Thesis 2: Truth Conditions arise in Theology only within Models

Thesis

Theological sentences possess truth-conditions only when the language of theology (T) is interpreted within a model that specifies an ontological domain and assigns denotations to its terms.

Explicatio

Language becomes semantically charged only when its symbols are given reference or extension. Logic distinguishes between the syntax of well-formed sentences and the semantics that determine what those sentences are about. 

Theology, too, must follow this distinction. The language of faith, T, by itself defines forms of saying; but only when T is interpreted in an ontological model M—one that specifies the kinds of beings, relations, and properties relevant to God and the world—can its sentences be called true or false.

Theology therefore speaks truth not by fiat but by interpretation. The same expression in T may yield different meanings under different models. For example:

• In a purely moral model, “Christ dwells in the believer” denotes ethical imitation.

• In a participatory model, the same sentence expresses an ontological indwelling.

Each model defines how sentences with the predicate “dwells in” are to be satisfied, that is, what must exist and what relations must obtain for 'x dwells in y' to be true. Hence, truth in theology always presupposes a chosen ontological model, a model that specifies what there is, and how predicates and relations are constituted on the basis of what there it. Accordingly, to talk about truth without specifying that model is to speak ambiguously.

This is not relativism but precision. Just as physics distinguishes Newtonian and relativistic models of motion, theology can distinguish Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, or Lutheran-participatory models of divine–human relation. The statement “God acts in the world” is true only within the model that makes sense of divine action as a causal relation rather than as a mere metaphor.

To assign truth-conditions is thus to commit oneself ontologically. Theologians do not have the luxury of “neutral” statements about God. Every true sentence in T assumes a world in which its referents exist and its predicates obtain. Modeling makes that world explicit.

Objectiones

Objection 1. If truth depends on a model, does this not make theology relativistic? Each community could select its own model and call its sentences true.

Objection 2. Furthermore, divine reality exceeds any human model. To claim that truth arises within a model risks domesticating the transcendent into human categories.

Objection 3. The believer’s certainty is grounded in revelation, not in semantic interpretation. Why replace faith’s immediacy with formal mediation?

Responsiones

Ad 1, I answer that dependence on a model does not mean dependence on subjective choice. Models are not arbitrary; they are constrained by Scripture, tradition, and rational coherence generally. A model is the theologian’s explicit description of the ontological assumptions already operative in any claim about God. By exposing those assumptions, theology becomes accountable to reason and revelation alike. Truth is relative to a model, but models themselves are evaluable by adequacy, applicability, and fidelity to the deposit of faith. 

Ad 2, I concede that God transcends all models. Yet this is precisely why theology must name its models, for in the naming of models we confess our finitude. A model is not a cage for the divine but a disciplined window through which finite minds may speak truly about God without presuming total comprehension. The necessity of modeling arises from our creatureliness; we have no God's eye perspective. Moreover, the humility of modeling arises from God’s transcendence.

Ad 3, I reply that faith’s immediacy does not bypass form. The Word that creates faith also creates meaning. To believe is to affirm a proposition embedded in a structure of sense, e.g., “Christ for me,” “The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.” These sentences are already modeled linguistically and ontologically. Formal interpretation does not destroy faith; it clarifies what faith confesses to be true.

Therefore, theological truth arises when felicitous expressions in T are interpreted within a model that faithfully renders divine–human relations. Without models, theology can speak only felicitously; with models, it can speak truly.

Nota

The Institute of Lutheran Theology's (ILT) intellectual vocation requires precisely this labor of modeling. The seminary must help the Church understand not only what it confesses but how its confessions become true. In a fragmented age, ILT can stand as a community that names the models through which theological language attains truth. By teaching students to interpret the Church’s speech within faithful models, we prepare a new generation to articulate the real presence of God in the world without confusion or collapse. 

Thesis I: Understanding Theological Expressions Syntactically

The following series of posts deal with the theses of a theological position I am developing. Each posts teases out aspects of my position by articulating a thesis, an explicatio of that thesis, possible objectiones to the thesis, appropriate responsiones to those objections and closes with a nota about the wider significance of the thesis. Happy reading!

Thesis

Theological expressions T are first to be regarded as syntactical—governed by formation and inference rules—so that questions of meaning and truth arise only when T is interpreted within a model.

Explicatio

Before theology can claim truth, it must have a disciplined language. Every theological expression belongs to a larger body of speech, the language of faith (T), which must be treated as a formal system. In this way, T functions as a formal system before it functions as a disclosure of reality. Within this formal domain, what matters is not whether a sentence is true or false, but whether it is well-formed, consistent, and properly related to other expressions in T.

Regarding T syntactically does not, however, deny the importance of truth; it simply postpones the question of truth until the language of faith can be mapped into an ontological domain, that is, into a model. Just as logic separates syntax from semantics to avoid circularity, theology must first secure the integrity of its own discourse syntactically. (Syntax deals with the structure and form of expressions, while semantics concerns the meaning and truth of such expressions.)  

Thus, when a theologian says, “Christ is truly present in the Eucharist,” she is using terms that have definite inferential roles present before anyone can ask whether the statement corresponds to reality. “Presence,” “Christ,” and “Eucharist” each carry rules of use inherited from Scripture, liturgy, and doctrine. If those rules are violated, the statement loses felicity, that is, it loses the very conditions under which it can succeed as a linguistic act, the conditions under which it can be meaningful and/or true. Questions about these conditions are logically prior to questions about the truth of the expressions in question.  

This syntactical focus functions as theological self-discipline. It enables theology to evaluate its own utterances for coherence, consistency, and intelligibility. It also makes theology a public language that can, at least formally, be inspected by reason. Only after this groundwork is established can theology responsibly address the question of truth.

Objectiones 

Objection 1. It seems that theology is not merely a formal system. The truth of the gospel precedes our linguistic rules; therefore, treating theology as syntactical appears to place human logic above divine revelation.

Objection 2. Furthermore, language about God is inherently analogical and poetic. To demand syntactical discipline risks freezing the living Word into an artificial system of rules.

Objection 3. Finally, faith speaks to the heart, not to the structure of propositions. The believer’s “I believe” cannot be reduced to well-formed formulas without destroying its existential immediacy.

Responsiones 

Ad 1, I respond that syntax does not supersede revelation; it serves it. The Word of God comes to us in human speech, and therefore within grammar. To regard theology syntactically is to recognize that divine communication has entered human linguistic form. Theologians discipline their speech not to confine revelation but to preserve its intelligibility.

Ad 2, I concede that analogical and poetic elements are indispensable in religious and theological language. Yet even poetic utterances have grammar. If theology abandons syntactical coherence, it can no longer distinguish legitimate mystery from mere contradiction. The formality of T is the condition for theological creativity; it keeps the Word from dissolving into private sentiment or ideological projection.

Ad 3, I affirm that faith involves the whole person. But faith as confession—as the public saying of truth—inevitably adopts linguistic form. When we speak “I believe,” we participate in a structured language that binds our speech to the faith of the Church. The syntax of T is the scaffolding that allows individual confession to join communal discourse.

Thus, viewing theology syntactically does not imprison the Word; it prepares the way for its faithful interpretation in models of reality. Syntax is the threshold of truth, not its substitute.

Nota

The Institute of Lutheran Theology (ILT) reflects this principle in its operations. A theological school must first safeguard the grammar of Christian teaching before it can speak persuasively to the world. By teaching future pastors how to use theological language with precision, ILT cultivates the felicity conditions for proclamation. The Church’s speech will be true only where its syntax remains faithful.