On Divine Causality and Theological Speech
Quaeritur
Utrum causalitas divina non sit externa actio super mundum, sed interna ratio tam essendi quam loquendi; cum Spiritus Sanctus, qui est amor subsistens, causet non solum esse rerum sed etiam recte loqui de Deo, ita ut omnis loquela theologica sit ipsa participatio in causatione divina.
Whether divine causality is not an external action upon the world but the interior ground both of being and of speaking; since the Holy Spirit, who is subsistent love, causes not only the existence of creatures but also the right speaking of God, such that every theological utterance is itself a participation in divine causality.
Thesis
The causality of the Spirit encompasses both the order of being and the order of speech. The God who causes creatures to exist also causes them to be spoken truly. Theology therefore does not merely represent divine acts; it participates in them through the Spirit, who is at once the cause of creaturely being and the cause of felicitous theological utterance.
Locus classicus
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Philippians 2:13
ὁ θεὸς ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν
“It is God who works in you both to will and to act.” -
Augustine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio 17.33
Non enim per solam gratiam fit ut faciamus, sed etiam ut velimus.
Grace alone happens gives not only action but willing. -
Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum Canticorum II
Ἡ θεία ἐνέργεια πάντα κινεῖ ἀκινήτως
“The divine energy moves all things while itself unmoved.” -
John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa II.12
Ἡ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐνέργεια διδοῖ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λέγειν
“The energy of the Spirit bestows both being and speech.”
These witnesses confess a single truth: divine causality grounds both existence and utterance. Theology speaks truly only where it moves within this causal order.
Explicatio
The preceding disputationes have shown that the language of faith T possesses syntactical coherence, pneumatological felicity, external reference, and a duplex truth fulfilled in Christ. Yet each of these presupposes a deeper act: the divine causality by which creatures exist, by which discourse becomes meaningful, and by which theological predication is rendered capable of bearing truth. The Spirit therefore stands not merely at the terminus of theological speech—as the one who authorizes its felicity—but at its origin, as the giver of being, intelligibility, and communicability.
This causality must be distinguished in its two modes. The causalitas essendi bestows upon creatures their existence, structure, and intelligible form. Finite beings possess agency, powers, and determinate natures only because the Spirit continuously sustains them in being. Without this underlying act, there would be no world for theology to describe and no agents capable of entering into divine address.
The causalitas loquendi, however, concerns the possibility of theological discourse. It is the Spirit who grants the form and coherence of theological grammar, who opens human speech to divine reference, and who renders predicates proportionate to the perfections they name. Human words are not naturally fitted to signify the living God. They become fitted only as the Spirit draws them into the expressive act of the Word. Thus theological language is not an autonomous human construction but a finite participation in the divine act that grants both being and meaning. Theological predication arises from this double causality: creatures exist through the Spirit, and speech signifies through the Spirit.
Let D_G denote a divine perfection and D_c its creaturely participation. The relation
does not express metaphor or analogy derived from below but a real ontological procession: the divine perfection constitutes the creaturely participation. Likewise, when we write D_c(x), we signify that the creature x participates in that perfection according to its finite mode. The predicate is possible because the Spirit mediately communicates the divine perfection into the created order and simultaneously authorizes the linguistic act by which that perfection is spoken.
This dual procession—into being and into speech—grounds what may be called theophysical predication: finite words moved by the same divine act that grants creatures their form and intelligibility. Theological assertions therefore are not merely descriptive; they participate in the ontological generosity by which God renders Himself speakable. Every predicate is suspended from this causality: the reality signified is given by the Spirit, and the capacity to signify is granted by the same Spirit. Thus theological discourse is neither an epistemic construction nor a linguistic projection but a mode of participation in the divine causality that constitutes beings and makes truth-intelligibility possible.
Explicatio analytica — De causalitate constitutiva
Modern analytic philosophy isolates different explanatory functions of causality: counterfactual dependence (Lewis), event-causation (Davidson), grounding (Fine, Schaffer), and truthmaking (Armstrong). These roles illuminate how one fact, event, or entity may depend upon another. Yet each framework presupposes a structured world in which modal space exists, events have efficacy, facts possess determinacy, and states of affairs sustain propositions. Divine causalitas constitutiva is not one cause within this framework but the condition for the framework itself. It is the causality that makes these explanatory roles possible at all.
1. Counterfactual dependence
Lewisian counterfactuals require a modal landscape: a space of possible worlds against which “had A not occurred, B would not have occurred” can be meaningfully evaluated. But the structure of the possible is not self-sustaining. Modal order presupposes the creative act by which the Spirit constitutes the actual world and its modal neighbors. Without this underlying act, counterfactual comparisons would lack metaphysical footing. Divine causality therefore underwrites the very intelligibility of counterfactual reasoning.
2. Event-causation
Davidson interprets causation as an extensional relation among events, while causal explanation belongs to the intensional domain of description. Yet for events to serve as genuine secondary causes, creatures must possess agency and powers. These cannot arise from within the created order alone. Agency presupposes the Spirit’s continuous bestowal of esse, which confers upon finite beings their efficacy. Finite events cause because the Spirit causes them to be capable of causing. Divine causality does not replace creaturely causality; it constitutes it.
3. Grounding.
Grounding concerns the relation by which one fact obtains in virtue of another. It is often regarded as more basic than efficient causation because it orders the metaphysical hierarchy of dependence. But grounding relations require a field of determinate facts in which they can operate. The Spirit’s actus essendi establishes this field. Divine causality is not a ground among grounds; it is the ground of grounding—the act by which creatures possess natures, properties, and relations susceptible to grounding analysis.
4. Truthmaking
Truthmaker theory holds that true propositions require robust ontological correlates that make them true. In theological terms, divine causality supplies both the res and the verbum: the reality that grounds the proposition and the linguistic capacity by which that reality is predicated. The same constitutive causality that grants existence to creatures also grants reference and semantic stability to theological speech. A proposition about God has a truthmaker because God grants both the state of affairs that makes it true and the linguistic participation that allows it to be truly said.
Taken together, these analytic models reveal that divine causality is not an instance of any of these relations but the transcendental condition for their intelligibility. The Spirit constitutes the world in which counterfactuals can be assessed, events can act, facts can ground, and states of affairs can make propositions true. This causality is not subsequent to the created order; it is the ontological generosity that gives the created order its very capacity to be causally intelligible.
Thus causalitas constitutiva is the deepest presupposition of theology, grounding both being and discourse. It is the Spirit’s act that makes creatures exist, makes them intelligible, and makes theological predication possible. Every true statement about God is therefore a finite participation in this causality: a word that signifies because the Spirit first gives the reality signified and then grants the capacity to signify it.
Objectiones
Ob I. According to Aristotelian naturalism, human speech belongs to the domain of secondary causes. To attribute it to divine causality dissolves human agency.
Ob II. Nominalist voluntarism holds that theological language is an act of obedience to divine decree, not a participation in divine causality.
Ob III. If God directly causes every act, occasionalism follows; if humans act, divine causality must withdraw. The position is internally inconsistent.
Ob IV. Analytic semantics grounds meaning in convention and intention, not metaphysical causality. Divine causality is irrelevant to linguistic content.
Responsiones
Ad I. Primary and secondary causes do not compete. Divine causality grants the creature its power to act. The theologian truly speaks, yet speaks by the Spirit who enables the act without supplanting it.
Ad II. Nominalism protects divine sovereignty but denies divine presence. The Spirit’s causality is participatory: human signs remain human yet become transparent to divine reality through the Spirit’s enabling.
Ad III. The dilemma assumes univocity between divine and creaturely causation. Divine causality is in esse: it grounds the being of secondary causes and their efficacy. God causes the act to be the creature’s act.
Ad IV. Semantic theories describe proximate mechanisms of meaning but cannot secure theological reference. The Spirit grounds the determinacy of divine predicates and authorizes their truth.
Nota
To relate causality and language is to secure theology’s realism. If to be is to act, then truthful speech must itself be an act grounded in God. Felicity thus appears as the linguistic form of divine causality, for the Spirit does not merely permit theological utterance, He empowers it. A felicitous word is causal because it proceeds from divine causality and tends toward its fulfillment in divine truth.
Without causal participation, theological predicates become abstractions. With participation, they become acts of communion—finite words bearing the life of God.
Determinatio
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Divine causality operates both in the order of being and the order of speech.
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The Holy Spirit is the principal cause of every felicitous theological utterance.
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Theology speaks truly only where it is divinely caused.
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Felicity is the linguistic manifestation of this causality and truth is its ontological fulfillment.
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The Spirit binds ontology and discourse in a single causal order, causing both what is spoken and what is spoken of.
Transitus ad Disputationem VII: De Participatione et Ontologia Theoseos
Divine causality has now been shown to ground creaturely existence and theological utterance alike. The Spirit who causes creatures to be and words to signify is the Spirit who renders creation capable of participating in God. To be is already to participate; to speak truly is to participate knowingly.
Thus the next question concerns the nature of this participation: how the Spirit constitutes real union without confusion, and how creaturely life is elevated into communion with the divine. We therefore proceed to Disputatio VII: De Participatione et Ontologia Theoseos.