Bare Particulars, Trinity and Incarnation I

I

I was blessed thirty years ago to be a graduate student in philosophy at the University of Iowa.  It was in the 1980s, a time where the influence of the "Iowa School" was rapidly waning.  The "Iowa School" of philosophy was associated inter alia with the work of Herbert Feigl, Gustav Bergmann, Wilfred Sellers and Everett Hall.  These men deeply understood logical positivism and further grasped that ontological questions could not be disassociated from it.  While none were teaching at Iowa in the 1980s, excellent philosophers like Panayot Butchvarov remained who were profoundly interested in questions of contemporary metaphysics.   

Of all of the Iowa philosophers, Gustav Bergmann was perhaps the most interesting.  Born in Vienna in 1906 with a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Vienna, Bergmann was briefly a member of the famous "Vienna Circle" before moving to Berlin in 1931 to work with Einstein on certain aspects of mathematical physics.

Bergmann later migrated to America in the late 1930s and was invited to the University of Iowa to work with the Gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin.  While Bergmann and Lewin parted company fairly quickly, Bergmann made connections at Iowa and was appointed a lecturer in the early 1940s, finally progressing to full professor by 1950.    Bergmann stayed in Iowa City beyond his retirement in 1974.  I remember seeing him occasionally in the philosophy department in the early 1980s when I was there, often reading an Italian novel.  Unfortunately, he developed Alzheimer’s and succumbed to the disease in 1987.  

Bergmann was committed to logical positivism early on, and retained a general orientation towards logical empiricism throughout his life.[1]  He was also an unregenerate realist who held that metaphysics was not only possible, but necessary if one was going to give a coherent account of the ontological structure grounding the semantic conditions of ideal language.  Starting with the syntax of the language of formal logic, Bergmann attempted to make explicit the logical structure of that language by pointing to the metaphysical constitution of the objects and states of affairs referred to by that language.[2] 

The Iowa School has always been interested in the metaphysics of universal and particulars, believing that careful analysis of a logically perspicuous language could bear metaphysical fruit.   And Bergmann’s vineyard was indeed lush!   A committed realist who granted ontological status to various kinds of abstract objects, Bergmann advocated that the common sense particulars of which we are directly acquainted, e.g., this ball and that spot, are actually not metaphysically simple, but rather are constituted by metaphysically more basic bare particulars exemplifying various universals.  Bergmann thus argued for a “complex ontology” while eschewing a “functional ontology” (Frege).[3]   There is much wisdom to be gleaned in reading Bergmann, though such reading is mostly out of favor today.[4]

II

In this essay I want to review Bergmann’s notion of a bare particular with an eye towards its theological appropriation.   Is there any way that this notion can be helpful in understanding the ontological grounds for Trinitarian and Christological discourse?  

Bergmann’s Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong gives a description of what he means by a ‘bare particular’. 

A bare particular is a mere individuator.  Structurally that is its only job.   It does nothing else.   In this respect it is like Aristotle’s matter, or, perhaps more closely, like Thomas’ material signata.   Only, it is a thing.[5]

Bergmann claims that two red spots can “exemplify” the same universals (e.g., redness, spot-shapeness), and are yet different spots because they are constituted by different bare particulars.  Like Aristotelian primary substances, bare particulars can neither be “said of” any other thing nor be “present in” something else.  Furthermore, while bare particulars are predicated, they cannot be predicated of any other thing.  Bare particulars, unlike properties, are thus the ultimate subjects of predication.  While ‘white’ can be “said of” particular white properties or can be “present in” particulars as such, it can also be predicated: this particular white property had by this particular can itself be said to be white.[6]  This is not possible with a bare particular.  In phrases like ‘x is a bare particular’, the “is” must be one of identity and not attribution.  

Bill Vallicella has written quite cogently about the metaphysical situation regarding bare particulars.[7]  Such particulars, while possessing properties, have no natures, that is, they have nothing by virtue of which the particular is the particular that it is.  Bergmann countenanced that an external relation of exemplification obtains between bare particulars and the universals that are “exemplified” in them.   For instance, bare particular a can exemplify whiteness and felininity (catness), in that whiteness and felininity are both “here.”   The relation of exemplification is external because there is nothing about whiteness or felininity that necessitates there exemplification at a.   Conversely, there is nothing about being a that requires whiteness and felininity to be so exemplified. Since every bare particular is externally related to the properties that are exemplified at that particular, the properties had by the bare particular or merely accidental to it.   While this particular exemplifies white and felininity, it is possible for it to have exemplified black and canininity (dogness). 

The fact that bare particulars are not Aristotelian substances is easily grasped.  Aristotelian substances have a “layer” of properties without which the particular could not be the particular it is.  One might say that the individual is internally related to its nature for Aristotle.[8]  As Vallicella points out, on an Aristotelian understanding, the particular Fido is no longer free to take on any property whatsoever.  The dog Fido cannot, as it were, take on the property of felininity and still be the dog Fido.  In other words, the particular Fido is a canine in each and every possible world in which Fido exists.  

This is not the case with the bare particular a, for apparently, a can take on properties like canininity or felininity at will as it skirts through possible worlds.  The capability a posseses to do this is necessary if a is properly to individuate, for a bare particular simply is that which individuates two qualitatively identical objects.   This red spot and that red spot are individuated by the fact that this red spot is this one and that red spot is that one.   A bare particular always exemplifies some property or other, but does so only contingently. Any properties exemplified at a are simply primitively exemplified at a.  There is no deeper ground in a, no nature, that determines the expression of any particular properties at a.   Vallicella terms this feature “promiscuous combinability”: each bare particular can “hook up” with any universal, in that it is logically possible for any universal to be exemplified at any bare particular. 

Bergmann is a constituent ontologist holding that bare particulars are ingredient in each ordinary particular, that is, an ordinary particular is constituted by a bare particular exemplifying properties.   One could argue that a bare particular having constituent parts violates the nature of that particular’s particularity, and advance instead a non-constituent ontology for particulars.   On this view, there would be no deeper constitution of an ordinary particular. The particular is numerically distinct from other particulars, although that by which it is numerically distinct is not specified.  This seems the tactic of Nicholas Wolterstoff, who rejects Bergmann’s constituent analysis claiming that ordinary particulars are, in fact, simple.[9] 

At this point we might distinguish Bergmann’s “bare particular” from the notions of “thin particular” and “thick particular.”   David Armstrong seems – unjustly in my view -- to think his “thin particular” is different than Bergmann’s “bare particular.” But his distinction between thick and thin particulars is useful.   While a thin particular is a particular considered in isolation from the properties it instantiates, a thick particular is that thin particular considered in combination with the properties it instantiates.[10]  Armstrong declares, “the thin particular remains the particular with its attributes abstracted away.  The thick particular is again a state of affairs: the thin particular’s having the (particular) attributes that it has.  Armstrong’s thin particular, like Bergmann’s bare particular, is committed to a constituent analysis of ordinary particulars. 

I assume for the remainder of this article that the notion of a “bare particular” or “think particular” is ultimately philosophical defensible, though I know that much work is needed in making that defense.  As a theologian, my purpose is not to do the philosopher’s deep work at this time, but rather to move to a different question entirely.   What do the doctrines of the Trinity and two natures of Christ look like when assuming that notion of bare particularity?  How do “bare” or “thin” particulars relate to the tradition’s understanding of hypostasis and persona?  Finally, how might this discussion connect with Scotus’ notion of haeccity?   I will take up these questions in the next post.         
   

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[1] Defining “logical empiricism” is not easy.  Richard Creath writes, "What held the group together was a common concern for scientific methodology and the important role that science could play in reshaping society. Within that scientific methodology the logical empiricists wanted to find a natural and important role for logic and mathematics and to find an understanding of philosophy according to which it was part of the scientific enterprise.”  See Creath, Richard, "Logical Empiricism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .[2] For an overview of the life and philosophy of Bergmann, see William Heald, “From Positivism to Realism: The Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann, 1992, http://digital.lib.uiowa.edu/bai/heald.htm.
[3] His constituent ontology analyzes seeming particulars into bare particulars exemplifying universals.   A function ontology eschews “in” as the primary metaphysical relationship, substituting instead a coordinating function, e.g., the function of {green, oval, spatio-temporal location} as argument delivers “this spot” as a value.
[4] Bergmann does place fairly heavy demands upon his reader.   Those interested in his work should study the following:  Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis: Ontology and Analysis:  Essays and Recollections about Gustav Bergmann, eds., Addis, Jesson and Tegtmeier (Muenchen: Walter de Gruyter, 2013); Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis: Fostering the Ontological Turn: Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987), eds. Egidi and Bonino, (Muenchen: Walter de Gruyter, 2013); and Philosophsche Analyse / Philosophical Analysis: Gustav Bergmann: Phenomenological Realism and Dialectical Ontology, eds., Langlet and Monnoyer, (Muenchen: Walter de Gruyter, 2013).
[5]Gustav Bergmann, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (Madison, WS: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 25.
[6] All of this goes back, of course, to Aristotle in his Categories.   Aristotle famously said that only particular substances are neither “said of” nor “present in” something else.
[7] See http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2014/11/bare-particulars-versus-aristotelian-substances.html.
[8] a is internally related to b if and only if the being of a is in part determined by the being of b, e.g., I am internally related genetically to my father.  a is externally related to b if and only if the being of a is not affected by the relationship a has to b, e.g., my father is externally related genetically to me.
[9] See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Bergmann’s Constituent Ontology,” Nous 4:2 (May 1970), 116ff. 
[10] See David Armstrong, “Universals as Attributes,” 65-93, Michael Loux, Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings (New York: Routledge, 2001), 79:  “The thin particular is a, taken apart from its properties (substratum).   It is linked to its properties by instantiation, but it is not identical to them. . . .  However, this is not the only way a particular can be thought of.   It can also be thought of as involving its properties.  . . This is the thick particular.  But the thick particular, because it enfolds both thin particulars and properties, held together by instantiation, can be nothing but a state of affairs.”   Armstrong seems to think that Bergmann’s “bare particular” does not instantiate properties, a view that Bergmann explicitly denies.

Horizons and Proper Theological Education

Good theology is always involved in mediation.  I am not here directly talking about the Vermittlungstheologie of the nineteenth century, a theology inspired by the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), and associated with such names as Isaak Dorner (1809-84), Julius Mueller (1801-78), and Richard Rothe (1799-1867).  A look at Vermittlungstheologie is, however, important to clarify what it is that I don't and do mean when talking about theology as mediation.

Historically, Vermittlungstheologie commenced with the 1828 founding of the Heidelberg theological journal Theologische Studien und Kritiken.  The founding editor of the journal was obviously thinking Hegelian thoughts when he wrote:  "Mediation is the scientifically tracing back of relative oppositions to their original unity, through which an inner reconciliation and higher standpoint is gained by which they are transcended, the intellectual position arising out of this mediation being the true, healthy mean."  [See Roger Olsen, The Journey of Modern Theology: From Reconstruction to Deconstruction, p. 242.]  

As practiced, however, Vermittlungstheologie was less concerned with making proper Hegelian moves, and more interested simply in carving out a bridge between two apparent opposites, e.g., between the Gospel and the secularized culture, between rationalism and supernaturalism, between Hegel and Schleiermacher, between theology and the life of the church.

Dorner was perhaps the most famous of the mediating theologians, trying as he did to mediate faith as Christianity's subjective standard with Scripture as its objective standard.  He also wanted to combine aspects of the "feeling approach" of Schleiermacher with the deeply rational intellectual approach of Hegel [Olsen, p. 243].  In his reflection upon God, he searched to mediate between transcendent immutability and immanent changeability.  His "progressive incarnation" attempted to mediate orthodox and kenotic Christology.  

Many of the moves of historical mediating theology can be associated with the tension between rationalism and romanticism, between objectivity and subjectivity.  While this dialectic remains with us today - - I am thinking specifically of views of scriptural authority advocating a causal relationship between God and Scripture versus views that claim authority arises in the meaningful confrontation of text and reader  - - I am not thinking primarily of objectivity/subjectivity or thinking/feeling when conceiving mediation, but rather the the poles of message and context, kerygma and cultural situation.   All good theology is contextual because all effective theology must start with the historical proclamation of the particularity of Christ and the constellation of events so linked, and connect this to the universal human situation - - or at least that which is considered universal within a particular cultural trajectory.  Theology mediates the horizon of the proclaimed Christ event with the intellectual and cultural horizon of its reception.  

As I look at the current situation within Lutheran churches within North America, I see a general attempt to avoid effective mediating theology.  This is no surprise in this.  This type of mediation is very difficult work.  The problem is that one pole of the mediation seems often to be cancelled, redescribed, or otherwise assimilated by the other.   This seems true of theological education in particular.  

In order to see this, consider one antipode of the dialectic to be the proclaimed Christ event, the kerygma of Christ and Him crucified for our salvation, and the other pole to be the present intellectual and cultural horizon, the sum total of received contexts of significance and meaning, the assumed cannons of rationality, the intellectual/cultural ethos.   Thinking about theological education, it is easy to see that Lutheran seminaries have a tendency to concentrate upon one of the poles and, accordingly, seek to understand the other pole on the basis of the former.   For instance, there are a number of Lutheran seminaries that know deeply the intellectual and cultural horizon of the present and, upon this basis, seek to articulate the relevance of the historic kerygma for the contemporary horizon.   Although it is dangerous to generalize, I will do so nonetheless simply for the sake of illustration.  (I am not seeking to establish here or in the next two paragraphs that particular seminaries have a particular orientation.)

The ELCA seminaries seem sometimes to be engaged in assimilating the particularity of the proclamation to the generality of the cultural standpoint.   For instance, the faculty and students at the Lutheran School of Theology in Chicago clearly know what positions are just, right, compassionate and loving with regard to same sex relationships and same sex marriage.  Their position on this issue is not one that they assume needs profound argumentation; it is clearly and immediately experienced as just and loving.  Its rectitude is in the cultural air, following facilely from vague and inchoate cultural intuitions about natural rights.  Something so clearly known must be given theological legitimation as well, of course, and thus appeal is made to the prophetic element within the theological tradition to do just that.  Kerygma and context are thus not mediated, but rather the general context tends to assimilate the particularity of the proclamation.  Here the contour of the intellectual/cultural context trumps that of the traditional kerygma.  

One might regard the LCMS seminaries as occasionally emphasizing the other pole to the exclusion of the former.   Here the effort is to hold on tightly to the particularity of the kerygmatic proclamation against the horizon of the cultural context.  While it is important to understand deeply the particularity of the proclamation, sometimes the focus on this risks ignoring the subtleties of the intellectual/cultural horizon.  This can, occasionally, lead to an effort to repristinate the past articulations of kerygma at the expense of being open to more deeply understanding the contemporary horizon.   Now the kerygma can trump the context.

At the Institute of Lutheran Theology we want profoundly to explore both the contemporary cultural/intellectual horizon and the tradition's proclamation of kerygma.  Why?   It is because we believe that effective theology must mediate proclamation and context, kerygma and the contemporary situation.   In this way there is a mediation between the horizons that keeps in tact the contour of each while yet bridging between that which might prima facie appear as disparate.  The goal is never to reduce one to the other; never to understand the kergyma as a movement upon the horizon of the cultural context, nor to understand the cultural context as a movement brought forth from the determinate contour of the proclamation.   Ultimately, God's work in creation, obscured by the Fall, is nonetheless still dimly palpable within the contemporary situation.  It is therefore always "addressable" by the kerygma.  Good theology always mediates kerygma and context, forming, as it were, an isometric between the two hands of God.

Model-Theoretic Semantics and Theology

All too often we unthinkingly assume a "magical" view of language.   We naturally suppose that our language is anchored to the world correctly, as if our language intends to link to the world in a particular way.  For instance, we might believe that 'dog' uniquely refers to that class of which the canine at my heels is a member, and 'laptop' to that class of which this object upon which I type is an element.

However, reflection about the nature of such intentionality does not support these prima facie intuitions.    'Dog' cannot and does not intend the canine at my feet, though through appropriate human context and practice it may refer to that animal.   'Laptop' is conventionally linked to the object upon which I type these words, though it may not have been the case.

Hilary Putnam famously advanced the "model-theoretic argument against realism."  In it he purports to show that that an entire linguistic system considered as a totality cannot by itself determinately refer.   Representations, no matter how involved, are not agents and thus have no power to intend objects in the world.  Language, considered formally and syntacticly, does not in itself have meaning and cannot thus refer to the world.  Any attempt to give language such an intentionality through the use of model-theoretic semantics must fail.  In order to understand what Putnam is saying and its relevance for theology, we must understand what model-theoretic semantics is.

Model theory provides an interpretation to formal systems.  For the various symbols of a language, it assigns an extension, i.e., particular individuals, sets, functions and relations.  Model theory recognizes that since language does not magically intend objects in the world, the elements of language can only map to structures of objects.  Simply put,  given a particular function f, and any non-logical term p, f(p) graphs to a unique object in the world o.  In other words, there is a transformation from language to its extensional interpretation, a correspondence that is itself conventional.   Accordingly, while a particular function f1 maps 'dog' to the class of objects of which the canine at my feet is a member, another function f2 maps 'dog' to the last horse standing at Custer's last stand.  When we think language magically picks out the elements of the world, we simply forget that many other functional images of our language are possible.  Simply put, we forget that our language can sustain a large number of multivalent interpretations.

Model-theoretic semantics proceeds by constructing models which satisfy classes of statements, that jointly makes true those statements.   Take, for instance, this class C of statements:  'The cat is on the mat', 'John understands that an equivalence relation is reflexive', and 'All mats are owned by John'.   A model is an extensional interpretation I making all members of C true.  This might happen when 'cat' refers to the set of all domesticated felines, 'mat' to the set of all objects upon which one wipes one's feet, 'on' to a two place predicate Oxy specifying the set of all ordered pairs {x, y} such that x is adjacent and above y, 'John' to a particular person,  'understands' to a dyadic predicate Uxy forming the set of all ordered pairs {x, y} such that the first is an epistemic agent and y is that which is understood, 'equivalence relation is reflexive' to a member of the set of all concepts, and 'owned by' to a two place relation Wxy forming the set of all {x, y} such that x possesses y.  In addition, 'the cat' is a definite description uniquely picking out some member of the set of all domesticate felines, while 'the mat' uniquely refers to one member of the class of all objects upon which one wipes one's feet.  

The reader should reflect upon how difficult it is to provide an adequate intensional characterization of the set of mats or the set of things understood.   Fortunately, we don't have to pick all the properties that each and every member of the set has.  We can simply refer to the set whose members have these properties as well as others.  It is obvious that the three propositions above are true (or "satisfied") if there exists the sets in question and the members of these sets are related in the ways above specified. Let us call this interpretation I.  

Now notice that we can form I2 as follows:  Allow 'cat' to refer to the set of positive integers and 'mat' to refer to the set of negative integers, and "on to" (Oxy) to be the set of all ordered pairs {x, y} such that x is greater than y.   'The cat' now refers to a definite positive integer and 'the mat' to a particular negative integer.   Let 'John' refer to the positive integer 17 and 'understands' be the two place relation forming the set of all x such that x is the square root of y.   Assume that 'equivalence relation is reflexive' refers to 289, itself a member of the set of all odd numbers.  Finally, allow 'owned by' to refer to be the set of ordered pairs {x, y} in W, such that either x is greater than y v x=y v x is less than y.  While this interpretation may seem very artificial, it does in fact "satisfy" each member of C.  The point is that all sentences of C are true both on models I1 and I2.  

Model-Theoretic semantics provides abstract models satisfying classes of statements.  These models are sets obeying set-theoretic operations.  Clearly, we can think of the satisfaction of the classes of statements to be mappings from the constituents of those statements to unique set-theoretic structures; the relationship of the linguistic entities to their extensions are unique functions.  Each interpretation is a function from the linguistic to the set-theoretic because the following uniqueness condition holds where x is the linguistic and y the set-theoretic:  If and are members of f, then y = z. 

Putnam's argument purports to show that simply having a model that makes a class of statements true does not in and of itself determine reference.   There are an infinite number of models with different extensions that make the class of statements true!  Neither does representational similarity between the linguistic symbols and their extensions nor truth itself vouchsafe a unique reference for a language.

One way to grasp this is to consider Quine's gavagai example.   The anthropologist sees the native saying 'gavagai whenever presented with a rabbit.   But the anthropologist is sophisticated in his reflections and realizes that the native could mean 'undetached rabbit part' or 'rabbit event' or 'temporal rabbit stage'.   The model would seemingly be satisfied by any of these interpretations.   Language does not determine reference.

Putnam finds in the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem significant results which extend this insight.   The theorem holds that any satisfiable system -- that is, any system that has a model -- has a countable finite or infinite number of models.  Putnam generalizes the results of this theorem, showing that even in a system vast enough to incorporate all of our empirical knowledge, it would nonetheless be the case that there would be great numbers of models (and associated ontologies) satisfying all of the constraints of the system's theoretical and operational constraints.

While there is debate about whether Putnam's proof in "Model's and Reality" (see Realism and Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 1-25) commits a mathematical error, the general point is clear enough to anyone who has every taught an introductory logic course: Truth is always truth under an interpretation.   Agreeing on language does not an agreement make.   Agreement is only had if there exists agreement of language and a common interpretation or model.   Only if the same model is specified and there is agreement in truth-value among the relevant propositions can one speak of actual agreement.  

It should be obvious to anyone who reads theology that theological traditions have not always been clear about the interpretation of their language.   This becomes deeply clear in interfaith dialogues when two sides may use the same language, but mean something quite different with that language.   It happened, in my opinion, in the Evangelical Lutheran Church's adoption of three important documents between 1997-99:  Call to Common Agreement, the Formula of Agreement, and the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification.  The frustrating thing about those debates was that many of the participants either did not know that they needed to clarify the models they were using, or intentionally did not deeply reflect upon their interpretations for fear of losing the historic "agreement" between the parties that the ecumenical talks were supposed to engender.  

Maybe the proclivity of participants in ecumenical dialogues not to clarify the models they are assuming stems from a general historical practice among theologians to fail to specify the interpretations they employ in their own polemics and constructive work.

Take the following three propositions and assign them extensional interpretations I1 and 2.

• T1:   God creates the universe.
• T2:   All of creation has fallen into sin. 
• T3:   Through His Son, God redeems his fallen creation.  

Let I1 be the following interpretation: 

• 'God':    That being having all positive predicates to the infinite degree
• 'Creates':  A dyadic predicate whose extension is the relation {{x, y}: x causes there to be both the material and form comprising y}
• 'Universe':  All that exists outside of diving being
• 'Creation':   All that exists outside of divine being
• 'Falls':  A dyadic predicate whose extension is the relation {{x, y}: x is creation and y is the distortion of x under the conditions of present existence}
• 'Sin':  The distortion of creation under the conditions of present existence
• 'Son":  Hypostasis bearing the divine nature sustaining the following relationships of having been begotten by the hypostasis of the Father and spirating the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit
• 'Redeems':  A triadic predicate whose extension is the relation {{x, y, z}: x causes there to be reordering of y on account of z, such that x regards y as manifesting properties characteristic of the created universe 

Many readers may take issue with the extension I gave to T1-T3.   It would be an important exercise, I think, were all who employ theological language to attempt to provide a semantics like I just attempted.   It is by no means a simple task.   It is time, I believe, for theologians not simply to take responsibility for their theological language, but also for the interpretation they give that language.

Let I2  be the following interpretation:

• 'God':   To-beness in its totality.  That which is presupposed by the notions of being a particular being, and not-being a particular being
• 'Creates':  A dyadic predicate whose extension is the relation {{x, y}: x is conceptually presupposed by the class of all existing beings}
• 'Universe':  The set of all non-divine beings
• 'Creation':  The set of all non-divine beings
• 'Falls':  A dyadic predicate whose extension is the relation {{x, y}: x is creation and y is the set of attitudes, dispositions, and existential orientations of human beings phenomenologically present to human awareness as lacking the character of original creations
• 'Sin':  The existential of human existence towards the "what is" of the past rather than the "what might be" of the future 
• 'Son':  A symbol that points to and participates in the totality of being, and is capable of communicating the power of being itself phenomenologically to human beings
• 'Redeems':  A triadic predicates whose extension is the relations {{x, y, z}: x communicates the power of being itself to human beings (y) by means of the symbol of the Son (z)}  

The perceptive reader might find a trace of Tillich in interpretation I2.   The point to realize is that I1 and I2 both make T1-T3 true.   Both models satisfy a very small class of theological propositions.   Notice it is meaningless to ask if T1-T3 are true until a model has been specified upon which to evaluate their truth.  Here as everywhere in theology, truth is always truth under an interpretation.    

Growth of the Institute of Lutheran Theology

I want to inform all of you about the growth and development of the Institute of Lutheran Theology.   I have not been updating my blog regularly because I am pretty busy with ILT these days.   If you have not been to our webpage for awhile, please take a look.   We are growing with celerity and probity.

The Institute of Lutheran Theology was blessed to take in more than $760,000 in cash donations last year, and had revenue of over $1,000,000.  It has now achieved these levels with respect to the most recent American Theological School (ATS) listings: 

• ILT expended more than 28 other ATS accredited institutions in 2014.
• ILT had a headcount greater than 29 other ATS accredited institutions in 2014.
• ILT had a full-time equivalency of students (FTE's) higher than 23 accredited institutions in 2014.   
• ILT is now larger than three of the four Canadian Lutheran seminaries.  

The Institute of Lutheran Theology has a permanent staff of 14 (11 full-time) with a faculty of 16 (7 permanent and 9 adjunct).  It has awarded four masters of divinity degrees, four masters of religion degrees, and 12 ministry certificates.   Its library has grown to 40,000 volumes available to faculty, students and friends.   

Our staff and faculty have eight members from the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (LCMS), six from the North American Lutheran Church (NALC), four from Lutheran Congregations in Mission for Christ (LCMS), three from the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), two from the Augsburg Lutheran Churches (ALC), and one each from the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada (ELCIC) and the Association of Free Lutheran Congregations (AFLC).  On our Board we have the senior justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court and the former President of the American Academy of Religion. It is comprised of five LCMC members, two from the ELCA, one from the NALC, one from the LCMS,  and one from the Canadian Association of Lutheran Churches (CALC).  It is remarkable to bring together Lutherans from many so many Lutheran church bodies to build one institution.   Soli Deo gloria et honor!!!

Because we believe that laypeople are quite capable of thinking theologically, we provide these resources for congregations and interested Christians of all kinds: 

• Table Talk.  This devotional bulletin insert by Pastor Tim Swenson is used by scores of congregations around the country and ILT hopes that more of you know about this and use it.   The masters are distributed without charge or a small fee for mailing bulk copies.  You may click here to see examples of this product.

• Word at Work Magazine.  A seasonal magazine with articles on subjects of interest for all Lutherans, it is distributed free of charge and is also available online here.   Register online to join the 4,000 households already on the mailing list.

• Word at Work Classes.   No longer do we charge for these excellent video products.   Go to this page to see what they have to offer.  ILT is currently featuring Dr. Forell’s last lectures on Luther.   Other things of interest include Dr. Buddy Mendez’s class on communication and relationships, Pastor Scott Grorud’s confirmation class, and Pastor Moe Redding’s class on discipleship.

• Word at Work Events.  If you go here you see that ILT is happy to come to congregations and do theological lectures on various topics.   For instance, the Academic Dean, Dr. Jon Sorum just did a series on “What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Facing the Crisis in the Church” in Mesa, Arizona, last week.  Dr. Paul Hinlicky is just one of many ILT professors willing to do these events.  

• Weekly ILT Chapel (and daily sermons from the ILT community).  Go here to view past and present chapels.  

Grounded in Scripture and the Lutheran Confessions, ILT boldly asserts the reality of God and the causal linkage between God and His creation.  It believes that God really was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself (2 Cor. 5:19), and it believes that this truth can be effectively related to the contemporary intellectual and cultural horizon.  

Visit our webpage, our Facebook page, or our YouTube channel for more information.    

Reformation Freedom

This was released by the Institute of Lutheran Theology last Friday.   I couldn't bring the formatting through well to this blog page, but I decided the content might make it worth putting up anyway.   Hopefully, every Lutheran already knows this . . . 

October 31, 2014 (Reformation Day) points to the beginning of the Reformation in Europe.   The gospel reading from John 8, asserts this: “If you continue in My word, then you are truly disciples of Mine;  and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free” (31-32).  Reformation Day is all about freedom.   It is not, however, about freedom in the sense that most Americans think.   When we citizens of western democracies think of freedom, we are likely to think the following:  A person is free if and only if that person is able to do what the person wants to do.  This freedom from external constraint or compulsion is what is meant by political or civil freedom.   A free people are a people whom the state does not coerce, who have natural rights for the pursuit of happiness that cannot be taken away by the state and must be honored by the state.   Some read the Reformation as a movement towards individual freedom.   Each person has a free conscience, and can interpret Scripture properly on his or her own.  According to this line of interpretation, this notion developed into freedom of religion, a idea that Americans understand as a constitutional right.  The Reformation gave greater freedom to individuals over and against the powers of Church and Empire.  But this way of understanding freedom, is not what Jesus is talking about here.  This notion of freedom is not Reformation freedom.         

Teaching philosophy for so many years has made me acutely aware of a second sense of freedom:  A person is free if and only if that person could have done other than what he or she did do.  This understanding of freedom speaks to so-called "contra-causal causality":  Is a person merely moved along by the movement of the subatomic particles comprising him, or has that person real freedom with respect to those particles?  The idea is this:  We are all made up of matter (energy) that is ruled by certain fundamental laws of motion.   The decisions we make are actually determined by the neurons and synapses of our brain that, in turn, our comprised of matter (energy) obeying laws of motion.  Thus, when I choose to go through door A rather than B, I am really just being moved neurophysiologically to walk through A rather than B.  Free choice is an illusion.  If I knew all of the laws of motion at work in the system, I would be able to calculate with absolute certainity the future movement of any particles in that system - - this includes particles that make up people and thus includes the people themselves.   But this philosophical sense of freedom is not something about which John 8 is concerned.  This is notion of freedom is not Reformation freedom.

What John 8 concerns is a specifically Christian sense of freedom:  A person is free if and only if that person wants to do, and is able to do, that which that person ought to do.  The idea here can be seen easily with respect to the alcoholic.   He may not rationally want to drink, and indeed may be successful not drinking much of the time, but he always passionally wants to drink.  He is always besieged by the desire to drink, and finds himself divided: He does not want to drink at the same time as he deeply wants to drink.   It is this way with respect to sin.   St. Paul discusses this in Romans 7.  "So I find it to be a law that when I want to do what is good, evil lies close at hand.  For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members."  The sinner, like the alcoholic, is divided.  He is a slave to sin, rationally wanting desperately not to do that which he wants passionally to do.  All of us our in bondage to sin and cannot free ourselves.    The freedom of the Reformation is a freedom that returns the sinner back to what God would have him be; it is a re-forming of a self de-formed by sin.   The freedom of the Christian is a freedom from sin that quells the divided self, allowing the believer a sense of peace through certain knowledge that that she is becoming, and in some sense already is, that which God has intended her to be.  

Christian freedom is not an absence of external compulsion like in civil freedom, nor is it an absence of internal compulsion like in philosophical freedom, it is rather a reorientation of the whole way of thinking about freedom.  Christian freedom does not measure freedom with respect to the self, but rather with respect to God. The Reformation's deepest insight is that when God looks upon us, He sees his holy, innocent, suffering Son, and thus he sees us as being who we are intended by God to be.  God justifies sinners, and in so doing gives the gift of freedom: We are who God wants us to be on account of Christ.   This is true Reformation freedom. May the freedom of the Reformation animate you and keep your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus! 

Dennis Bielfeldt, Ph. D

President

Institute of Lutheran Theology 

Fall 2014 Classes at the Institute of Lutheran Theology

If you go to the ILT website here you shall discover some very interesting courses being offered.   The first thing to realize is that ILT is offering twenty courses for graduate credit this fall.  These courses include standard courses in Biblical theology, systematic theology, historical theology, and pastoral theology, as well as a Greek readings course and courses in philosophy and ethics.   (We believe at ILT that theological reflection has been, and must always be, in dialogue with the philosophical assumptions and views of the age in which it is undertaken.  Theological reflection is clearly not philosophical reflection, but it nonetheless neglects philosophy at its own peril.)

Our Masters of Sacred Theology (STM) students this fall can choose courses in theological German, Bonhoeffer, philosophy of religion and theology & science.   Readers of this blog will find all of these courses interesting, but I want to bring to attention the excellent course on Bonhoeffer taught this fall by our Dean of Academic Affairs, Dr. Jonathan Sorum.  Sorum is a Bonhoeffer expert, and the course is extremely well-prepared an insightful.   If you are interested in a challenge on Wednesday nights from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. CDT, I recommend that you email admissions@ilt.org and get enrolled today.   Dr. Sorum is also available for conversation on it at 605-692-9337.

ILT also is offering six certificate courses on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday evenings.   If you don't already have an undergraduate or graduate degree, but are interested in studying theology seriously, these courses are for you!   We designed them to be basic training in theology, much like companies like IBM give basic job training to computer science majors.  The computer science majors find IBM's training deep and challenging, even if they already have a computer science degree.   Similarly, students with undergraduate or advanced degrees already will find our certificate courses deep, challenging and interesting.

All of our courses are delivered in a fully-interactive format on-line.  We at ILT take educational quality very seriously, and we have well-known professors currently teaching and more coming soon.   You can study with some of the top names in Lutheran theology in the English-speaking world.

There is no other place like ILT.   We are not an idea waiting to be implemented, but a fully-functioning, degree-granting institution with faculty, faculty governance, students, embedded ministry sites, and a guarantee to offer each and every class on schedule so that you can advance through our Masters of Divinity program in as few as three years.  Come and join the fun!       

Facts and Values

It seemed simple once - - this distinction confidently taught to grade school children by those knowing nothing of its lineage.  "Children, please listen up.  There are facts and there are values.  You can say that Sally got the wrong answer in science class because science deals with facts.  She can have the wrong answer because there is something to measure the facts against.  However, you cannot say, and you must not ever say, that Sally has got it wrong when she says that there is a God, or when she says that there is not a God, or when she claims Frank was wrong to push Molly.  After all, every person is entitled to his own opinion."  

Every future teacher secondary school teacher I had in my university classes knew and believed in the fact/value distinction. Future school teachers, after all, have to be taught to respect familial and cultural diversity.  It is not wrong that Piper has two mothers or that Alex faces Mecca each day. Of course, the reality of such diversity entails that many of our most cherished judgments are simply values.  There is nothing to measure the probity of Piper having two mothers against; there is no fact of the matter that decides the truth or falsity of Alex facing Mecca.  School teachers teach the facts of grammar, mathematics, science and history, and let the kids "express themselves" in art, music, theater and the interpretation of literature.  While most kids don't any longer have the chance to study philosophy or theology in secondary school, if they could do so today, they would find these disciplines relegated to the same arena as art, music and theater. "Kids need to respect the views of others," their teachers confidently intone.  There can be no fact of the matter in philosophy or religion.  Some kids are Catholics, some Lutheran, some Jewish, some Islamic, and some reject religion all together.   There is no fact of the matter which makes Catholicism "right" and Islam "wrong." To suggest this simply displays abject intolerance.  

Maybe the exposure to this distinction when young explains its popularity today.  Everywhere within popular culture we find the presupposition of the arbitrary and capricious nature of value. The great ideals of humanity (beauty, goodness and truth) are confidently thought to be mere affairs of subjective value.  Some people believe there is a God, but others do not.   This is fine because there is no fact of the matter about there being or not being a God.  Some people believe that abortion is right and others believe it wrong.  This is fine because there is no fact of the matter about its rectitude.  But while Amber might believe abortion wrong, since there is no fact of the matter about its rectitude, she ought not to block access to abortion for others who might believe it is morally permissible.  Since Amber's value is personal, it concerns only her personal behavior.  For her to claim that her personal value ought to govern public policy is for her to succumb to close-minded intolerance.  Does she not know that abortion can be right for Alex but wrong for Piper?  If she knows that abortion could be right for another, she simply has no right to block access to abortion to another - - even if she believes it is a heinous murder.

American people in the second decade of the twentieth century quite naturally assume that talk of God is valuational, that it concerns not a publicly observable arena, but rather expresses the perspective or orientation on life of the author or speaker and his culture.  When theologians write of God and pastors preach passionately from the pulpit, contemporary readers and hearers increasingly simply read or hear the words as valuational expressions; they naturally assume that these words offer a personal or cultural perspective or reveal personal or cultural dispositions and orientations.  The young particularly have been well trained not to understand the words as being factual.  They must not understand these words that way, for to do so would itself be an act of intolerance.   This is where the preacher starts today.  She  starts with an audience trained to be open-minded enough not to regard her words as descriptive and factual.  Paradoxically, the more open-minded the hearer, the more difficult it is today for the hearer to hear the Word.   In this way, the Word is sacrificed on the altar of the fact/value distinction.             

Philosophical Impediments to Proclamation

Theology was once a lofty discipline whose practitioners were among the brightest and best of their age.  In Luther's day candidates for the Doctor of Theology had first to receive a Masters of Arts in philosophy.  They knew the trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric), and they had exposure to the quadrivium (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry and music).  They understood Latin deeply and some learned Greek and Hebrew as well.   Luther knew his Aristotle well enough to realize that the Aristotle he encountered in the text was not the Aristotle that many theologians embraced in the High and Late Middle Ages.  Like in every age, Luther's era was a time in which philosophy and theology were deeply related.

Our age also is a time in which theological and philosophical matters are deeply connected.   The relationship between the two is so profound that many thinkers (often very deep theological thinkers) often overlook or miss it entirely.  But theologians today ignore philosophical issues at their own peril.  Deeply-educated in the Biblical text, its historical and social context, its history of reception, and effective homiletical techniques to proclaim it, theological thinkers often fail to examine and appreciate deeply enough the contemporary cultural and intellectual horizon into which the text is preached.  In failing to grasp the differing philosophical assumptions between textual origination and reception, they overlook the presuppositional issues making it difficult for the text to be properly understood be contemporary readers and hearers.  These issues, I believe, our explicitly philosophical.  They involve such traditional and meaty philosophical concerns as ontology (the study of being), epistemology (the study of knowing), and semantics (the study of meaning).

In the following series of posts I will spell out what I believe to be some of the philosophical impediments to Biblical proclamation in our time.  I will deal with such issues as the fact/value distinction, the loss of normativity, the problem of truth-conditions for religious and theological language, the problem of the external world as it relates to the divine, the question of agent motivation, the problem of reductionism, and, of course, the question of freedom.  (Of course, the discussion will be necessarily brief and undeveloped.)  Throughout, the questions of dualism, physicalism and idealism will be engaged.   The overarching issue is semantic.  What does (or can) the Gospel mean in an age where the horizon of understanding of the reader or listener is pluralistic, therapeutic, and anti-realistic?  What can God-talk mean to those today (particularly the young) who neither know the intellectual tradition, nor are normatively determined by it?               

 

The New School of Lutheran Theology

In 1919 a distinguished group of American intellectuals, many from Columbia University, pioneered a new model of education that allowed ordinary citizens to exchange ideas with artists and scholars representing a wide spectrum of intellectual and political orientations.   During the 1930s the "new school" provided safe haven for European thinkers threatened by rising Nazi power.  By 1934 the "new school" had matured into a full graduate school that offered masters and doctors degrees. Today this graduate school has over 1,000 students from 70 countries, offering graduate degrees in anthropology, economics, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology.  The school, born out of the German Volkshochschulen for adults, has truly come of age as an excellent graduate school with a powerful faculty.

In 2007 a group of American Lutherans pioneered a "new school" of their own.   The idea was simple:  Curious Lutherans (both lay and clergy) could and should  exchange theological ideas with theologians and  academics representing a wide spectrum of theological opinion.  The first courses of the Institute of Lutheran Theology (ILT) were done for congregations.  From these Volkhochschulen-like roots, an excellent graduate school has developed, offering Masters of Religion, Masters of Divinity, Masters of Sacred Theology, and Doctor of Ministry degrees with a partnered Ph.D. on the way.  ILT has offered a safe haven for theological reflection; it is a place where scholars from many different Lutheran traditions have found common ground.  It is a place where curious students engage professors and each other in fundamental questions of truth and meaning about those ultimate things bearing the most truth and meaning.  Though still small, ILT is growing in student headcount, number of staff, number of courses offered, budget, tuition and donation revenue, and in numbers of friends. Please visit www.ilt.org to see all of the changes.  We are definitely not the ILT of four years ago.

ILT has so far done what few thought possible: We have built an independent, autonomous school of theology and seminary from scratch without financial support from an institutional church body. Because of the dedication of the faculty, staff and friends of ILT, we have grown to twelve full-time staff including President, Assistant to the President, Vice-President of Development, Dean of Academic Affairs, Comptroller/Head of Admissions, Dean of the Chapel/Director of Student Affairs, Associate Director of Development, Director of Congregational Relations, Director of Publications and Certificate Programming, Registrar/Associate Dean, Director of the Library, and Graphic Artist/Web Presence Specialist. We have a faculty of 20, of which seven have continuing appointments.

The new semester is upon us at this New School of Lutheran Theology.  In a time when other Lutheran seminaries and graduate schools are shrinking and redesigning their curriculum to fit the intellectual and cultural horizon of the age, the Institute of Lutheran Theology is growing and strengthening its curriculum, and becoming even more rigorous. The Institute knows that the future will not resemble the past, and that this future will demand passionate, faithful, and very well-educated clergy who will be able to give an account of the faith that lies within them to a culture no longer pre-understanding what Christian claims are even about.

Check out our graduate courses at http://www.ilt.org/#!course-offerings/clgm. Study with the best!  Become an ILT student.   ILT is the  New School of Theology for a new time.

A Question

The question that has always interested me is not merely whether God exists and has a determinate contour apart from human awareness, perception, conception and language, but whether or not it is ultimately meaningful to make such a claim.  Simply put, what would the truth conditions be of the claim that God exists and has a definite contour apart from awareness, perception, conception and language?  That God exists and has a definite contour apart from awareness, perception, conception and language?  But what is this?   "Not words," you say, "but the reality of that existence and contour apart from awareness, perception, conception and language. . ."  But what is that?

When thinking about truth conditions one wants to think about entities, properties, and relations apart from words.  But how precisely do we think of such things?  How do we think of that which makes true divine existence and contour apart from human awareness, perception, conception and language?  What is it precisely that makes true this and does not make true a divine existence and contour that is, but is not apart from human awareness, perception, conception and language?

Performatives, Illocutions and Felicity Conditions for Preaching

Many point out that preaching is a performative act.  Instead of a mere conveyance of said information, good preaching is a doing.  In the sermon, Jesus Christ Himself is handed over to the hearers of the Word. 

The Tuebingen systematician Owald Bayer (b. 1939) uses the notion of a performative utterance, connects it with the promissio, and contrasts it with a mere constative.  Accordingly, Bayer quotes a statement from Luther’s Tishreden as stating a general principle in Luther’s semantics: "Signum philosophicum est nota absentis rei, signum theologicum est nota praesentis rei"  (“The philosophical sign is a mark of an absent thing; the theological sign is a mark of a present thing"), and “the signum itself is already the res; the linguistic sign is already the matter itself" (Martin Luther’s Theology, 52).

The promissio Bayer locates at the center of Luther's theology is unpacked by equating the word in language with the reality itself. Bayer suggests that in promises, words are not to be interpreted extensionally or intensionally, but are themselves their own reality.  (I have elsewhere called this the "donational model.")  Bayer regards this to be the deepest presupposition of Luther's theological semantics, a position he claims is akin to the views on performative language advanced by Austin. 

Over and against the constative, Bayer regards the promissio as a performative utterance: "In contrast to every metaphysical set of statements that teach about the deity, this assertion [e.g. "To you is born this day a Savior"] declares that God's truth and will are not abstract entities, but are directed verbally and publicly as a concrete promise to a particular hearer in a specific situation. 'God' is apprehended as the one who makes a promise to a human being in such a way that the person who hears it can have full confidence in it" (53).  Bayer has many more things to say about promise-talk:  

•  " . . . one cannot take the promise, which is not a descriptive statement, and transform it into a descriptive statement.” 
• “Secondly, one cannot take the promise, which is not in the form of a statement that shows how something ought to be done, and transform it into an imperative. . . .” 
•  "The truth of the promise . . . is to be determined only at the very place that the promise was . . . constituted. This means it is located within the relationship of the one who is speaking . . . and the one who hears. . . .”

Unfortunately, regardless of his authorial intent, Bayer’s formulations suggest a possible confusion.  One might hold that the sermon is a set of performative utterances - - promises being one type of performative - - that do something rather than say something, and then go on to claim that since performative utterances are not true or false, preaching expressions have no truth-conditions.  While this might seem a very bad thing, it is actually has some theological advantages.   How is this view possibly fruitful?  

Since the time of Kant there has been a tendency to claim that religious and theological language do not talk about the same reality as that talked about by historical, scientific, and even philosophical language.  This happened because the Kantian criticisms of natural theology succeeded in adding to the previous Enlightenment distrust that theological statements could be straightforwardly true.  If they weren't true, but still useful, then what were they?  The view that whatever religion and theology talk about, they don't talk about the same reality as discussed in the other disciplines is called the independence thesis in the theology and science discussion.  The question is then to locate the domain of theology with respect to other domains.  What domain is theology about?   

Here is where performative utterance-talk can come to the rescue.   The promise of performative utterances is that Lutheran theology can thus avoid metaphysical statements about God, God’s causal relationship with the universe, and God’s relationship to the realm of being generally. Instead one merely says that theology is all about doing, and doing cannot conflict with what is, with the saying of  metaphysics!   One can thus both be an academic, post-Kantian and a Lutheran theologian all at the same time!  
    
Accordingly, proclamations become first-order doing expressions without truth conditions, and they produce what they say.  Preaching is constituted by performative utterances declaring one’s freedom from sin, death, and devil through Christ.   Explicitly theological formulations then become second-order saying expressions which are merely regulative in that they order the performative utterances, and govern the occasions and context of their use.  One detects a fleeting ghost of Schleiermacher who held:  

• First-order religious language is expressive and poetic;
• First-order rhetorical language is rhetorical and persuasive;
• Second-order theological language is didatic and dogmatic.  

Clearly, a great deal of weight must be carried by the notion of a performative utterance, if it is to ground the very questionable discipline of theology in our time.  Unfortunately, many theologians do not realize that the status of a performative utterance is itself a matter of considerable philosophical controversy, and that Austin was already attacking his own performative-constative distinction almost 60 years ago.  

In sections IV and VII of How to Do Things with Words, Austin accumulates a number of doubts about the performative-constative distinction.   It seems that certain "felicity conditions" must be met in order for a declaration or promise to occur, and that these conditions rest both on social convention and speaker intentionality.  A performative is null and void if issued by a person not in position to perform the act, e.g., the pastor can marry the couple only in the appropriate social context, not by himself in the shower.  An unelected plumber cannot declare war on behalf of the United States.   One cannot promise with the intention to break it or without any means to fulfill the promise.   It seems that, for Austin, there is an element of the constative in each performative, and an element of the performative in the constative.   For these reasons Austin abandons the performative-constative distinction and formulates instead a distinction among locutions, various illocutionary acts, and the different perlocutions accomplished through these illocutions.   

The locution is the semantic content of an utterance; it is the act of saying something.   The illocutionary act is that which is accomplished in the saying.  It is the "extra meaning" beyond the literal meaning of the locution.  It and the perlocution constitute part of the speech act's force.   The perlocution is the intended effect produced in the hearer by the illocution.   This effect clearly depends upon social convention.   Austin's student, John Searle, revised the threefold schema of Austin into five categories:  

• Representatives state something in the doing.  Examples are "the cat is on the mat," and "David Hume died in 1776."  
• Directives tell others to do something, e.g., "Give me the hammer!", "Don't make a sound during church." 
• Commissives occur when promises are made, e.g., "I promise to be faithful to you until death parts us," "God sent his only begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him shall never die." 
•  Expressives merely display the speaker's attitudes and states.   Examples are, "I am really sorry about that," "Congratulations!!!"  
•   Declarations actually do something with words, e.g., "I name you John," "Class dismissed!"  

Searle regards directives, commissives and declarations to be general performatives where the world must now fit the words.  Alternately, representatives and expressives are general representatives where the words must fit the world.   (In an expressive, the word is supposed to fit the world of the speaker's attitudes and emotions.)  With all of these, however, there is an element of each in the other.   General performatives have locutionary semantic content; general representatives have a particular illocutionary force.  A single locution can sustain markedly different different illocutionary and perlocutionary force.

Take, for instance, the phrase, 'The dog is in the yard."   This could be a representative or an assertive merely stating what one thinks.  It might be used as a directive, telling others to stay away.   It might be a commissive that promises to all a safe yard.   Of course, it could be an expressive that does nothing more than display speaker fear.   The phrase, "I promise to be there tomorrow," can be a promise, but it might be a threat.  Saying 'the Day of the Lord is at hand' might be interpreted as a promise if God's presence is thought to be advantageous to the hearer, but it might be threat if divine presence is likely disadvantageous to the hearer.  (Notice how easy it is to explain now how the same locution of Scripture can both be Law and Gospel?)    

Given all of these distinctions, it becomes very hard to see how a performative utterance can somehow lead to Bayer's championed identity of a signum and res.  The signum does constitute the locutionary content of the expression.  The res, however, seems best associated with the perlocution, with what is brought about through the illocution.  Clearly, on this interpretation the perlocution cannot be a thing identifiable with the semantic content of the word itself.

We have found that the notion of a performative utterance has been employed in preaching to speak of the force of preaching and its effect, but that the notion of a performative as not having a truth value makes problematic this use.  We have also learned that Austin himself found his distinction between performatives and constatives problematic, and that newer views were subsequently devised to speak of illocutionary acts which utter locutions.  What Austin and Searle both discovered, however, is that in the analysis of speech act meaning, one simply cannot escape semantic content.    

We have previously concluded from this that there is nothing especially mysterious about using language to accomplish persuasive ends.   In good preaching, illocutions effect perlocutions.  Preachers thus exhort by demand and promise to move the hearts of their hearers.   This movements of the heart are the perlocutionary effects of these utterances.   Consequently, there is no simple identity between signum and res.  So far so good.   But there remains one really big problem for those finding an isolated doing in preaching performance that protects Lutheran's from an Enlightment-style critique of putative Lutheran saying.   

According to speech act theory, for a declaration to obtain certain felicity conditions must be in place.  For preaching to be interpreted as felicitiously performative, there can be no misfiring or abuse, and there must exist the proper preparatory conditions.  This means that while 'I absolve you' may have the sufficient felicity conditions in congregations whose attendees have appropriate presuppositions about the authority of the preacher to pronounce absolution and the sincerity of the preacher in pronouncing it, this is not the case in much of America now.   If preaching is a performative utterance, then any putative identity of signum and res can only occur as an “inside game” where the appropriate executive conditions --- are there appropriate background conditions? -- and essential  felicity conditions --is there proper fulfillment of the speech act? -- obtain.

I believe our time is like the time of the first century.   People to whom we preach must be convinced of the truth of what we are saying before they will join a community and adopt the appropriate felicity conditions making possible preaching declarations.   One can "hand over Christ" in preaching only if there are previous broad commitments about the existence and nature of a God causally efficacious in salvation.   The problem of our time is that only a few share the societal conventions that make possible the obtaining of the felicity conditions for proclamation.  The following likely hold:   

• We find the background conditions of belief necessary for the social conventions grounding the felicity conditions of preaching declaration are no longer present. 
• We find that few are moved by the illocutionary acts of preaching because the very possibility of perlocutionary response is tied to the question of truth. 
• We discover that more than a few pastors are simply insincere; they use language in ways that downplay propositional content in order to bring about a perlocutionary effect that in the tradition was always tied to that content.   

Performative utterances are not mysterious and cannot remove us from the truth game.   Accordingly, they cannot lead us around the critique of modernity.