This essay forms part of an ongoing series in philosophical theology produced through the Department of Philosophical Theology at Christ School of Theology. The series explores the conditions of intelligibility, reality, theological language, and the philosophical foundations of Christian belief. It proceeds from the conviction that theology exists because these questions exist and that theology's first responsibility is to render Christian doctrine intelligible without diminishing, translating away, or replacing the reality to which it refers.
Try asking someone this question:
Why should anyone devote a life to understanding reality?
Not What should I believe? Not Does God exist? Just that.
Why spend a lifetime trying to understand what is ultimately real?
Watch what happens.
Most people won't argue with you. They simply aren't sure why you're asking. The question doesn't quite register as a genuine question. It sounds a little abstract, perhaps a bit impractical, the sort of thing discussed in seminars but having little to do with ordinary life.
That response has begun to fascinate me.
For many years I believed that the central question of my work concerned the intelligibility of Christian theology. I still believe that theology must once again become intelligible as genuine discourse about reality. Increasingly, however, I have come to suspect that this is not the deepest problem.
Theology's difficulty may itself be only one expression of a much larger cultural development.
There was a time when philosophers, theologians, scientists, poets, and artists alike assumed that reality itself was worthy of lifelong attention. The theologian seeking to understand God and the theoretical physicist seeking to understand quantum reality shared something fundamental. Their objects differed, but their vocation did not. Both believed that reality possessed depths worthy of patient, disciplined, and sometimes lifelong contemplation.
Today I am less certain that our culture recognizes that vocation.
Notice that I am not speaking first about religious belief. I am asking something prior to belief.
Why has the vocation of intelligibility itself become unintelligible?
But there is an even stranger question.
Why has asking that question itself become strange?
We have not merely lost confidence in theology, philosophy, or metaphysics. We seem increasingly to have lost curiosity about why the pursuit of reality itself no longer commands our attention. We have forgotten—and, more remarkably, we have largely forgotten that we have forgotten.
That strikes me as one of the defining characteristics of our age.
One can see a small but revealing example in the way we speak about freedom and choice.
"It is my choice."
Conversation over.
Rarely does anyone ask the obvious follow-up question:
What makes a choice worth making?
Or:
What makes freedom meaningful?
Those questions often create discomfort, not because people have carefully considered them and rejected them, but because they scarcely register as questions requiring thought. We defend freedom passionately while rarely asking what freedom is for. Detached from any prior answerability to reality, choice quietly becomes self-justifying simply because it is ours.
Yet there is no enduring depth to such choice.
Reality must once again become something to which we are answerable before it becomes something about which we merely have opinions.
Seen in this light, theology's predicament may not be primarily theological at all. It may be anthropological. Before people can hear talk of God as talk about reality, they must once again experience reality itself as worthy of a lifetime's attention.
Perhaps this is why theology has become increasingly difficult to hear. It has not merely lost arguments. It speaks into a culture that no longer finds the pursuit of ultimate reality an obvious human vocation.
This is not a criticism of individuals, nor is it a lament for some imagined golden age. It is an attempt to understand the horizon within which we now live.
Charles Taylor has taught us much about the rise of the secular social imaginary. Others have illuminated the historical, political, and cultural transformations that have shaped late modernity. Yet I increasingly suspect that an even deeper question remains before us.
What cultural conditions have rendered the vocation of intelligibility itself unintelligible?
Until we can answer that question, we may continue addressing symptoms while leaving the underlying condition untouched.
These reflections are exploratory. They arise from the growing conviction that my own work has been moving toward this question for many years without my recognizing it in its full clarity. I do not yet know where this inquiry will lead. I have become convinced, however, that Christian theology cannot recover its public intelligibility unless we first recover something even more fundamental: the human vocation of becoming answerable to reality.
That, it seems to me, is a conversation worth beginning.
Hello, Dr. Bielfeldt. I appreciate the way you have framed this question.
ReplyDeleteNot that I have an answer to the problem of answerability to reality, which requires an appreciation for dependence; (I have begun reading about Truthmaker Semantics because of your earlier articles on the subject; in fact, my fascination with Category Theory and its place in discussions of explanatory power, explanatory reach, and what counts as an explanation, has been revived through your careful attention to the teleological space any construal of reality as an experience-able thing has to pass or inhabit (the teleo-spaces) but I do have a response to the question so-framed.
The response is in the form of an initial reaction or image. I am reminded of the allegory of the cave. The character not led, but dragged, out of the cave, into the light of being, is gladdened by the experience of experiencing something new and better than, which are attributes or predicates concerning the reality they were transported into, or translated into, somehow.
Now, the reality of those predicates being in the new reality (or the revealed layer of reality that was more-than, deeper, and crisper, so to speak) was not in a single blade of grass as some extra. It was somehow, somewhere in the observer-and-observed occurrence-encountered or encountered-occurrence, but it was just as real, and not less, for that fitting-ness of the observer to the observed.
Hence the shadows falling away in the light of day (metaphor) with respect to their dependence on the
light as an ingredient to their contours. But the light of the sun, in this analogy, being more real than the fire in the cave, gave more light than could be tolerated (taken in as programmable to a set of constraints that made the particular shadow a particular shadow) by the shadows, so they disappeared, which is not the same thing as being destroyed (this is where the metaphor breaks down for me, since particulars need not be conceived of as flimsy as a shadow, it is more a comparison-thing).
But what I want to say with all this is the following:
The moment the character in the real world (the world of the bright sun that makes model fires extinguish in the memory by comparison) is told to go back, there is a kind of reluctance that matches the reluctance the character had to leave the fire to go to the land of the sun. This is fascinating to me, not the idea of the fire or the sun so much, as the idea of the symmetric reluctance to face the knowledge, since now the going back is a going back with the relation of the sun in mind, just as before the going forward out of the cave was a going forward with the relation of the fire in mind; in either case, forwards or backwards -- ontologically or epistemologically -- the same reluctance to bear the sight is evoked and registered. This seems peculiar to me, and it may have connections to what you are canvassing here with respect to the forgetting of what we have forgotten about why the pursuit of reality no longer commands our attention.
Matthew, it is very good to hear from you! I remember our conversations at SDSU with real gratitude, and I am pleased to see you still thinking with such philosophical seriousness and imaginative force.
DeleteYour appeal to Plato’s cave is very apt. What especially interests me in your reading is the “symmetric reluctance” you identify: the reluctance to leave the cave and the reluctance to return after one has seen differently. That seems exactly right. The encounter with reality is not merely an increase in information. It changes the one who encounters. To see more truly is also to become newly responsible for what one has seen.
That is closely connected to what I am trying to name here as answerability to reality. The vocation of intelligibility is not simply curiosity, nor merely the construction of better conceptual models. It is the disciplined willingness to be transformed by what resists, corrects, deepens, and exceeds our present construals. Your language of fittingness between observer and observed is helpful here, because it suggests that intelligibility is not imposed upon reality from the outside, but arises in a relation in which the knower is summoned beyond the shadows without thereby despising those who still see only by their light.
Thank you for this thoughtful and generous response. It helps clarify precisely why the loss of the vocation of intelligibility is not simply an intellectual problem, but also an existential and perhaps spiritual one.
Peirce: "Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy, *Do not block the way of inquiry.* ... [T]o set up a philosophy which barricades the road of further advance toward the truth is the one unpardonable offense in reasoning, as it is also the one to which metaphysicians have in all ages shown themselves the most addicted."
DeleteTo me it seems that our modern western culture has been decidedly anti-metaphysical for hundreds of years. Modern science was born explicitly with that intention in mind. Witness, for example, Descartes' criticism of Newtonian "occult" entities. The justification for this Duhemian position is "plain." The objective was to achieve some kind of consensus. Explicit metaphysics is poor soil for such agreement, esp. after the decline of the Middle Ages hegemony and the decline of Church's dominance. Secular society, esp. anything like democratic secular society, requires an anti-metaphysical position. As such, we attend to the external, the visible, tangible, and "indisputable."
ReplyDeleteFor modern man the subject and their internal states are sacrosanct. These are private, their personal possessions. This justifies our reluctance to assign values as objective or absolute. These dwell within the sacred confines of the subject. To breach this chasm would be to entertain what is not seen, to tread onto metaphysical grounds. We are suspicious of a meta-physics, of meta-truth, of meta-narratives, and we have good reason to be so. Such an invisible, untestable, realm appears too thin. We search for more "certain" grounds, and fear to go much further, most especially when they make universal claims.
It isn't, I think, that reality is out of favor. It's more what we allow of reality. The question is more, "What is Real?" How can we know the Real? Increasingly, our sense of the Real is reduced and diminished, shrunk down to the external, the factual, undeniable and the like. We are looking for some kind of epistemological certainty, and like positivists, are trained to be satisfied with it. It isn't that we don't or can't see that there must be more, more questions, it's rather that we can't see how we can go much further given our epistemological constraints. We are epistemological skeptics.
This limited and reduced "reality" may feel too small. It may very well have serious implications for our well-being. If I am right, what we require is an embellished sense of how to live and dwell with uncertainty. And here we enter into the realm of faith. Such an environment may not favor a Christian narrative, but it will be, as Taylor calls it, be an open immanent frame.
Bill, thank you for this remarkably thoughtful response. I especially appreciate the way you frame the matter. You are quite right that the modern West has not simply lost interest in reality. The deeper issue may be that our operative sense of reality has been narrowed in advance. Reality becomes what can be rendered external, visible, measurable, publicly negotiable, and therefore capable of sustaining some measure of social consensus.
ReplyDeleteThat narrowing has real historical intelligibility. As you note, metaphysical claims have often appeared too contested, too thin, too prone to domination, or too closely bound to inherited authorities whose claims modernity learned to distrust. A democratic and secular order therefore seeks a common space in which persons need not agree about ultimate reality in order to live together. That is not a trivial achievement.
Yet the achievement comes at a cost. If the “real” is increasingly identified with the external and indisputable, then those dimensions of reality that require judgment, trust, inward transformation, disciplined interpretation, or metaphysical courage begin to appear less real rather than differently real. The subject then becomes sacrosanct, while truth about the subject’s ends, goods, loves, and final orientation becomes nearly impossible to discuss without seeming to violate the privacy of the self.
Your language of epistemological skepticism is especially helpful here. The question becomes not simply whether modern persons believe there is “more,” but whether they believe we have any responsible way of speaking about the more. That is close to the issue I am trying to name. The eclipse of intelligibility is not the denial that reality exists, but the constriction of what we are permitted to expect from reality and from our own inquiry into it.
I also think you are right that learning to live with uncertainty is crucial. But I would want to distinguish uncertainty from arbitrariness, and faith from a mere leap beyond evidence. Perhaps faith, at its best, is not the rejection of intelligibility under uncertain conditions, but the disciplined willingness to remain answerable to a reality that exceeds our mastery while still summoning our trust, judgment, and obedience.
That is why Taylor’s “open immanent frame” remains so important. The frame may be immanent, but it is not sealed. The very sense that our reduced account of reality is too small may itself be one of the ways reality continues to press upon us.
Peirce again: "Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics--not by any means every man who holds the ordinary reasonings of metaphysicians in scorn--and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with which they are packed. We must philosophize, said the great naturalist Aristotle--if only to avoid philosophizing. Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence his life greatly. Far better, then, that that metaphysics should be criticized and not be allowed to run loose."
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