In July of 1955, Marcus Singer discussed in Mind (Vol. 64, No. 255: 361-375) the so-called "generalization argument in ethics." The argument's general form is this: "If everyone were to do that, the consequences would be disastrous (or undesirable); therefore no one ought to do that" (361). An instance of the argument is this: "The consequences of no one doing x would be undesirable; therefore everyone ought to do x. The question for Singer is this: What are "the conditions under which the fact that the consequences of doing x would be undesirable provides a good reason for concluding that it is wrong for anyone to do x" (361)?
Singer believes that determining these conditions links to the basic principle underlying generalization arguments. The generalization principle states that what is right or wrong for one person must be right or wrong for any similar person in similar circumstances" (362). In the Mind article Singer defends the validity of the generalization argument, leaving open the question of its soundness, that is to say, there is nothing in the form of the generalization argument that determines whether or not the consequences of everyone acting in a certain way are, in fact, undesirable. He is not concerned with the "desirability or undesirability of a certain set of consequences" (375), but only with the hypothetical 'were the consequences of x undesirable were all to do x', then no one ought to do it.
Because he is not concerned with the truth of the assertion, 'were everyone to do x, the consequences would be undesirable', he does not take seriously the popular objection to the generalization argument: "Not everyone will do x." Singer claims that the objection "is irrelevant because the argument does not imply that everyone will" do x. What it implies is that "if A has the right to do something, then everyone else (or everyone similar to A in certain respects) has the same right in a similar situation," or alternately, "if it is undesirable for everyone to have this right, it is undesirable for A to have it" (374-75). Singer believes that while it might be undesirable for A to have a certain right, this does not entail that the consequences of A acting in a particular way are themselves undesirable (375).
While Singer does not find the objection 'not everyone will do x' relevant to evaluating the validity of 'if the consequences of everyone doing x are undesirable, no one ought to do x,' in the actual application of generalization arguments it nonetheless seems quite important.
Take a standard example, 'If everyone were to engage only in homoerotic activity then there would be no children and the human race would end, then no one ought engage only in homoerotic behavior'. Is this valid?
One might say that it is formally valid, but point out that the antecedent simply does not in fact obtain. It is simply not the case that everyone will engage only in homoerotic behavior. Clearly, if it is false that the antecedent in fact holds, then the first conditional is vacuously true.
But it must be admitted that if the disaster conceived on the supposition of exclusive homoerotic behavior will not in fact obtain, then the very motivation to cast the homoerotic behavior argument as a generalization argument resting on the generalization principle disappears. If, as a matter of fact, only 5% or less of the population engages in exclusive homosexual activity, then correct application of the generalization principle must take this fact into consideration in determining what is to count as "similar circumstances."
Imagine Molly is deciding how to apply the generalization principle when determining whether or not to initiate sexual activity with Myrna. She thinks, "what is right or wrong for me must be right or wrong for similar people in similar circumstances." Thus it is, thinks Molly, that my desire to engage with Mryna must be judged acceptable if people having the particular psychological orientation I have are deemed acceptable in pursuing homoerotic relationships with others who, like Myrna, are open to them.
Clearly, Molly's thinking has drifted far away from an application such as this: Molly is similar to every other woman in being a woman, and since if all women were to have only homosexual relationships is disastrous for the human race, then Molly having only homosexual relationships is disastrous for the human race. Obviously, everything depends on what one understands "similar" to mean. How does one rightfully apply similarity here?
How does generalization in ethics affect contemporary thinking on climate policy? Is such policy committed to a generalization principle that is, in fact, misapplied?
The default position of many of the North Atlantic countries on climate policy seems to be this: If the situation of no countries doing anything to limit greenhouse emissions is undesirable, then all countries should limit greenhouse emissions. Or alternately, if every country ignoring greenhouse emissions has disastrous consequences, then no country ought to ignore such emissions. Again, one might grasp that the generalization argument rests on this principle: what is right or wrong for one country with regard to greenhouse emissions must be right or wrong for any similar country in similar circumstances.
Those convinced of the general validity of this principle are obviously convinced that the fact that not every country will limit greenhouse emissions is irrelevant to what ought to be done, for clearly, if every country were so to limit emissions then disaster might be averted.
But does this situation not call for an investigation of what motivates the application of the argument in this context? Clearly, the presupposition is that it is in the power of every country to limit greenhouse emissions.
Compare this to the situation of Molly. Can it be said that it is fully within the power of Molly simply not to be predisposed to homoerotic activity? In one sense, of course, Molly might reasonably be said to have the power to do other than what she might otherwise want to do with Mryna, but does this mean that she has the power not to have the general psychological orientation she has? Given her psychological orientation, and given the psychological orientation of others similar to her, and given the relative infrequency of her psychological orientation among the general population, could it be said that acting in accordance with her psychological proclivities actually lead to disastrous consequences?
It might be similarly argued, that while every nation may have the abstract power to limit greenhouse emissions, many would not find it in their best immediate interest so to, and might even find it almost impossible to limit such emissions given the current socio-economic conditions obtaining in their country, and the happiness of the actual populations of that country! What I am suggesting is simply this: Just as it seems that 'not everybody will do so' is ethically relevant to the application of the generalization argument to homoerotic behavior, so is it relevant to that argument's application with respect to greenhouse emissions.
Take, for example, the country of Germany having the fourth largest GDP in all the world. Many in Germany are convinced by the generalization argument. Since every country ignoring greenhouse emissions would lead to disastrous consequences for the future of humanity, it is not morally permissible for Germany to ignore such emissions. Presumably, German citizens hold this even knowing that were they completely to eliminate fossil fuel consumption, such elimination by itself has virtually no effect on global temperatures over the next 100 years. The actual consequences of Germany eliminating fossil fuels is irrelevant, we are told, from their ethical mandate so to eliminate these fuels, for "if everybody continuing to burn fossil fuels has disastrous consequences for the earth, then it is not allowable that Germany should continue to burn such fuels."
But why exactly? Why should Germany and the North Atlantic countries limit emissions over the next century when, as a matter of fact, most of the developing countries will increase emissions dramatically? Why must Molly act like the rest of the women who are unlike her? What makes Germany unlike countries like India and China that will likely raise carbon emission levels through the end of the century? How should we apply the criterion of similarity here?
I would argue that while Molly is unlike 19 out of 20 women, (but like 1 out of 20), Germany is more like China and India than it likely believes. Undeveloped, developing and developed countries share overarching similarities. They are all comprised of people who want to have enough food to eat, clean water to drink and air to breath, and energy to heat and cool their days and get them from one place to another.
Right now there is general acceptance that undeveloped and developing countries do not have the requisite socio-economic structures that would allow them to eschew consumption of all fossil fuels. Prohibiting such consumption would wreak havoc within their societies with concomitant suffering of their populations. It would lead to the profound unhappiness of their populations. Is Germany ultimately more similar or dissimilar to these countries? Does Germany find herself in similar or dissimilar circumstances with respect to these other countries? How does the generalization principle rightfully get applied?
I believe that the fact that not all countries will limit emissions is ethically relevant to the generalization argument with regard to climate policy. Given that Germany has a population that wants many of the same things that the folks of India and China want, how does the requirement that Germany's population suffers by deeply limiting their carbon footprint find ethical justification when the other populations will not in fact limit fossil fuel emissions, and that Germany's reductions will likely have no discernible effect on temperature and sea-level measurements world-wide?
The answer might be more surprising than we originally imagine. Perhaps it is because the plausibility of using the generalization argument in climate policy is based on a presumed dissimilarity between Germany and the developing countries. Just as Molly might get a pass from the ethical requirement of exclusive heterosexual behavior based upon her dissimilarity from the rest of the women, so does the requirement that Germany achieve all fossil fuels emissions ultimately rest on its dissimilarity from the populations of the undeveloped and developing countries. While China and India are exempt from the requirement to limit fossil fuel use based upon the sufferings of their populations were such fuels not used, so is Germany not exempt from this requirement. After all, the German population has already developed and has no right to claim an exclusion from general requirements of the generalization argument. Thus, the suffering that eschewing carbon emissions will bring to German life are simply not ethically relevant the German situation.
This is a rather startling conclusion, I think, and I shall end this reflection purposefully in ambiguity because the ethical situation underlying it is not clear. I have claimed that the generalization argument seems to support current climate policy. The argument is this: If the effect of all nations not dropping carbon emissions is disastrous, then it is not allowable that one nation not drop carbon emissions. This is so because what is right or wrong with respect to this issue for one country, is right or wrong with respect to this issue for all similar countries in similar situations. Thus, Germany must drop their carbon emissions even though dropping such emissions will have little to no effect on world-wide temperatures and sea-levels.
All of this is clear enough, bur remember that that not all countries will drop their carbon emissions. So what is Germany's responsibility in lowering carbon emissions given that lowering such emissions themselves have little effect on the climate? Here we must look to the generalization principle itself. What makes a country similar to another? I have suggested that through a strange inversion of its use, the chief perpetrators of high carbon emissions are protected from moral censure on the grounds that adopting strict carbon emission policies would lead to untoward suffering to their populations. Germany, however, (and by extension other North Atlantic countries) are dissimilar from these populations in ways that do not allow escape from moral censure. Because of this dissimilarity, Germany is condemned. The fact that many countries will not lower emissions is somehow not ethically relevant to the proscription and the guilt under which Germany labors.
I do not believe that that such moral censor ought be the case, and I would argue that populations are comprised of concrete individuals whose sufferings are morally relevant to climate policy no matter what countries they inhabit. Further, I would argue that the Rule Utilitarian yardstick simply does not work in climate policy. Here we must be Act Utilitarians. But this argument awaits another post.
