate intelligibility. The Spirit illumines the intelligibility eternally constituted in the Logos and draws creatures into participation with it.

Thus the Spirit is not an epistemic supplement, nor a secondary condition added to divine self-disclosure. The Spirit is the very possibility of reception, the act whereby divine intelligibility becomes creaturely light. Revelation is therefore not a transmission of concepts but a participation in the intelligible articulation of divine life.

Locus Classicus

John 16:13
ὁδηγήσει ὑμᾶς εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
“He will guide you into all truth.”

The Spirit leads not by external instruction but by granting entry into the truth already articulated in the Logos.

1 Corinthians 2:10–12
τὸ γὰρ Πνεῦμα πάντα ἐρευνᾷ… ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν.
“The Spirit searches all things… that we might know the things freely given to us by God.”

Knowledge is the fruit of participatory illumination, not conceptual deduction.

Athanasius, Ep. Serap. I.20
οὐ χωρὶς τοῦ Πνεύματος θεογνωσία.
“There is no knowledge of God apart from the Spirit.”

Luther, WA 40 I, 226
Spiritus Sanctus est qui facit verbum intelligi et corda accendit.
“The Holy Spirit is the one who makes the Word understood and kindles the heart.”

Explicatio

The Spirit does not create intelligibility but opens it. The intelligibility of divine action is eternally constituted in the Logos. The Spirit neither adds to nor completes this intelligibility. Rather, the Spirit grants creatures participation in what the Logos eternally is. Illumination is therefore not a form of epistemic enhancement. It is the metaphysical condition under which divine intelligibility becomes available to those whose being is not divine. Without the Spirit there can be divine intelligibility but no creaturely apprehension of it.

Illumination as participation, not perception. Creaturely knowledge often assumes a model of perception: the object is intelligible; the subject observes. But revelation does not follow this pattern. For divine acts cannot be perceived as objects that stand before a viewer. Rather, one must participated in them. The Spirit is the one who effects this participation. To know God is to stand within the intelligible form of God’s act, and this standing-within is the Spirit’s gift. Thus, theology is grounded not in the capacities of the knower but in the indwelling of the Spirit who grants access to the Logos.

The Spirit and the Logos remain distinct in their missions. The divine missions reflect eternal relations. The Son manifests the Father; the Spirit grants communion with the Son. Illumination is therefore not reducible to articulation. The Logos articulates divine intelligibility; the Spirit incorporates creatures into this articulation.

There is no confusion of persons. The Spirit does not become the Logos nor supply what the Logos lacks. The Spirit brings creatures into the Logos without dissolving the personal distinction that grounds the economy. Revelation is intelligible life rather than conceptual content, for if revelation were merely conceptual, illumination would be superfluous. Human reason could grasp divine propositions as it grasps mathematical ones. But revelation is participation in divine life. Concepts may accompany this participation, but they are never its essence. The Spirit draws creatures into the Logos-shaped intelligibility of divine action. The mind is illuminated because the heart is converted. The intellect receives light because the whole person is brought under the form of divine act.

Thus, revelation is not information but transformation.There is an insufficiency of linguistic or communal models to grasp this. Some modern theologies treat illumination as the communal regulation of meaning. But linguistic formation alone does not yield divine knowledge. It orders speech, not reality. Grammar can describe how the church speaks of God, but the Spirit alone grants participation in God. To collapse illumination into communal formation is to reduce revelation to anthropology. It confuses theological intelligibility with linguistic coherence. The Spirit is not the curator of ecclesial grammar, but is rather the giver of divine light.

Objectiones

Ob I. If illumination is participation, however, knowledge becomes mystical rather than intelligible.

Ob II. If intelligibility is in the Logos and illumination in the Spirit, it seems that revelation is divided, for form is given by one person, and access by another.

Ob III. Illumination introduces contingency into revelation and access seems dependent on subjective conditions.

Ob IV. If the Spirit grants participation, human cognition seems bypassed, thus undermining the rational character of theology.

Ob V. Postliberal theology claims the community already possesses intelligibility through its practices, and thus the Spirit’s role becomes redundant.

Responsiones

Ad I. Participation is not obscurity. The Logos is form; the Spirit is light. To participate in form is to know truly, not to dissolve into the inarticulate. Mysticism is avoided because participation is in the Logos, whose intelligibility is determinate.

Ad II. Revelation is not divided but ordered. The Son is intelligibility; the Spirit is communion. These are not separable acts but one divine motion under distinct personal relations.

Ad III. Illumination is contingent for creatures, not for God. Divine intelligibility is eternally complete, yet creatures receive it according to their created and redeemed condition. This does not relativize revelation but confirms its gift-character.

Ad IV. Cognition is not bypassed but elevated. The Spirit does not cancel reason but enables it to apprehend what exceeds its natural horizon. Reason becomes capable of divine things because it is drawn into their form.

Ad V. Grammar regulates theological speech but does not confer divine knowledge. The Spirit is not redundant because the community cannot generate participation in God. While practices can shape discourse, only the Spirit grants knowledge.

Nota

The Spirit’s illumination is the metaphysical bridge between divine intelligibility and creaturely knowledge. It is neither enthusiasm nor epistemic supplementation. It is the act whereby God’s own intelligibility becomes creaturely light. Theology therefore depends neither on external demonstration nor on internal intuition. It depends on participation in the Logos through the Spirit.

This is why theology is always doxological, for the knower’s act is a response to divine illumination, not an autonomous achievement of reason.

Determinatio

We therefore determine:

1. The intelligibility of divine action is constituted in the Logos.
2. The illumination of this intelligibility for creatures is the work of the Spirit.
3. Revelation is participation in divine life, not merely conceptual apprehension.
4. The Spirit’s illumination preserves both divine transcendence and authentic theological knowledge.
5. Theological truth (Tₜ) is received only insofar as Λ ⊨* Tₜ becomes luminous to the creature through the Spirit’s act.

Transitus ad Disputationem LVIII

Having shown that the Spirit grants access to the intelligibility constituted in the Logos, we turn to the question of how this illumination takes shape in the order of signs. For revelation comes to creatures through words, sacraments, and histories.

Thus we proceed to Disputatio LVIII: De Signo Theologico et de Forma Illuminationis, where we examine how the Spirit-illumined Logos shapes the signs through which divine action becomes manifest in the created order.

_________

Quaestiones Analyticae Post Determinationem

Q1. You describe illumination as participation. How does this differ from epistemic justification?

Responsio

Justification concerns the adequacy of reasons for belief. Participation concerns the transformation of the knower’s being. Illumination precedes justification because it grants the very possibility of apprehending divine intelligibility. Justification operates within a horizon and illumination grants that horizon.

Q2. Does illumination imply a noetic regeneration analogous to moral regeneration?

Responsio

Yes, but not by analogy of degree. Noetic regeneration arises because divine intelligibility cannot be apprehended from the standpoint of fallen reason. Illumination does not destroy reason but reorders its orientation, giving it a share in the Logos’ form. This is not psychological improvement but ontological redirection.

Q3. If illumination is necessary for knowledge of God, does this undermine the possibility of natural theology?

Responsio

Not entirely. Natural theology may recognize that creation bears intelligible marks of divine goodness. But knowledge of God as God requires participation in divine intelligibility, which only the Spirit grants. Natural theology yields analogical apprehension; illumination yields participatory knowledge.

Q4. Could illumination be interpreted as a kind of divine testimony?

Responsio

Testimony is too weak a category. It presumes a propositional content relayed by a speaker. Illumination is not a report but a sharing. It grants the creature a share in the intelligibility of divine act rather than asserting propositions about it.

Nota Finalis

This disputation advances the theological logic established in LV and LVI by showing that intelligibility and its apprehension are not parallel operations but one divine motion received under two aspects: the Son articulates; the Spirit illumines. These analytic questions demonstrate that theological knowledge is neither constructed nor inferred but given as participation. They reveal that to know God is to stand in the light of the Logos by the Spirit who grants sight.

Disputatio LI: De Verbo Realiter Praesente: Utrum Praesentia Logi Sit Conditio Omnis Veritatis Revelatae

 On the Real Presence of the Word: Whether the Presence of the Logos is the Condition of All Revealed Truth

Quaeritur

Utrum praesentia realis Logi—tam in revelatione quam in sacramento et praedicatione ecclesiae—sit conditio sine qua non omnis veritatis revelatae; et utrum veritas theologiae consistat non tantum in actu constitutivo Logi (XL) sed etiam in eius praesentiali actualitate qua Logos adest ut verum manifestetur.

Whether the real presence of the Logos—in revelation, sacrament, and ecclesial proclamation—is the indispensable condition of all revealed truth; and whether theological truth consists not only in the constitutive act of the Logos (L) but also in His presential actuality by which the truth is disclosed.

Thesis

The Logos not only constitutes truth by making being (Disputatio L), but makes truth knowable by being present. Without the real presence of the Logos, revelation would be opaque, sacrament would be sign without reality, and proclamation would be sound without truth. Thus, the real presence of the Word is the condition of the possibility of revealed truth. Accordingly: Truth = Constitutive Act + Real Presence + Spirit-Authorized Reception. The Spirit unites these three by making the constituting Word present to the believing subject.

Locus Classicus

1. John 1:14 — Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο

Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν.
“And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.”

Incarnation is the primal instance of Logos constituting truth through real presence: veritas visibilis. Truth is not merely spoken; Truth comes.

2. Luke 24:32 — Ἐνῆπτεν ἡμῶν τὰς καρδίας

“Did not our hearts burn within us while He was with us and opened the Scriptures to us?”

Here Christ’s presence interprets Scripture: revealed truth requires the Revealer present.

3. Matthew 28:20 — ἐγὼ μεθ’ ὑμῶν εἰμι

“Lo, I am with you always, to the end of the age.”

Mission and proclamation contain revealed truth because Christ is with the Church. Presence grounds truth.

4. Cyril of Jerusalem, Mystagogical Catecheses I.7

“Μὴ νομίσῃς τὸν ἄρτον εἶναι· σῶμα Χριστοῦ ἐστιν.”
“Do not think this is bread; it is the Body of Christ.”

Sacramental truth is real presence, not an interpretive projection.

5. Luther, WA 26, 444 — “Das Wort ist der Träger der Gegenwart Christi.”

“The Word is the bearer of Christ’s presence.”

In preaching, the Logos is really present to accomplish what He says. Truth occurs because the Speaker is present in the speech.

Explicatio

While Disputation XL established that the Logos constitutes truth by creating the order of being, Disputation XLIX showed that theological truths require divine truthmakers, and Disputation L demonstrated that the Logos constitutes truth because He makes being, Disputatio LI advances the argument that truth must also be present to the recipient. Accordingly, revelation is not true because the world is shaped by the Logos alone, but it is true because the Logos is present in revelation.

1. Revelation: Presence as the Condition of Disclosure

Revelation is not information but manifestation. Truth is disclosed because the One who is Truth is present in the theophany in the Old Testament, the incarnation in the New Testament, and the indwelling of the Spirit.

2. Sacrament: Presence as the Condition of Efficacy

The truth of “This is my body” is contra Zwingli not symbolic, contra Lindbeck not merely intepretive, and contra Schleiermacher not merely communal. Rather, it is true because Christ is present constitutively and sacramentally.

3. Preaching: Presence as the Condition of Communication

Proclamation is not the recounting of absent truths, but is rather the mode of the Logos’ real presence through the Spirit. Thus, revelation is presence makes truth visible, the sacrament is presence makes truth tangible, and preaching is presence making truth audible. Accordingly, truth becomes truth-for-us by the real presence of the Word.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to Enlightenment rationalism, truth consists in clear propositions corresponding to empirical or conceptual content. Presence—divine, sacramental, or ecclesial—is epistemically irrelevant. Propositions can be true without the Logos being present; thus revealed truth does not require presence.

Ob II: According to Zwinglian and Memorialist Sacramental Theology, the sacrament need not involve the real presence of the Logos. Christ is absent bodily and present only in memory and faith. Sacramental truth is commemorative, not ontological. Therefore, real presence is not necessary for the truth of sacramental claims.

Ob III: On the reading of Postliberal Linguistic Theology, truth is intratextual coherence within the Church’s language-game. “Presence” introduces metaphysical commitments foreign to grammar-based theology. Meaning is generated by communal rules, not divine presence. Therefore, revealed truth does not require ontological presence.

Ob IV: Kantian Critical Philosophy claims that the divine, as noumenal, cannot be present in the phenomenal order. Revelation cannot involve real presence but must be symbolic or moral. Thus theological truth cannot depend on the Logos being present to human cognition.

Ob V: Secular Hermeneutics regards “presence” as a mythic remnant of pre-critical consciousness. Meaning is constructed, not given and nothing “comes” from outside interpretive structures. Therefore, the real presence of the Logos is neither possible nor necessary for truth.

Responsiones

Ad I: Propositions presuppose an intelligible world; intelligibility presupposes the Logos as arche and light. Rationalism mistakes derivative clarity for primordial illumination. Without presence, truth becomes abstraction without ontological ground. Presence grounds intelligibility itself.

Ad II: Divine speech is performative: God’s words accomplish what they signify. Christ’s “This is my body” is an ontological act, not a mnemonic suggestion. Sacramental truth is grounded in the Logos present as gift, not in subjective recollection. Without presence, sacrament has no truthmaker.

Ad III: Grammar accounts for internal felicity, not external truth. Without a real God present in Word and sacrament, theology becomes a self-referential linguistic practice. Presence supplies the external anchor postliberalism cannot provide.

Ad IV: Incarnation is the decisive negation of Kant’s phenomenal/noumenal divide. The Logos becomes flesh, rendering divine presence phenomenally given without ceasing to be infinite. Revelation presupposes a metaphysics larger than Kant’s categories permit.

Ad V:  Interpretation does not entail construction. That humans interpret does not imply that nothing is given. Presence is the metaphysical form of divine givenness—the condition under which revelation transcends mere projection. Meaning is received, not fabricated.

Nota

Presence is the ontological mode by which constitutive truth (L) becomes accessible as revealed truth.

Three clarifications follow:

1. Presence Makes Constitutive Truth Manifest. The Logos’ constitutive act grounds truth-in-itself; His presence grounds truth-for-us. Revelation requires not only that the Logos has acted but that He is present to the recipient.
2. Presence Is the Form of Theological Knowing. Theology is not cognition of absent propositions but participation in the Truth who comes. Knowledge of God is fundamentally encounter, not inference. Presence is the epistemic bridge uniting creaturely consciousness with divine act.
3. Presence Is the Sacramental Form of Divine Self-Giving. Revelation (light), proclamation (voice), and sacrament (gift) share one structure: the Logos present through the Spirit for the sake of truth. Without presence, revelation becomes history, sacrament symbol, and proclamation mere exhortation.

Thus: Veritas revelata = Verbum praesens. Revealed truth is nothing other than the Word present in His own disclosure. 

Determinatio

We determine:

1. The real presence of the Logos is necessary for all revealed truth, for without His presence revelation would not be self-disclosure.

2. Sacramental truth is grounded in real presence, not symbolic representation.

3. Preaching is a mode of presence, not a mere report of past acts.

4. Truth becomes truth-for-us through presence, as the Spirit unites creaturely knowing to divine manifestation.

5. Christ is both constitutive and presential truth: He makes truth and He is present as truth.

Thus theological truth is not merely metaphysical (L) nor merely linguistic (XLVIII), but presential:
the Truth who made all things is the Truth who comes to us.

Transitus ad Disputationem LII: De Donatione Referentiae per Spiritum

Having established that truth requires the real presence of the Logos, we next consider: How does the Spirit make this presence intelligible? Presence alone is not yet understanding.

Therefore we proceed to Disputatio LII: On the Donation of Reference by the Spirit wherein it will be asked how the Spirit gives the res of theological language—whether all theological understanding rests upon the Spirit’s act of donating the referent by interpreting the presence of the Logos to the creature.

Disputatio XLVII: De Contingentia Gratiae et Donatione Spiritus

On the Contingency of Grace and the Giving of the Spirit

Quaeritur

Utrum gratia, quae ex necessitate amoris divini oritur, contingenter tamen conferatur, et quomodo huiusmodi contingens donum in ordine Spiritus collocetur.

Whether grace, though proceeding from the necessity of divine love, is nevertheless bestowed contingently, and how such a contingent gift is ordered within the work of the Spirit.

Thesis

Since God is love, Grace arises necessarily from the divine nature. However, since creatures are finite and free, this grace is received contingently. The contingency of grace does not contradict divine necessity but manifests it in temporal form: necessitas amoris becomes contingentia doni. The Holy Spirit mediates this transition, translating eternal plenitude into temporal gift. Accordingly, divine necessity may appear as freedom and love as grace.

Locus Classicus

Ὁ ἄνεμος πνεῖ ὅπου θέλει, καὶ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ ἀκούεις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἔρχεται καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει· οὕτως ἐστὶ πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος.

— Ἰωάννης 3:8

“The wind blows where it wills, and you hear its sound, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone born of the Spirit.” — John 3:8

Here Christ compares the Spirit’s operation to a wind that moves freely yet lawfully: ubi vult spirat. Grace thus reveals itself as contingent in its temporal bestowal though grounded in divine necessity. The Spirit acts neither by whim nor by determinism, but according to the wise freedom of love.

“Gratia Dei non est secundum debitum, sed secundum libertatem voluntatis eius.”

— Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II, q.112, a.1

“The grace of God is not given according to debt, but according to the freedom of His will.” — ST I–II, q.112, a.1

Aquinas locates grace between necessity and arbitrariness. God necessarily wills the good, yet the particular mode of His giving remains free. Grace manifests divine necessity under the aspect of freedom: necessitas amoris in libertate donationis.

“Ἡ χάρις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια τοῦ Θεοῦ σωτήριος, ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐν Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ προϊοῦσα.”

— Γρηγόριος Νύσσης, In Canticum Canticorum Hom. XIII

“Grace is the saving energy of God, proceeding from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit.” — Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on the Song of Songs XIII

Gregory presents grace as the dynamic operation (energeia) of the Triune life itself, as an eternal act proceeding from the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit. Its contingency in time corresponds to its procession in eternity. What is eternal in God appears as temporal gift to creatures.

“Haec est summa et potissima fides Christianorum: credere Deum esse misericordem, non ex debito, non propter merita nostra, sed ex mera voluntate et gratuita bonitate.”

— Martin Luther, De Servo Arbitrio (WA 18, 719)

“This is the sum and substance of the Christian faith: to believe that God is merciful—not from obligation, nor because of our merits, but from His sheer will and gratuitous goodness.” — The Bondage of the Will

For Luther, the contingency of grace is the revelation of divine freedom, not its limitation. God acts freely because He is bound only to His own goodness. Grace is not a response to human disposition but the overflow of divine voluntas misericordiae. What seems contingent to us is the historical manifestation of a love that is, in God, eternal and necessary.

In these witnesses—the Gospel, Aquinas, Gregory, and Luther—the same paradox of grace is illuminated from differing angles. The Spirit’s freedom (ubi vult spirat), Aquinas’s libertas donationis, Gregory’s ἐνέργεια σωτήριος, and Luther’s mera voluntas et gratuita bonitas all converge upon one truth: that grace is both free and faithful, contingent in appearance yet necessary in source.

The contingency of grace thus safeguards the transcendence of divine love. Were grace necessary in its distribution, God’s will would be bound by external law; were it arbitrary, His goodness would cease to be intelligible. In reality, divine necessity and freedom coincide: Deus necessario et libere amat. The Spirit manifests this coincidence by translating eternal love into temporal acts of mercy, so that what is necessary in God may become contingent for us—ut amor necessarius Dei contingenter salvet.

Explicatio

In the metaphysical structure developed in the preceding disputation, possibility mediates necessity and contingency. Here, that mediation takes personal and salvific form. Grace is the realization of divine possibility within time—the act whereby God’s eternal necessity expresses itself as temporal mercy.

Divine necessity, rightly understood, is not mechanical determination but the perfect consistency of love with itself. Because God is necessarily good, He necessarily wills to communicate His goodness. Yet the form of this communication is not determined by nature but by freedom. Hence, grace is necessary quoad Deum, contingent quoad creaturam.

This dual aspect explains the paradox of salvation: that it is both divinely willed from eternity and freely bestowed in time. The contingency of grace does not imply arbitrariness but the fittingness (convenientia) of divine wisdom to the diverse conditions of creatures. In the order of the Spirit, grace assumes contingency as its very mode—grace is not an exception to divine order but its most intimate manifestation.

The Spirit, therefore, is the person of contingency in God: not in the sense of mutability, but as the openness of divine love to new relations. As the Father is the source and the Son the expression, the Spirit is the donation—the actuality of possibility, the temporalization of the eternal.

Objectiones

Ob. I. Necessitarianism claims that if grace flows necessarily from the divine nature, then no act of God could fail to bestow it. The contingency of grace would be illusory, for divine will would coincide with natural necessity.

Ob. II.  Libertarianism holds that if grace is contingent, then it is arbitrary; divine freedom becomes indistinguishable from caprice, and God’s constancy of love is undermined.

Ob. III. Pelegianism argues that if grace is contingent in its bestowal, then human cooperation can determine its reception. The gift becomes dependent on creaturely conditions rather than divine initiative.

Ob. IV. Modern Determinism supposes that contingency is merely epistemic, a function of our ignorance. From the standpoint of divine omniscience, grace is neither free nor contingent, but eternally fixed in a necessary decree.

Responsiones

Ad I. Divine necessity concerns the actus amoris, not the modus doni. God necessarily loves, but the way in which this love is communicated remains free. The distinction between essence and economy safeguards both necessity and contingency without contradiction.

Ad II. Divine freedom is not indeterminacy but superabundant self-determination. Grace is contingent not because it lacks reason but because its reason lies beyond necessity: ratio doni est bonitas donantis, not the need of the recipient.

Ad III. Human cooperation does not cause grace but manifests it. The contingency of grace includes the contingency of secondary causes; God ordains human response as the created medium through which His free gift becomes visible.

Ad IV. The contingency of grace is ontological, not merely epistemic. From the divine perspective, the act is necessary; from the creaturely perspective, it is free and unforeseen. The one act of God appears under two modalities, necessity and contingency, according to the order of participation.

Nota

Grace is the contingentia caritatis: the form in which divine love enters time. It is the historical mode of that which is metaphysically eternal. The contingency of grace is thus not an imperfection but its splendor—the glory of divine freedom refracted through the prism of created finitude.

The Spirit is the agent of this refracting. As light passing through crystal diversifies without division, so the Spirit distributes grace “as He wills” (1 Cor. 12:11), revealing the inexhaustible creativity of divine necessity. In every contingent act of grace, eternity touches time anew.

Determinatio

1. Grace proceeds necessarily from the divine essence: God, being Love itself (□G → □L), cannot but communicate Himself; the necessity of grace is identical with the necessity of divine self-diffusion.

2. The manifestation of grace is contingent: although grace proceeds necessarily in God, its historical and personal appearance (◊Gr ∧ ¬□Gr) depends upon the receptivity of creatures and the divine will’s fitting adaptation to them.

3. The Holy Spirit mediates between necessity and contingency: in the Spirit, the unchanging love of God becomes freely given gift (□L → ◊Gr), so that divine necessity is expressed as temporal generosity without ceasing to be eternal.

4. Contingency in grace is not defect but plenitude: it signifies not imperfection but the overflow of infinite love into finite form—the mode by which immutability makes the new possible.

5. In Christ the logic of grace is fulfilled: the eternally necessary Son (□F) becomes contingently incarnate (◊F), and through this union the necessity of love and the freedom of gift coincide.

6. Thus, the contingency of grace reveals divine rationality as donation: grace is intelligibility-in-gift, the rational outpouring of necessary love through the Spirit into the ever-new contingencies of creation.

Transitus ad Disputationem XLVIII: De Fine Creationis et Ordine Amoris

The mystery of grace leads inevitably to the mystery of order. For every gift implies an orientation, and every donation seeks its end. If grace is the contingent manifestation of divine love, then creation itself must be ordered toward love as its final cause.

The next disputation therefore asks how this ordo amoris—the harmony between divine necessity, created freedom, and ultimate purpose—constitutes the final intelligibility of all things. We turn from the contingency of grace to the teleology of love, from donum to finis.

Let us transition then to Disputationem XLVIII: De Fine Creationis et Ordine Amoris, in which we shall demonstrate that love, which is necessary in God and contingent in grace, also pertains to the universal end through which everything returns in the unity of the Spirit.