Being realist with regard to a class of theological statements does not mean one has to commit to metaphysical realism, to a claim that there are self-identifying theological objects, properties, relations, events or states of affairs that obtain apart from human awareness, conceptualization and language. One might allow some ontological contribution on the part of the subject, and still claim that the principle of bivalence holds for theological assertions, that these assertions are either true or false (but not both), and that their truth-conditions are evidence transcendent, i.e., that although, in principle, adequate evidence cannot be found for the truth of statements like 'God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself', such statements are true or false solely on the basis of whether the conditions do in fact obtain.
But the question immediately arises, can Lutheran theology be realist in this sense? Is not Lutheran theology committed to a bundle of paradoxes that become problematic if theological statements are interpreted in a realist way? Can a Lutheran who wants to assert that humans are justified and sinful simultaneously, that the bread really is bread but is the body at the same time, that God is both love and wrath simultaneiously honestly embrace semantic realism. If theological statements are either true or false, then A has a definite truth value (true or false), and if ~A is simultaneously asserted, then A & ~A hold simultaneously, and from a contradiction anything follows whatsover. So is not semantic realism incompatible with Lutheran theological assertion? Must not the assertions of theology be given a different analysis, perhaps as projetions of human emotion, disposition, or existential orientation? If Lutheran theology is commited to paradoxical claims, must it not reject semantic realism, for to accept it is itself incompatible with the assertion of those paradoxical claims?
This question goes to the heart of the problem. If there are paradoxes that must be asserted, and such paradoxes are vicious in and for any ontic divine domain, then to assert those paradoxes must entail that the assertions are not really assertions about an ontic divine domain; they are expressions of, or assertions about, that region of being for which the law of excluded middle is relaxed: human being. Human being is a paradoxical reality, it seems, because it is a being, who in its being has its be-ing at issue, a be-ing where both the projective possibilities of the future, and the remembered facticities of the past are simultaneously consistutive of its present. If I am both who I am (because of who I was), and who I am (because of who I might be) then I am both who I am and who I might be. Since I might be different than I was, then I am both A & ~A simultaneously. From the fact that my present is constituted by both my past and future, I am both who I am (I was) and who I am not (who I might be who is not who I was). The fact that I am both simultaneously gives the Lutheran hope, it seems, to think the simul eschatologically. I really am sinful because I have always been so. At the same time, I am justified because the possibility of being no longer sinful is my possibilty given the life, death and resurrection of the Christ. I am thus both who I am (sinful) and who I am not (sinless on account of Christ) at the same time. Similar moves must be made for the other Lutheran paradoxes; language about objective paradoxes must be traced back to the existentiality of the subject, to the being of that being who lives simultaneously as thrown pro-ject. It is no small wonder why Lutheran theology should find solace in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger. It seems, to paraphrase Tillich, that existentialism really is the good luck of Lutheran theology.
But much is lost with this approach. To justify paradox in theology by tracing the paradoxes back to the subject makes theological assertions essentially autobiographical. Talking about God cannot, as Barth said, be achieved by talking about ourselves in a loud voice. Giving a semantic realist construal to theological statements is to assert again what Luther and the Reformers presupposed: that God existed independently of us, and that statements about God are true or false if the truth-conditions of those statements are met. 'God is in Christ reconciling the world to Himself' if and only if God is in Christ reconciling the world to Himself'. The meaning of the statement is given by its truth-conditions, by specifying those things that must be so if the statement is true. So how can Lutheran theology embrace seeming paradox and still accept semantic realism? The answer to this question, I believe, drives Lutheran theology back into its Catholic origins. Lutheran theology did not spring forth from Catholicism as a separate theological school with its fundamental terms and statements logically disconnected from, or (worse yet) incommensurable with, the fundamental terms and statements of late medieval scholasticism. Lutheran theology is Catholic theology with a few twists. It emerged and grew in the waters of a late medieval scholasticism that was nominalist in its ontology and realist in its semantics. But that the Lutherans could argue that a justified person can remain sinful suggested that something quite ontologically different was at work in Lutheran theological thinking than had been thought before. Coming to an honest appraisal of this difference can help us, I think, in our quest for answering the question: How is a Lutheran realist semantics possible?
You posit, "If Lutheran theology is commited to paradoxical claims, must it not reject semantic realism, for to accept it is itself incompatible with the assertion of those paradoxical claims?"
ReplyDeleteI assert that it is compatibYou posit, "If Lutheran theology is committed to paradoxical claims, must it not reject semantic realism, for to accept it is itself incompatible with the assertion of those paradoxical claims?"
I assert that it *is* compatible, in that it can exist, and does quite comfortably, in the minds of some in Lutherdom. To see how this can be, we need to look at cognitive science.
In psychology, there exists a state called "confirmation bias". It is a tendency to search for or interpret new information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions and avoids information and interpretations which contradict prior beliefs. It is a type of cognitive bias (from a state of cognitive dissonance) and represents a form hypothesis confirmation and disconfirmation of an alternative hypothesis. This state *can* be good in invoking critical thinking, but only if the person critically thinks using references and not *opinions* or *feelings* as so many “Lutherans” do.
So, perhaps, one could state that this, you posit, is compatible in a biased condition.
le, in that it can exist, and does quite comfortably, in the minds of some in Lutherdom. To see how this can be, we need to look at cognitive science.
In psychology, there exsists a state called "confirmation bias". It is a tendency to search for or interpret new informatin in a way that confirms one's perconceptions and avoids information and interpretations which contradict propr beliefs. It is a type of cognitive bias (from a state of cognitive dissonance) and represents a form hypothesis confirmation adn disconfirmatino of an alternative hypothesis. This state *can* be good in invoking critical thinking, but only if the person critically thinks using references and not *opinions* or *feelings*.
Dennis--
ReplyDeleteAre we not talking about two different things? To assert 1) the existence of God independent of the human experience of the divine; 2) that this God has "theo-physical causation;" & 3) that the agent of this theo-physical causation is the "Word of God; is to assert something different than that which can be verified epistemologically. Cannot these assertions reflect a "semantic realism" in that they refer to "real things" even though those things can be known only by faith through revelation and not by sense through reason?
Isn't part of the problem our desire to deal with things ontologically from the subjective perspective, i.e. it's not "real" unless it's noticed by ME in MY spiritual, intellectual, emotional, or sensual self? Thus, the subject's interior reactions such as a "spiritual state," "intellectual assent," or "feelings of faith," and the subject's external reactions such as "ritual behavior" or “good works” become the mechanisms of "realism" for theological language. The subject’s “response-ability” becomes the test as to the effectiveness of the Word of God, theo-physical causation, and the independent existence of God. The journey from this point to the point of God’s existence being dependent upon the human subject’s experience is very short.
However, if you assert that “faith” and its entire attendant works are also an objective reality brought about solely by the agency of the Word of God independent of the subject’s experience of them, then the subject does not need to epistemologically verify “faith” through the experience of “faith,” but only needs to point to the experience of receiving the Word of God. In other words, God’s declarative Word is the sole verification that the subject has all the things the Word promises. The Word essentially says, “Don’t listen (look) to yourselves, but listen to me! I’ll tell you what you need to know.” Rather than arising internally so as to be given expression externally, this Word comes at the subject externally in order to “shut up” the interior voices.
Both the Law and the Gospel must be external voices.
Take the simultaneously and totally saint and sinner: The Word does not bring about a transformation in the ontology of the continuously self. Instead the Word speaks the self anew in the new creation. This is the radical discontinuity: translation not transformation. Just like translating a text from one language to another does not destroy the original but allows the two to exist side-by-side or in different localities simultaneously, the simultaneity of sinner and saint does not rest on one “being” sharing two ontologies but on the same being existing in two separate kingdoms simultaneously. For now in this mortal kingdom the sinner is also saint because Christ, the first fruits of the new creation, is the presence of the new creation where the saint resides. His reality as the Word of God handed over at pulpit, font, and altar is the epistemological verification of faith and all its attendant works.
I think it important to distinguish between what is incompatible, and what a group of rational agents might hold as incompatible. Famously, Russell showed that the axiom of comprehension was false: there is a satisfaction class for each and every predicate. Take the predicate 'all sets that are not members of themselves'. Most sets are not members of themselves, but is the set of all sets that are members of themselves, a member of itself? THis leads to paradox, because if the set is a member of itself, it is not a member of itself, and if it is not a member of itself, it is a member of itself. This paradox disproves the existence of the universal set, and yet most rational agents believed that such a set existed throughout the history of mathematics. So clearly one must distinguish what is incompatible with what was thought incompatible.
ReplyDeleteNow let us say that a Lutheran holds A and ~A simultaneously. From the standpoint of semantic realism, some set of truth conditions specify the existence of a situation making both true and false A. THis is unthinkable, of course, when one tries to think of that state of affairs that could actually satisfy A and ~A at the same time.
Now one can argue, like Descartes, that logical rules cannot bind God, that God can bring about a satisfaction of both A & ~A. But then what has one said? If this is true, then the law of excluded middle does not hold for divine things, and presumably for all of our talk about whether the law of excluded middle holds for divine things. So thus 'the law of excluded middle holds for the divine' and 'the law of excluded middle does not hold for the divine' can both be true. But this is pure chaos.
So semantic realism on the surface of things seems incompatible with some traditional assertions with in Lutheran theology, e.g., 'this is bread' and 'this (same thing) is the body of Christ'.
Ultimately, I believe that Lutheran theology is compatible with semantic realism, however, and hope to work through these issues with all of you.
Now for Tim's response - -
ReplyDeleteI agree completely with your point about objectivity and faith. I dug up a Luther quote that Hinlicky used in the introduction of The Substance of Faith. Here Luther opines that up until this time (circa 1530) what has been most important in the disputes has been the subjectivity of faith, because faith was "merely historical" to a great extent in his day, according to Luther. Now, he says, we must deal with the objective verities believed by the subjective grasping of faith. These objective verities constitute the extension of theological language, and, according to semantic realism, an expression's truth is a function of whether or not theological statements have a satisfaction set. The truth conditions of the language specify what situations must obtain for the statements to be true. For predicates, it is that there exists a satisfaction set of elements, for relations, a set of ordered n-tuples, for statements, the satisfaction set is the truth-value 'true'.
Now we agree on the issue, Tim, as far as I see. I even like your statement that two separate descriptions can be satisfied by the believer: one wherein the believer is a member of 'die himmlische Reich', the other as she exists in 'Die irdische Reich'. Of course, the problem is to think this through carefully.
Now I am going to say something that no follower of Forde would like to hear, but I am throwing it out for discussion. Can one have an eschatology without an ontology? If 'X is A by virtue of F' and 'X is ~A by virtue of G', are we not presupposing some ontological situation? It seems we are, though one might want to say that the ontology is wider than the subject.
I look forward to futher conversation. Thanks.
The following comes from Harold Schlachtenhaufen:
ReplyDeleteI have finally read your articles on your blog site and I think, know and believe they are all on target. I have a couple of questions and comments in response. First, are you contending that if you explain to any thinking (rational) non-religious adult person in our society that humans are "paradoxical" which includes that "I am who I am not" that they will agree with you. Cannot a rational human refuse to think this way, or as I would prefer to say, can they refuse to believe this? Does that then make them irrational?? (like my wife - just kidding)
Second, Lutheranism is nominalist in its ontology and realist in its semantics; at least as an ethical proposition or belief (statement of faith) this ought to be true. The fact that this is not supported by a majority of Lutheran clergy points to a deep cleavage in our theologies and faith.
My reductionist theology affirms that Luther always had two priority principles of faith (or thought) woven into his theology: 1. Luther always asserted and protected the sovereignty (or unconditional and incomprehensible nature) of God (it's why we can be nothing other than nominalists); and 2. Luther always affirmed the alienation, enmity, fragmentation and helplessness of humans to save or redeem themselves (OR to be able to genuinely know or love God or their neighbor) Even with the gift of revelation and faith our understanding is fragmentary and self-serving (it's the sin in which we believe).
Second, I had not heard of Searle or read anything by him, but he is indeed asking the right questions and an age old question (as well as a very modern question). I think his willingness to allow "quantum neural indeterminism" is as close as he can come to any concept of free will, but here free will is in bondage to empiricism (or genetics and environment) rather than to sin and self. This also allows Searle to allow some fragment of free will as that narrowed area of life that cannot be explained by "quantum neural determinism", which is his main position.
Thirdly, since the problem of free will cannot be solved or understood; it can only be described, believed, and observed in spite of and in its polarities, and like hope and love, affirmed in its potential. So, "ought cannot be derived from is"; and is (existentially) cannot express the completeness of ought; and I ought does not imply I can or will; but rather if I believe or deduce that I ought, then I will "try" or simply think, say, and do the best I can which is never enough to fulfill the law or principles of faith or ethics.
Fourthly, and finally for now, this evidence supports the thesis that the ELCA and other Christians are spinning out of control with "incoherent" theologies where the law is turned into the Gospel and a new false Gospel is really a new law parading as the Gospel.
Also, I mailed a copy of my book to you this week and your feedback would be appreciated. Some parts are somewhat redundant, but this is intended for an introduction and also for lay study groups (my brother (who has a M.A. degree) says it's too technical even for lay people. I hope this is not true.
Thanks, Harold
Harold,
ReplyDeleteYou have introduced a number of issues in your comment, and I will respond to them in a series of comments. I will try to address the first two issues in this post.
1) You ask whether a rational person my reject the proposition 'I am who I am not' as either false - - or maybe even contradictory. The answer is: yes, of course. We must distinguish a claim being strongly rational for P over and against it being weakly rational. If c is strongly rational for P to accept, it would be irrational for him no to accept it. If c, however, is weakly rational for P to accept, that it would not be irrational for P to accept it. I think it is clearly weakly rational to hold 'I am who I am not'.
2) Yes, we quite agree: Lutheran theology is nominalist in its ontology and realist in its semantics. Luther learned this at Erfurt from Unsinn and Trutvetter, and he never abandoned it. Now the question is does the unconditional and incomprehensible nature of God entail nominalism? I don't thin so. One could be a realist with respect to universals, and still claim, I believe, that God is incomprehensible and unconditional. Just because we cannot grasp and conceive omnibenevolence, it does not follow that the universal goodness cannot exist ante rem and be that in which all who do some good things participate. Infinitizing a form does not a non-form make. Or at least I am sticking with this for now for the sake of discussion.