Disputatio LVI: De Formā Logi ut Principio Intelligibilitatis

 On the Form of the Logos as the Principle of Intelligibility

Quaeritur

Utrum forma Logi sit principium intelligibilitatis omnium divinorum actuum, ita ut omnis divina operatio sit cognoscibilis solum quia informatur a Logō; et quomodo haec informatio non solvat simplicitatem divinam neque introducat abstractionem supra vitam Trinitatis.

Whether the form of the Logos constitutes the principle of intelligibility for all divine acts, such that every divine operation is knowable only because it has its determinate form in the Logos; and how this does not compromise divine simplicity nor introduce an abstraction standing above the life of the Trinity.

Thesis

The Logos is not merely the interpreter of divine action nor a medium through which intelligibility flows. The Logos is the ground of intelligibility itself. Every divine act is intelligible because its act-form subsists in the Logos. There is no higher principle of order, no abstract structure, no metaphysical category that conditions God’s intelligibility from without.

The form of the Logos is therefore both metaphysically constitutive and epistemically foundational: constitutive because all divine action is structurally what it is in and as the Logos; foundational because creatures know divine action only by participation in this Logos-formed intelligibility.

Thus intelligibility is neither imposed upon God nor constructed by creatures. It is the radiance of the divine act as it subsists in the eternal Word.

Locus Classicus

John 1:18
ὁ μονογενὴς Θεὸς… ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο.
“The only-begotten God… He has made Him known.”

The Logos is the exegesis of God, not by reporting but by being the intelligible form of divine life.

Colossians 1:16–17
τὰ πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἔκτισται… καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε.
“All things were created through Him and for Him… and in Him all things hold together.”

Creation’s intelligibility depends on the Logos’ inner structural sufficiency.

Athanasius, Contra Arianos II.22
ὁ Λόγος μορφὴ τοῦ Πατρός ἐστιν.
“The Word is the form of the Father.”

Luther, WA 40 III, 64
Christus est ratio et forma omnium promissionum.
“Christ is the reason and form of all promises.”

Divine intelligibility is Christologically concentrated.

Explicatio

1. Intelligibility cannot arise from creaturely or abstract conditions

Theological modernity has sometimes treated intelligibility as a category external to God—a structure into which God must “fit” to be known. This misconstrues both metaphysics and revelation. Intelligibility is not a transcendental horizon that precedes God; neither is it a human conceptual framework imposed upon divine action.

To posit intelligibility as an abstract form above God would be to posit a metaphysical genus under which God falls. This violates the categorical dualism of Creator and creature and implicitly denies divine simplicity.

Therefore: whatever intelligibility divine acts possess must arise from within the divine life itself.

2. The Logos as the constitutive form of divine intelligibility

Following Disputatio LV, where divine intention and divine act were shown to be one in the Logos, we now articulate the deeper structure: Every divine act is intelligible because its form subsists in the Logos as its constitutive intelligibility.

This means:

• The Logos is not the representation of divine operations.

• The Logos is their formal principle, their internal determination.

• The Logos is not a cognitive filter applied by creatures but the intrinsic ground by which divine actions can be known at all.

Intelligibility is therefore ontological before it is epistemological. In classical terms: the forma logica of divine action is simply the Logos Himself, the eternal articulation of the Father’s being.

3. Intelligibility and divine simplicity

This view preserves simplicity rather than threatens it. For if God were intelligible by a form other than the Logos, God would be composite: essence + form, act + structure. But Scripture and tradition affirm that the Word is eternally “with God” and “is God.” Therefore the form that makes God’s act intelligible is not added to God but is God.

The Logos is the divine act in its intelligible articulation. This articulation is one with the being of God, not an abstraction above it.

4. Creaturely knowledge as participation in Logos-formed intelligibility

Creaturely knowledge of God, then, is not a climb toward divine essence nor a projection of human concepts onto divinity. It is the Spirit-enabled participation in the intelligibility that already inheres in the Logos.

The Spirit does not produce intelligibility; the Spirit grants access to intelligibility already constituted in the Logos. Thus every act of divine revelation—Scripture, sacrament, promise—is not merely information but participation in the Logos’ intelligible form.

What creatures perceive as “revelation” is nothing other than the Logos donating His own act-form to them.

5. Rejection of merely linguistic or postliberal construals

Some modern theologies, especially postliberal ones, treat intelligibility as a function of the ecclesial grammar that governs Christian discourse. But grammar without metaphysical anchor cannot disclose divine act. It only regulates human speech.

The intelligibility of theology must be anchored in the Logos or it becomes circular, self-referential, and finally empty. Revelation is not the community’s speech about God; it is God’s act made knowable because the Logos is its form.

Objectiones

Ob I. If intelligibility is located in the Logos, we introduce a second-level structure in God, undermining simplicity.

Ob II. If all intelligibility is in the Logos, the Father and Spirit become unintelligible except through the Son—an implicit subordinationism.

Ob III. Intelligibility is a creaturely category; to attribute it to God is anthropomorphism.

Ob IV. Intelligibility in the Logos suggests determination of divine acts, jeopardizing divine freedom.

Ob V. Postliberal theology denies that intelligibility is metaphysical; it is purely linguistic.

Responsiones

Ad I. No second-level structure is introduced. The Logos is God; therefore no composition arises. Intelligibility is not an attribute added to God but the radiance of divine act.

Ad II. The knowledge of God is indeed through the Son, but this is not subordination. It is Johannine metaphysics. The Son is the exegesis of the Father, and the Spirit grants participation. Each person is known personally in the one divine act.

Ad III. Creaturely intelligibility is a participation in divine intelligibility, not its source. Anthropomorphism arises only when creatures impose structures on God; we instead receive intelligibility from God.

Ad IV. Determination in the Logos is not constraint. It is the fullness of divine act in its eternal articulation. Freedom is the plentitude of act, not the absence of form.

Ad V. Grammar without ontology cannot speak of God. The Logos grounds all theological grammar by grounding the very acts theology names.

Nota

To say that the Logos is the principle of intelligibility is to say that divine truth is not a construction, approximation, or regulative ideal. It is the self-articulation of God’s own life. Theology’s intelligibility, then, is not a human achievement but a gift: the Spirit draws creatures into the Logos’ articulation of divine being.

This is why theology cannot begin with epistemology. It must begin with Christology. Knowledge of God is grounded not in the capacities of the knower but in the intelligible form of the One who acts and gives Himself to be known.

Determinatio

We therefore determine:

1. Intelligibility is not an external condition to which God conforms but an internal articulation of God’s act in the Logos.

2. The Logos is the constitutive form of all divine action; nothing God does is without this form.

3. Creaturely knowledge of God is participation in the Logos by the Spirit’s donation.

4. This view preserves divine simplicity, avoids abstraction, and grounds theological realism.

5. No theological statement (Tₜ) can be true unless grounded in the Logos-constituted act that Λ ⊨* Tₜ specifies.

Transitus ad Disputationem LVII

Having established that the Logos is the condition of intelligibility for all divine action, we now consider how this intelligibility becomes efficacious in creaturely life. If intelligibility is constituted in the Logos, it is communicated through the Spirit’s act of illumination.

Thus we proceed to Disputatio LVII: De Spiritu Ut Luminatore Intelligibilitatis, where we examine how the Spirit grants creatures access to the intelligible structure of divine act without reducing revelation to cognition or collapsing knowledge into mere conceptuality.

Disputatio LV: De Intentione Divina et Identitate Actuum in Deo

On Divine Intention and the Identity of God’s Acts

Quaeritur

Utrum intentiones divinae sint ipsi actus divini secundum rationem essendi, an potius principia actuum; et quomodo unitas intentionis et actus in ipso Logō constituatur sine confusione personarum vel collapsu distinctionum operum.

Whether divine intentions are themselves divine acts in their ground of being, or whether they should be understood as principles preceding divine acts; and how the unity of intention and act is constituted in the Logos without confusing the persons or collapsing the distinctions among divine operations.

Thesis

Divine intention is not a condition that precedes action, nor a preparatory state within God. Intention in God is itself a divine act. To distinguish the two, even conceptually, would introduce sequence or internal differentiation into the divine life and thereby undermine divine simplicity.

Divine intention and divine act are therefore identical in being but distinguished in their formal orientation: one names God’s act as it is understood in relation to God’s inner life, the other names that same act as it is directed toward creatures. This unity is constituted in the Logos, in whom all divine action is intelligible, and it is donated to creatures by the Spirit, who grants participation in the concrete act that God is performing.

Thus, the identity of intention and act is neither a collapse into unipersonalism nor a fragmentation of God’s work. It is the form of divine agency itself.

Locus Classicus

1. Isaiah 55:11
   לֹא־יָשׁוּב אֵלַי רֵיקָם
   “My word shall not return to me empty.”

Here intention (my word) and act (it accomplishes) are indivisible. The divine Word is the performing.

2. John 1:3
   καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν
   “Without Him nothing came to be.”

The Logos is not merely the instrument of intention but its operative identity.

3. Maximus Confessor, Ambigua 7
   ἡ θεία πρόθεσις ἔργον ἐστίν.
   “The divine intention is an act.”

Maximus explicitly identifies intention and act, distinguishing them only by their tropos of manifestation.

4. Luther, WA 40 I, 360
   Deus operatur, dum loquitur.
   “God acts in speaking.”

In God, intention (speaking) and operation (acting) are metaphysically identical.

Explicatio

1. Why created intention does not illuminate divine intention

In creaturely agency, intention precedes action. A human being entertains possibilities, evaluates alternatives, forms a plan, and then carries it out. Intention and action are therefore distinguishable stages within a temporal process, and each stage has psychological and deliberative elements appropriate to finite agents.

None of this applies to God. To speak of a divine “intention” that is not already identical with divine action introduces a conceptual gap into God’s life. Such a gap implies sequence, potentiality, or unrealized form—all of which are incompatible with divine simplicity. Any model that treats intention as a prior state that makes action possible inadvertently imposes creaturely categories on God. It mistakes the internal life of the Trinity for a process analogous to human deliberation. This obscures the nature of divine action rather than clarifying it.

Thus, in theology we must reject accounts of intention that retain even a faint shadow of psychological or modal priority. They cannot describe a God who is pure act.

2. Intention as formal act in the Logos

If intention cannot stand before action, the alternative is not to remove the concept but to understand it correctly. Divine intention is the act-form of God’s own acting. When we speak of God’s intending, we speak of the internal form of an act as it exists in the Logos.

Because the Logos is the constitutive ground of divine intelligibility, every divine act has its determinate form in the Logos. That form is not something separate from the act itself; it is the act in its intelligible structure. Thus “intention” names the act as it exists in the Logos, and “action” names that same form as it is directed toward creatures. These are two relational orientations of the same divine reality, not two stages or components.

This distinction is not an embellishment but a necessity: it allows us to explain how divine acts are both one in God and manifold toward creatures without collapsing either level into the other.

3. How the Spirit donates the unity of intention and act

The Spirit’s work makes this unity available to creatures. The Spirit does not donate a general divine favor or a generic presence. Rather, the Spirit donates the specific act that God is performing—God’s forgiving, consoling, sanctifying, or indwelling here and now.

Because the Spirit’s donation is always of a concrete and particular act, the divine intention behind that act must itself be concretely and particularly formed. The Spirit cannot give what is not already determinate in God. This specificity presupposes a hyperintensional divine life in which acts are distinguishable by their internal form, even when their effects coincide.

Thus, divine intention and divine act remain united in God but are given to creatures according to the Spirit’s donation of the act-form appropriate to them in that moment.

4. The Trinity and the identity of intentions

It may seem that identifying intention with act risks eliminating Trinitarian distinctions. But the opposite is the case: it protects them. If we treat intention as a pre-act located in the Father, action as the execution of the Son, and application as the work of the Spirit, we create a sequence of roles that mirrors creaturely agency. Classical theology rejects this.

What we must say is this: the same divine act-form exists in the one God, but it is known and given according to the personal modes of Father, Son, and Spirit. The Father’s willing is the Son’s acting is the Spirit’s donating—one act, fully divine, yet personally differentiated.

Thus, the unity of intention and act is theologically indispensable. Without it, the divine life becomes a chain of tasks distributed among persons; with it, we preserve both unity of being and distinction of persons.

Objectiones

Ob I. If intention and act are identical, then distinctions of divine willing become unintelligible.
Ob II. If intention is act, the Trinity collapses into a single operational subject.
Ob III. Classical Thomism teaches that God’s will is simple; therefore all intentions are one, and their individuation is a creaturely projection.
Ob IV. If intention is hyperintensional, this is merely linguistic, not metaphysical.
Ob V. Postliberal theology denies that divine intention bears metaphysical significance beyond ecclesial grammar.

Responsiones

Ad I. Distinctions remain at the level of the rationes formales of act—hyperintensional forms in the Logos—not at the level of temporal sequencing.

Ad II. The act-form is one, but the personal modes of intending/acting/donating remain irreducibly distinct. Unity does not imply unipersonality.

Ad III. Simplicity entails non-composition, not indistinction. The Fathers (Athanasius, Basil, Gregory) maintained simplicity while affirming real distinctions of operation.

Ad IV. Hyperintensionality is a metaphysical precision: it describes the identity of divine action, not the finesse of creaturely language.

Ad V. Grammar without metaphysical anchor collapses into self-reference. Divine intention grounds the community’s speech, not vice versa.

Nota

The theological implications follow directly. A God whose intentions are not identical with His acts would be a God who deliberates, evaluates, and chooses between unrealized options. This would make God’s inner life resemble that of creatures rather than the self-sufficient life of Father, Son, and Spirit.

By identifying intention and act, we preserve the immediacy of divine agency and the personal character of God’s deeds toward creatures. It is also what allows the Spirit to donate not abstractions but living realities: forgiveness, consolation, new life, and the presence of Christ.

The unity of intention and act is therefore not a speculative refinement. It is the metaphysical condition for understanding God as the one who acts personally and decisively for us.

Determinatio

We therefore determine:

1. Divine intention is not a precursor to action but the act itself in its intelligible form.

2. This act-form is constituted in the Logos, who is the principle of divine intelligibility.

3. The Spirit donates this act-form concretely, making it present to creatures.

4. The unity of intention and act preserves divine simplicity while allowing real distinctions of divine operation.

5. Theological truth depends on this unity, for Λ ⊨* Tₜ presupposes a determinate divine act that grounds a determinate theological statement.

Transitus ad Disputationem LVI

Having established that divine intention is itself a divine act and that its unity with action is constituted in the Logos and donated by the Spirit, we now turn to the deeper question of intelligibility itself. If every divine act is intelligible because it has its form in the Logos, then the Logos is not merely the site of intelligibility but its very condition.

Thus we proceed to Disputatio LVI: De Formā Logi Ut Principio Intelligibilitatis, where we consider how the Logos grounds the possibility of knowing anything of God’s action at all.

Disputatio LIV: De Hyperintensionalitate Divinae Operationis:

 

On the Hyperintensionality of Divine Action

Quaeritur

Utrum actus divini, quoad identitatem, formam, et rationem essendi, non possint explicari per extensionalem aequivalentiam, modalem necessitationem, vel possibilia mundorum, sed sint essentialiter hyperintensionales; et utrum veritas theologica requirat talem hyperintensionalitatem ut Deus cognoscatur secundum actum, non secundum eventum.

Whether the identity and form of divine acts can be explained by extensional equivalence, modal necessity, or possible-world semantics, or whether they are essentially hyperintensional; and whether theological truth requires such hyperintensionality so that God is known according to the act God performs, not merely according to an outcome.

Thesis

Divine acts are hyperintensional. By this we mean that the identity of a divine act cannot be captured by any framework in which acts are considered the same whenever they yield the same outcomes, share the same extension, or hold necessarily across all possible worlds. A divine act is not defined by its effects, nor by the set of circumstances under which it occurs, nor by its modal profile. Instead, a divine act is individuated by its formal identity within the Logos, by the specific constitutive act through which the Logos brings a res into being or presence, and by the Spirit’s concrete donation of that act to creatures.

Thus, extension does not capture divine identity,modal equivalence does not capture divine identity, and possible-world semantics is too coarse-grained to describe divine agency. A hyperintensional account alone preserves the theological conviction that God’s acts are personal, irreducible, and internally differentiated modes of the one divine life.

Locus Classicus

1. Exodus 3:14 — אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה

“I AM WHO I AM.”

This is not a definition, but an identity of act. Being itself is hyperintensional, for it names a unique form of divine acting, not a property instantiated across possible worlds.

2. John 5:19 — ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ

“Whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise.”

The divine act is not duplicated or numerically separable. Rather, its identity is internal to the Trinity, not extensionalized in effects.

3. Athanasius, Contra Arianos I.21

ὁμοούσιος οὐ κατὰ θέλησιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν.
“Of one being not by will but by nature.”

The divine act is identical with divine being; it is an identity finer than any modal equivalence.

4. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium

Οὐ τὰ γινόμενα, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἐνεργείας τὴν διαφοράν ποιεῖ.
“It is not the outcomes, but the manner of operation that makes the distinction.”

This is a classical statement of hyperintensionality clearly stating that the manner by which something obtains profoundly matters.

5. Luther, WA 40/III, 343

“Deus non est causa sicut causae creatae.”
“God is not a cause as created causes are causes.”

Thus God cannot be modeled extensionally.

Explicatio

1. Why extensional identity is inadequate

Extensional identity holds when two expressions apply to precisely the same set of objects. If two predicates pick out exactly the same individuals, classical extensional logic treats them as equivalent. For example, if every creature that is forgiven is also elected, and every creature that is elected is also justified, then these predicates are extensionally equivalent: they have the same extension.

Formally, if for all x, x is forgiven ↔ x is elected and x is elected ↔ x is justified, then the predicates forgiven, elected, and justified are coextensive.

Similarly, in the Spirit’s work, if for all x, x speaks in the Spirit ↔ x has been given the Spirit, and x has been given the Spirit ↔ the Spirit dwells in x, then Spirit-speaking, Spirit-giving, and Spirit-indwelling are extensionally equivalent expressions.

But extensional equivalence tells us nothing about what distinguishes these divine actions in God Himself. Forgiving is not the same divine act as electing, nor is electing the same divine act as justifying. Likewise, the Spirit’s giving, indwelling, and speaking are not identical divine operations simply because they coincide in the believer. Extensional identity collapses formally distinct divine works into a single undifferentiated outcome and therefore cannot serve as the framework for a theology that seeks to speak truthfully of God’s own acting.

2. Why modal equivalence is insufficient

A second temptation is to appeal to modal identity. Accordingly, if two acts occur in every possible world in which God acts toward creatures, or if one cannot conceive God performing one without the other, then they are treated as identical.

Creation and preservation offer a clear example. Classical theology holds that God’s preserving of the creature is nothing other than the continued giving of being. Because no creature could exist for a moment apart from God’s sustaining act, creation and preservation are necessarily coextensive: wherever one occurs, the other is already taking place.

So too with incarnation and redemption. In the Christian confession, the Son becomes incarnate for our salvation, and His incarnate life is unintelligible apart from His redeeming work. One cannot separate them modally, for in every possible description of God’s salvific activity, incarnation and redemption occur together.

Yet modal inseparability does not entail formal identity. Creation and preservation differ in their reason, because one brings being into existence, while the other maintains that being in existence. Incarnation and redemption differ likewise, for one is the assumption of human nature, the other is the reconciling act performed in that nature. Modal equivalence cannot register these distinctions because it treats any necessarily co-occurring acts as identical, thereby losing the finer structure of God’s activity that theology must retain.

3. Why divine acts require hyperintensional individuation

If theology is to speak truthfully, it must be able to say why this particular divine act grounds this theological statement. In our broader account, a theological utterance is true because the Logos performs a determinate act—Λ ⊨* Tₜ. But determinate truth requires determinate action. If divine acts could not be distinguished except by their extensions or modal profiles, then the truthmaker for any theological statement would be some undifferentiated divine activity, and doctrinal distinctions would lose their ontological grounding.

By hyperintensional identity I mean that divine acts differ not by their outcomes or by their modal placement but by their internal form in the Logos—the determinate way God is acting here and not otherwise. This internal form cannot be captured by appeal to effects, extensions, or modal profiles; it belongs to the act as God performs it. Forgiving is formally distinct from electing because each expresses a different aspect of the divine life, even when the same creature receives both. The Spirit’s indwelling is formally distinct from the Spirit’s giving because each arises from a different manner of divine self-communication. Hyperintensionality preserves the integrity of these differences.

4. The Spirit’s donation is hyperintensional

The Spirit does not donate to creatures a general divine presence or a generic divine favor. Instead, the Spirit donates the specific act that God is performing toward the believer. In one moment, this may be forgiveness; in another, consolation; in another, empowerment. The specificity of the Spirit’s donation presupposes a finely articulated structure of divine action in God Himself. Without this specificity, divine presence would become conceptual rather than real, and theology would lose the concreteness of God’s address.

5. Felicity is indexed to particular divine acts

A theological assertion is felicitous only if it corresponds to the act God is performing here and now—an act that is already individuated in God with a hyperintensional precision. The Spirit authorizes not theological grammar in general but this particular word because this particular divine act is being given. Thus the intelligibility of theology depends on a hyperintensional account of divine acting.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to classical extensionalism if two divine acts produce the same effects, they are the same act. If this is so, there is o need for hyperintensional identity.

Ob II: Modal realism holds that if God necessarily performs A and B, then He performs A and B in all possible worlds, and thus A = B. Therefore, modal equivalence suffices in individuation.

Ob III: Thomism claims that since God is simple, all divine actions are identical and distinctions collapse.

Ob IV: Deflationism asserts that hyperintensionality describes linguistic distinction, not metaphysical difference.

Ob V: Postliberalism holds that since all distinctions arise from use within the community, divine action adds nothing.

Responsiones

Ad I: Effects underdetermine cause. Divine acts differ in their formal ratio, not merely in outcome (Gregory of Nyssa). Thus, extension collapses personal identity.

Ad II: Possible-world semantics assumes shared structure with creaturely action. But divine acts exist outside modal ontology; they ground modality rather than inhabit it. God is not a node in a modal structure but its creator.

Ad III: While implicity entails no composition in God, it does not follow that divine acts lack distinct formal identities. The Fathers held simplicity alongside real distinctions of operation.

Ad IV: Hyperintensionality is not linguistic fineness but metaphysical precision. Divine act identity is not a function of language but of participation in the Logos.

Ad V: While usage explains how we talk, it does not identify what God does. Without hyperintensional divine action, grammar loses its anchor in reality.

Nota

Hyperintensionality is the ontological form of God’s personal action. We have seen that constitutive causation (L) requires fine-grained identity; that real presence (LI) is specific, not generic; that donation (LII) concerns a particular res, and that felicity (LIII) authorizes a particular act of creaturely speech. If theological semantics were simply extensional or modal, the Trinity collapses into one role, the sacrament collapses into symbol, revelation collapses into a proposition, grace collapses into an effect, and Christology collapses into monism.

Regarding the Trinity, hyperintensionality preserves the distinction of the trinitarian persons, Christ’s unique acts, sacramental specificity, and the performative depth of divine truth. Simply put, hyperintensionality is not an analytic embellishment but a theological necessity. Without it, we could not preserve the conviction that God acts personally and decisively for the creature, nor could we maintain the integrity of the Gospel’s claim that God’s work is addressed to us in its fullness and specificity.

Determinatio

We have determined that:

1. Divine acts are intrinsically hyperintensional, distinct in their internal form even when extensionally identical.

2. Neither extensional equivalence nor modal necessity suffices to individuate divine action.

3. Hyperintensional identity flows from the Logos’ constitutive act (L) and is made present (LI), donated (LII), and authorized (LIII).

4. Theological truth (Λ ⊨* Tₜ) requires such hyperintensional grounding.

5. Therefore, theology must employ a hyperintensional semantics to speak truly of God.

Transitus ad Disputationem LV: De Intentione Divina et Identitate Actuum in Deo

Having established hyperintensionality in divine action, we proceed to the related question as to how divine intentions are related to divine acts, and how the Logos unifies them without collapsing distinctions. 

Thus, we turn to Disputatio LV: De Intentione Divina: Utrum Intentiones Dei Sint Actus et Quomodo Unitas in Logō Constituitur, where we shall inquire as to whether God’s intentions are identical with His acts, and how the Logos grounds their unity and distinction.

Disputatio LIII: De Felicitate Theologica: Utrum Spiritus Sit Auctor Locutionis Fideli

 On Theological Felicity: Whether the Spirit is the Author of Faithful Speech

Quaeritur

Utrum felicitas locutionis theologicae, id est, rectitudo, auctoritas, et veritas performativa sermonis fidei, non ex intentione vel peritia humana oriatur, sed ex ipso Spiritu Sancto qui loquentem informat, linguam fidei custodiens, purgans, et in Verbo ordinans.

Whether the felicity of theological speech—its rightness, authority, and performative truth—arises not from human intention or rhetorical skill but from the Holy Spirit, who forms the speaker, guards the language of faith, and orders it to the Word.

Thesis

Theological felicity is Spirit-authored rightness of speech. A theological utterance is felicitous not merely when it is grammatically correct or doctrinally sound, but when the Spirit authorizes the speech-act so that the donated referent (Disp. LII), the real presence of the Logos (Disp LI), and the constitutive truth (Disp. L) are joined to the creaturely utterance in one act of fidelis locutio.

Thus: Felicity just in case Spiritus + donatio rei + conformitas ad Verbum. The creature speaks truthfully because the Spirit speaks in, with, and through the creature.

Locus Classicus

1. 1 Corinthians 12:3 — οὐδεὶς δύναται εἰπεῖν· Κύριος Ἰησοῦς, εἰ μὴ ἐν Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ

“No one can say ‘Jesus is Lord’ except in the Holy Spirit.”

Since the simplest and most central Christian confession is impossible without the Spirit, felicity is pneumatic.

2. Romans 8:26 — τὸ Πνεῦμα συναντιλαμβάνεται τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ ἡμῶν

“The Spirit helps us in our weakness… He intercedes with groanings too deep for words.”

The Spirit perfects our speech when our words fail.

3. John 14:26 — ἐκεῖνος διδάξει ὑμᾶς πάντα

“The Spirit will teach you all things and remind you of all that I have said.”

Speech becomes felicitous when it is brought under the teaching and remembrance of the Spirit.

4. Augustine, De Trinitate XV.19

“Spiritus est nexus amoris quo redimus ad Verbum.”
“The Spirit is the bond of love through whom we return to the Word.”

The Spirit links the human speaker to the Word He speaks.

5. Luther, WA 10/3, 14

“Spiritus Sanctus est verus doctor verbi.”
“The Holy Spirit is the true teacher of the Word.”

Preaching is felicitous only as the Spirit’s work.

Explicatio

Disputation LII established that reference is donation, that the Spirit gives the res. But a donated referent is not yet a felicitous assertion because etween having the referent and speaking the truth, another act is required: authorization.

1. Felicity as Pneumatic Authorization

In theological speech, felicity is not merely correctness of syntax, or accuracy of doctrinal formulation, or sincerity of the speaker, or even conceptual clarity. Rather it is the Spirit’s act authorizing the finite speaker to speak in the Word’s order.

2. The Structure of Felicity

Felicity occurs if and only if: 

1. The Logos is present (LI),

2. The Spirit donates the res (LII),

3. And the Spirit authorizes the creaturely utterance so that it properly bears the res.

This is why Paul says:

“We speak not in words taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit” (1 Cor 2:13).

3. Felicity and the Operator Λ ⊨* Tₜ

We must distinguish truth-through-the-Logos (Λ ⊨* Tₜ) and felicity as the Spirit’s ensuring that T is a proper vehicle for Tₜ. 

Thus, a felicitous theological assertion occurs just in case there is a Spirit-gifted word that bears the donated res of the Logos’ presence.

4. Felicity as Participation

To speak felicitously is to participate in the Logos’ act (L), the Logos’ presence (LI), and the Spirit’s donation (LII). Accordingly, human speech is grafted into divine speech.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to the speech act theory of Austin and Searle, felicity conditions are human conventions. Accordingly, no Spirit is needed.

Ob II: Classical Protestant orthodoxy assumes that speech is felicitous when it conforms to orthodox doctrine. If this is so, divine authorization appears unnecessary.

Ob III: Liberal Protestantism claims that truthful speech arises from the authenticity of the speaker’s self-expression. If so, felicity does not require external divine agency.

Ob IV: Contemporary linguistic philosophy supposes that felicity resides in correct rule-following within linguistic practice. Thus, no Spirit is needed for proper language-use.

Ob V: Barthian Theology declares that since human speech is incapable of bearing divine truth, only God’s own speech is true. Therefore, talk of “Spirit-authorized human felicity” is incoherent.

Responsiones

Ad I: Theological felicity cannot be reduced to human convention. The Spirit is not a pragmatic condition but the agent who unites human speech to divine reality, transforming finite utterance into a bearer of the infinite Word.

Ad II: Orthodoxy is necessary but not sufficient. One may confess correct propositions without the Spirit’s life. Felicity requires authorization, not merely accuracy.

Ad III: Authenticity is indexical to the self; felicity is ordered to the Logos. Theological speech is not self-expression but participation in divine speech.

Ad IV: Grammar governs internal form; felicity concerns divine empowerment.The Spirit gives a speech-act not only correctness but truth-bearing capacity.

Ad V: Barth rightly insists that God alone reveals—but the Spirit makes human words vehicles of that revelation. Felicity is the mode in which God’s speech becomes creaturely speech without ceasing to be divine in origin.

Nota

Felicity is the Spirit’s bridging act between the donated reference of Disp. LII, and the truthful assertions of Disp. L. It is the pneumatic fitting of human speech to divine being. Thus, we can claim the following about the Trinity: 

• The Father constitutes truth.

• The Son is present as truth.

• The Spirit donates the res and authorizes the word.

Felicity is the Spirit’s signature on human speech because without felicity doctrine becomes mere abstraction, the sacrament becomes only a symbol, preaching is only exhortation, and theology remains only grammar. However, with felicity doctrine becomes light, the sacrament becomes communion, preaching becomes divine address, and theology becomes true participation.

Determinatio

We determine that:

1. Felicity is Spirit-authored, not humanly achieved.

2. A theological utterance is felicitous when the Spirit authorizes it to bear the donated referent.

3. Felicity unites presence, donation, and truth, completing the semantic-ontological structure of theological meaning.

4. The Spirit’s act is the condition of faithful, truthful, and effective theological speech.

5. Thus: The Spirit makes human speech a participation in divine discourse.

Transitus ad Disputationem LIV: De Hyperintensionalitate Divinae Operationis

Having established that the Spirit authorizes speech to carry the divine res, we now turn to the final structural element of our semantic theory and ask as to why divine acts require a hyperintensional semantics.

Thus, we proceed to Disputatio LIV: De Hyperintensionalitate Divinae Operationis: Utrum Actus Dei Non Sint Reducibiles ad Extensiones vel Possibilia, in which we ask whether divine acts differ in such a fine-grained manner that no extensional or modal semantics can capture their truth.

Disputatio LII: De Donatione Referentiae per Spiritum: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus Donet Rem Theologicam

 On the Donation of Reference by the Spirit: Whether the Holy Spirit Gives the Theological Referent

Quaeritur

Utrum referentia in theologicis non per designationem humanam sed per donationem divinam constituatur; et utrum Spiritus Sanctus sit ille qui rem ipsam quae per linguam fidei significatur creaturae largitur, ita ut verbum theologicum referat quia res donatur.

Whether reference in theological language is constituted not by human designation but by divine donation; and whether the Holy Spirit is the one who bestows the very reality signified by the language of faith, so that a theological word refers because the res is donated.

Thesis

In theology, reference is not designation but donation. A theological expression does not gain its referent through human intention, mental representation, or linguistic convention, but through the Spirit’s act of giving the res that the expression signifies.

Thus:

1. The Logos constitutes being and truth, that is, the Logos is the truthmaker for theological language: Λ ⊨* Tₜ.  

2. The Logos is present as the truth-for-us as we saw in Disputatio LI. 

3. The Spirit donates the referent of theological language by linking word to real presence.

Hence, theological reference just is the Spirit-given participation in the reality of the Logos.

Locus Classicus

1. John 16:14 — ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήμψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν

ἐκεῖνος ἐμὲ δοξάσει, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήμψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν.
“He will glorify Me, for He will take what is Mine and declare it to you.”

The Spirit takes (λήμψεται) and gives (ἀναγγελεῖ). This is precisely donation: the res is received from Christ and given to the believer.

2. Romans 8:16 — αὐτὸ τὸ Πνεῦμα συμμαρτυρεῖ

“The Spirit Himself bears witness with our spirit.”

Witness is thus not designation but granted participation. The referent is given, not inferred.

3. 1 Corinthians 2:12 — τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ χαρισθὲν ἡμῖν

“We have received the Spirit… that we might know the things freely given to us by God.”

Knowing follows giving. The referent precedes the concept.

4. Augustine, De Magistro

“Nemo docet nisi interior magister.”
“No one teaches except the inner Teacher.”

The Spirit gives the res to the mind; language alone cannot.

5. Luther, WA 40/1, 360

“Spiritus est qui dat intellectum verbi.”
“The Spirit is the one who gives the understanding of the Word.”

Understanding presupposes reference. Thus, the Spirit gives the referent by giving the thing signified.

Explicatio

While Disputation L established constitutive truth -- the Logos makes being -- and Disputation LI established presential truth -- the Logos is present as truth-for-us -- Disputation LII establishes semantic truth, for the Spirit gives the referent of theological language.

1. The Problem of Reference in Theology

While ordinary semantics treats reference as a human designation, that is, a word refers because a subject intends it, in theology the following holds: 

• the subject cannot circumscribe God,

• the mind does not contain the res,

• signs do not determine their own referents.

Accordingly, designation fails. This suggests that only donation can ground reference.

2. Donation as the Ontological Form of Reference

The Spirit gives the referent by uniting:

• the human word to divine reality,

• the signifier to the Logos’ presence,

• the finite knower to the infinite known.

This act is therefore neither intellectual nor linguistic but ontological.

3. Donation and the Operator Λ ⊨* Tₜ,

We must distinguish these:

• Λ ⊨ T : truth in a model

• Λ ⊨* Tₜ : truth through the Logos

• donation as the Spirit’s act of linking T to Tₜ

Thus, while designation → Λ ⊨ T, donation → Λ ⊨* Tₜ.  Accordingly, donation is the movement from linguistic form to divine act.

4. Donation and Participation

Accordingly, to have a referent in theology is to participate in the reality of Christ. The Spirit grants this participation and thus grants reference.

Objectiones

Ob I: According to the Fregean theory of reference, reference is determined by sense or descriptive content. No Spirit is needed.

Ob II: For the Kripkean direct reference theory, terms refer rigidly independent of mental or divine acts, and therefore donation is unnecessary.

Ob III: Postliberalism claims that theological reference occurs within the grammar of Christian usage, and thus metaphysical donation is superfluous.

Ob IV: The Phenomenological critique declares that if God transcends objecthood, He cannot be referred to. Thus, donation is conceptually impossible.

Ob V: Constructivist Hermeneutics argues that reference is constructed within interpretive communities and that donation is an illusion.

Responsiones

Ad I: Since God exceeds conceptual capture, reference cannot be mediated by sense. Thus, the Spirit must donate the reality in excess of description.

Ad II: Rigid designation works only when the designator is already in causal contact with the referent. But the creature has no such causal access to God apart from divine initiative. Thus, rigid designation presupposes donation.

Ad III: Grammar governs felicity, not ontology. Revealed truth requires that the referent be real and given, not merely textual. Thus, without donation, theology becomes semiotic idealism.

Ad IV: Donation is not the giving of God as object but the giving of participation in divine presence. Accordingly, the Spirit gives mode of access, not objectification.

Ad V: Interpretation does not entail construction. Donation is the metaphysical act by which meaning precedes interpretation, and meaning is received because the res is given.

Nota

Donation is the semantic form of participation.

• In Disputatio L, the Logos constitutes being and truth.

• In Disputation LI, the Logos is present as truth-for-us.

• In Disputation LII, the Spirit donates the referent so that theological language participates in this presence.

Thus, theological semantics unfolds as:

1. Constitutive Ground because the Logos makes truth. 

2. Real Presence since the Logos is truth-for-us. 

3. Donated Reference because the Spirit gives the res of the word. 

4. Felicity since the Spirit authorizes the creature’s act of speaking.

5. Participation because truth becomes ours. 

Without donation, theology collapses into:

• designation as in analytic theory,

• symbolism as with Zwingli,

• grammar as postliberalism holds, 

• and construction as hermeneutics attempts. 

With donation, theology becomes:

• ontologically grounded,

• presential,

• pneumatologically mediated,

• hyperintensional,

• participatory,

• and true.

Determinatio

We determine:

1. Reference in theology is donation, not designation;

2. The Spirit donates the res of theological language, enabling participation in the Logos;

3. Reference is grounded in presence, not sense or convention;

4. Donation is the semantic form of the Spirit’s interpretive act;

5. Thus, theological language refers truly because the Spirit gives what it says.

Transitus ad Disputationem LIII: De Felicitate Theologica

Having established that reference is a divine donation, we now turn to the complementary question: How does the Spirit authorize the human act of speaking so that donated reference becomes felicitous utterance?

Thus we proceed to Disputatio LIII: De Felicitate Theologica: Utrum Spiritus Sit Auctor Locutionis Fideli where it will be asked whether the felicity of theological language arises from the Spirit’s co-action with the human speaker, rendering theological assertions valid, trustworthy, and performatively true.