This essay forms part of an ongoing series in philosophical theology produced through the Department of Philosophical Theology at Christ School of Theology. The series explores the conditions of intelligibility, reality, theological language, and the philosophical foundations of Christian belief. It proceeds from the conviction that theology exists because these questions exist and that theology's first responsibility is to render Christian doctrine intelligible without diminishing, translating away, or replacing the reality to which it refers.
Try asking someone this question:
Why should anyone devote a life to understanding reality?
Not What should I believe? Not Does God exist? Just that.
Why spend a lifetime trying to understand what is ultimately real?
Watch what happens.
Most people won't argue with you. They simply aren't sure why you're asking. The question doesn't quite register as a genuine question. It sounds a little abstract, perhaps a bit impractical, the sort of thing discussed in seminars but having little to do with ordinary life.
That response has begun to fascinate me.
For many years I believed that the central question of my work concerned the intelligibility of Christian theology. I still believe that theology must once again become intelligible as genuine discourse about reality. Increasingly, however, I have come to suspect that this is not the deepest problem.
Theology's difficulty may itself be only one expression of a much larger cultural development.
There was a time when philosophers, theologians, scientists, poets, and artists alike assumed that reality itself was worthy of lifelong attention. The theologian seeking to understand God and the theoretical physicist seeking to understand quantum reality shared something fundamental. Their objects differed, but their vocation did not. Both believed that reality possessed depths worthy of patient, disciplined, and sometimes lifelong contemplation.
Today I am less certain that our culture recognizes that vocation.
Notice that I am not speaking first about religious belief. I am asking something prior to belief.
Why has the vocation of intelligibility itself become unintelligible?
But there is an even stranger question.
Why has asking that question itself become strange?
We have not merely lost confidence in theology, philosophy, or metaphysics. We seem increasingly to have lost curiosity about why the pursuit of reality itself no longer commands our attention. We have forgotten—and, more remarkably, we have largely forgotten that we have forgotten.
That strikes me as one of the defining characteristics of our age.
One can see a small but revealing example in the way we speak about freedom and choice.
"It is my choice."
Conversation over.
Rarely does anyone ask the obvious follow-up question:
What makes a choice worth making?
Or:
What makes freedom meaningful?
Those questions often create discomfort, not because people have carefully considered them and rejected them, but because they scarcely register as questions requiring thought. We defend freedom passionately while rarely asking what freedom is for. Detached from any prior answerability to reality, choice quietly becomes self-justifying simply because it is ours.
Yet there is no enduring depth to such choice.
Reality must once again become something to which we are answerable before it becomes something about which we merely have opinions.
Seen in this light, theology's predicament may not be primarily theological at all. It may be anthropological. Before people can hear talk of God as talk about reality, they must once again experience reality itself as worthy of a lifetime's attention.
Perhaps this is why theology has become increasingly difficult to hear. It has not merely lost arguments. It speaks into a culture that no longer finds the pursuit of ultimate reality an obvious human vocation.
This is not a criticism of individuals, nor is it a lament for some imagined golden age. It is an attempt to understand the horizon within which we now live.
Charles Taylor has taught us much about the rise of the secular social imaginary. Others have illuminated the historical, political, and cultural transformations that have shaped late modernity. Yet I increasingly suspect that an even deeper question remains before us.
What cultural conditions have rendered the vocation of intelligibility itself unintelligible?
Until we can answer that question, we may continue addressing symptoms while leaving the underlying condition untouched.
These reflections are exploratory. They arise from the growing conviction that my own work has been moving toward this question for many years without my recognizing it in its full clarity. I do not yet know where this inquiry will lead. I have become convinced, however, that Christian theology cannot recover its public intelligibility unless we first recover something even more fundamental: the human vocation of becoming answerable to reality.
That, it seems to me, is a conversation worth beginning.
Hello, Dr. Bielfeldt. I appreciate the way you have framed this question.
ReplyDeleteNot that I have an answer to the problem of answerability to reality, which requires an appreciation for dependence; (I have begun reading about Truthmaker Semantics because of your earlier articles on the subject; in fact, my fascination with Category Theory and its place in discussions of explanatory power, explanatory reach, and what counts as an explanation, has been revived through your careful attention to the teleological space any construal of reality as an experience-able thing has to pass or inhabit (the teleo-spaces) but I do have a response to the question so-framed.
The response is in the form of an initial reaction or image. I am reminded of the allegory of the cave. The character not led, but dragged, out of the cave, into the light of being, is gladdened by the experience of experiencing something new and better than, which are attributes or predicates concerning the reality they were transported into, or translated into, somehow.
Now, the reality of those predicates being in the new reality (or the revealed layer of reality that was more-than, deeper, and crisper, so to speak) was not in a single blade of grass as some extra. It was somehow, somewhere in the observer-and-observed occurrence-encountered or encountered-occurrence, but it was just as real, and not less, for that fitting-ness of the observer to the observed.
Hence the shadows falling away in the light of day (metaphor) with respect to their dependence on the
light as an ingredient to their contours. But the light of the sun, in this analogy, being more real than the fire in the cave, gave more light than could be tolerated (taken in as programmable to a set of constraints that made the particular shadow a particular shadow) by the shadows, so they disappeared, which is not the same thing as being destroyed (this is where the metaphor breaks down for me, since particulars need not be conceived of as flimsy as a shadow, it is more a comparison-thing).
But what I want to say with all this is the following:
The moment the character in the real world (the world of the bright sun that makes model fires extinguish in the memory by comparison) is told to go back, there is a kind of reluctance that matches the reluctance the character had to leave the fire to go to the land of the sun. This is fascinating to me, not the idea of the fire or the sun so much, as the idea of the symmetric reluctance to face the knowledge, since now the going back is a going back with the relation of the sun in mind, just as before the going forward out of the cave was a going forward with the relation of the fire in mind; in either case, forwards or backwards -- ontologically or epistemologically -- the same reluctance to bear the sight is evoked and registered. This seems peculiar to me, and it may have connections to what you are canvassing here with respect to the forgetting of what we have forgotten about why the pursuit of reality no longer commands our attention.