Saturday, August 09, 2014

Fall 2014 Classes at the Institute of Lutheran Theology


If you go to the ILT website here you shall discover some very interesting courses being offered.   The first thing to realize is that ILT is offering twenty courses for graduate credit this fall.  These courses include standard courses in Biblical theology, systematic theology, historical theology, and pastoral theology, as well as a Greek readings course and courses in philosophy and ethics.   (We believe at ILT that theological reflection has been, and must always be, in dialogue with the philosophical assumptions and views of the age in which it is undertaken.  Theological reflection is clearly not philosophical reflection, but it nonetheless neglects philosophy at its own peril.)

Our Masters of Sacred Theology (STM) students this fall can choose courses in theological German, Bonhoeffer, philosophy of religion and theology & science.   Readers of this blog will find all of these courses interesting, but I want to bring to attention the excellent course on Bonhoeffer taught this fall by our Dean of Academic Affairs, Dr. Jonathan Sorum.  Sorum is a Bonhoeffer expert, and the course is extremely well-prepared an insightful.   If you are interested in a challenge on Wednesday nights from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. CDT, I recommend that you email admissions@ilt.org and get enrolled today.   Dr. Sorum is also available for conversation on it at 605-692-9337.

ILT also is offering six certificate courses on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday evenings.   If you don't already have an undergraduate or graduate degree, but are interested in studying theology seriously, these courses are for you!   We designed them to be basic training in theology, much like companies like IBM give basic job training to computer science majors.  The computer science majors find IBM's training deep and challenging, even if they already have a computer science degree.   Similarly, students with undergraduate or advanced degrees already will find our certificate courses deep, challenging and interesting.

All of our courses are delivered in a fully-interactive format on-line.  We at ILT take educational quality very seriously, and we have well-known professors currently teaching and more coming soon.   You can study with some of the top names in Lutheran theology in the English-speaking world.

There is no other place like ILT.   We are not an idea waiting to be implemented, but a fully-functioning, degree-granting institution with faculty, faculty governance, students, embedded ministry sites, and a guarantee to offer each and every class on schedule so that you can advance through our Masters of Divinity program in as few as three years.  Come and join the fun!       

Friday, August 08, 2014

Facts and Values


It seemed simple once - - this distinction confidently taught to grade school children by those knowing nothing of its lineage.  "Children, please listen up.  There are facts and there are values.  You can say that Sally got the wrong answer in science class because science deals with facts.  She can have the wrong answer because there is something to measure the facts against.  However, you cannot say, and you must not ever say, that Sally has got it wrong when she says that there is a God, or when she says that there is not a God, or when she claims Frank was wrong to push Molly.  After all, every person is entitled to his own opinion."  

Every future teacher secondary school teacher I had in my university classes knew and believed in the fact/value distinction. Future school teachers, after all, have to be taught to respect familial and cultural diversity.  It is not wrong that Piper has two mothers or that Alex faces Mecca each day. Of course, the reality of such diversity entails that many of our most cherished judgments are simply values.  There is nothing to measure the probity of Piper having two mothers against; there is no fact of the matter that decides the truth or falsity of Alex facing Mecca.  School teachers teach the facts of grammar, mathematics, science and history, and let the kids "express themselves" in art, music, theater and the interpretation of literature.  While most kids don't any longer have the chance to study philosophy or theology in secondary school, if they could do so today, they would find these disciplines relegated to the same arena as art, music and theater. "Kids need to respect the views of others," their teachers confidently intone.  There can be no fact of the matter in philosophy or religion.  Some kids are Catholics, some Lutheran, some Jewish, some Islamic, and some reject religion all together.   There is no fact of the matter which makes Catholicism "right" and Islam "wrong." To suggest this simply displays abject intolerance.  

Maybe the exposure to this distinction when young explains its popularity today.  Everywhere within popular culture we find the presupposition of the arbitrary and capricious nature of value. The great ideals of humanity (beauty, goodness and truth) are confidently thought to be mere affairs of subjective value.  Some people believe there is a God, but others do not.   This is fine because there is no fact of the matter about there being or not being a God.  Some people believe that abortion is right and others believe it wrong.  This is fine because there is no fact of the matter about its rectitude.  But while Amber might believe abortion wrong, since there is no fact of the matter about its rectitude, she ought not to block access to abortion for others who might believe it is morally permissible.  Since Amber's value is personal, it concerns only her personal behavior.  For her to claim that her personal value ought to govern public policy is for her to succumb to close-minded intolerance.  Does she not know that abortion can be right for Alex but wrong for Piper?  If she knows that abortion could be right for another, she simply has no right to block access to abortion to another - - even if she believes it is a heinous murder.

American people in the second decade of the twentieth century quite naturally assume that talk of God is valuational, that it concerns not a publicly observable arena, but rather expresses the perspective or orientation on life of the author or speaker and his culture.  When theologians write of God and pastors preach passionately from the pulpit, contemporary readers and hearers increasingly simply read or hear the words as valuational expressions; they naturally assume that these words offer a personal or cultural perspective or reveal personal or cultural dispositions and orientations.  The young particularly have been well trained not to understand the words as being factual.  They must not understand these words that way, for to do so would itself be an act of intolerance.   This is where the preacher starts today.  She  starts with an audience trained to be open-minded enough not to regard her words as descriptive and factual.  Paradoxically, the more open-minded the hearer, the more difficult it is today for the hearer to hear the Word.   In this way, the Word is sacrificed on the altar of the fact/value distinction.             

Wednesday, August 06, 2014

Philosophical Impediments to Proclamation


Theology was once a lofty discipline whose practitioners were among the brightest and best of their age.  In Luther's day candidates for the Doctor of Theology had first to receive a Masters of Arts in philosophy.  They knew the trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric), and they had exposure to the quadrivium (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry and music).  They understood Latin deeply and some learned Greek and Hebrew as well.   Luther knew his Aristotle well enough to realize that the Aristotle he encountered in the text was not the Aristotle that many theologians embraced in the High and Late Middle Ages.  Like in every age, Luther's era was a time in which philosophy and theology were deeply related.

Our age also is a time in which theological and philosophical matters are deeply connected.   The relationship between the two is so profound that many thinkers (often very deep theological thinkers) often overlook or miss it entirely.  But theologians today ignore philosophical issues at their own peril.  Deeply-educated in the Biblical text, its historical and social context, its history of reception, and effective homiletical techniques to proclaim it, theological thinkers often fail to examine and appreciate deeply enough the contemporary cultural and intellectual horizon into which the text is preached.  In failing to grasp the differing philosophical assumptions between textual origination and reception, they overlook the presuppositional issues making it difficult for the text to be properly understood be contemporary readers and hearers.  These issues, I believe, our explicitly philosophical.  They involve such traditional and meaty philosophical concerns as ontology (the study of being), epistemology (the study of knowing), and semantics (the study of meaning).

In the following series of posts I will spell out what I believe to be some of the philosophical impediments to Biblical proclamation in our time.  I will deal with such issues as the fact/value distinction, the loss of normativity, the problem of truth-conditions for religious and theological language, the problem of the external world as it relates to the divine, the question of agent motivation, the problem of reductionism, and, of course, the question of freedom.  (Of course, the discussion will be necessarily brief and undeveloped.)  Throughout, the questions of dualism, physicalism and idealism will be engaged.   The overarching issue is semantic.  What does (or can) the Gospel mean in an age where the horizon of understanding of the reader or listener is pluralistic, therapeutic, and anti-realistic?  What can God-talk mean to those today (particularly the young) who neither know the intellectual tradition, nor are normatively determined by it?               

 

The New School of Lutheran Theology


In 1919 a distinguished group of American intellectuals, many from Columbia University, pioneered a new model of education that allowed ordinary citizens to exchange ideas with artists and scholars representing a wide spectrum of intellectual and political orientations.   During the 1930s the "new school" provided safe haven for European thinkers threatened by rising Nazi power.  By 1934 the "new school" had matured into a full graduate school that offered masters and doctors degrees. Today this graduate school has over 1,000 students from 70 countries, offering graduate degrees in anthropology, economics, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology.  The school, born out of the German Volkshochschulen for adults, has truly come of age as an excellent graduate school with a powerful faculty.

In 2007 a group of American Lutherans pioneered a "new school" of their own.   The idea was simple:  Curious Lutherans (both lay and clergy) could and should  exchange theological ideas with theologians and  academics representing a wide spectrum of theological opinion.  The first courses of the Institute of Lutheran Theology (ILT) were done for congregations.  From these Volkhochschulen-like roots, an excellent graduate school has developed, offering Masters of Religion, Masters of Divinity, Masters of Sacred Theology, and Doctor of Ministry degrees with a partnered Ph.D. on the way.  ILT has offered a safe haven for theological reflection; it is a place where scholars from many different Lutheran traditions have found common ground.  It is a place where curious students engage professors and each other in fundamental questions of truth and meaning about those ultimate things bearing the most truth and meaning.  Though still small, ILT is growing in student headcount, number of staff, number of courses offered, budget, tuition and donation revenue, and in numbers of friends. Please visit www.ilt.org to see all of the changes.  We are definitely not the ILT of four years ago.

ILT has so far done what few thought possible: We have built an independent, autonomous school of theology and seminary from scratch without financial support from an institutional church body. Because of the dedication of the faculty, staff and friends of ILT, we have grown to twelve full-time staff including President, Assistant to the President, Vice-President of Development, Dean of Academic Affairs, Comptroller/Head of Admissions, Dean of the Chapel/Director of Student Affairs, Associate Director of Development, Director of Congregational Relations, Director of Publications and Certificate Programming, Registrar/Associate Dean, Director of the Library, and Graphic Artist/Web Presence Specialist. We have a faculty of 20, of which seven have continuing appointments.

The new semester is upon us at this New School of Lutheran Theology.  In a time when other Lutheran seminaries and graduate schools are shrinking and redesigning their curriculum to fit the intellectual and cultural horizon of the age, the Institute of Lutheran Theology is growing and strengthening its curriculum, and becoming even more rigorous. The Institute knows that the future will not resemble the past, and that this future will demand passionate, faithful, and very well-educated clergy who will be able to give an account of the faith that lies within them to a culture no longer pre-understanding what Christian claims are even about.

Check out our graduate courses at http://www.ilt.org/#!course-offerings/clgm. Study with the best!  Become an ILT student.   ILT is the  New School of Theology for a new time.

Tuesday, August 05, 2014

A Question


The question that has always interested me is not merely whether God exists and has a determinate contour apart from human awareness, perception, conception and language, but whether or not it is ultimately meaningful to make such a claim.  Simply put, what would the truth conditions be of the claim that God exists and has a definite contour apart from awareness, perception, conception and language?  That God exists and has a definite contour apart from awareness, perception, conception and language?  But what is this?   "Not words," you say, "but the reality of that existence and contour apart from awareness, perception, conception and language. . ."  But what is that?

When thinking about truth conditions one wants to think about entities, properties, and relations apart from words.  But how precisely do we think of such things?  How do we think of that which makes true divine existence and contour apart from human awareness, perception, conception and language?  What is it precisely that makes true this and does not make true a divine existence and contour that is, but is not apart from human awareness, perception, conception and language?

Sunday, October 13, 2013

Performatives, Illocutions and Felicity Conditions for Preaching

Many point out that preaching is a performative act.  Instead of a mere conveyance of said information, good preaching is a doing.  In the sermon, Jesus Christ Himself is handed over to the hearers of the Word. 

The Tuebingen systematician Owald Bayer (b. 1939) uses the notion of a performative utterance, connects it with the promissio, and contrasts it with a mere constative.  Accordingly, Bayer quotes a statement from Luther’s Tishreden as stating a general principle in Luther’s semantics: "Signum philosophicum est nota absentis rei, signum theologicum est nota praesentis rei"  (“The philosophical sign is a mark of an absent thing; the theological sign is a mark of a present thing"), and “the signum itself is already the res; the linguistic sign is already the matter itself" (Martin Luther’s Theology, 52).

The promissio Bayer locates at the center of Luther's theology is unpacked by equating the word in language with the reality itself. Bayer suggests that in promises, words are not to be interpreted extensionally or intensionally, but are themselves their own reality.  (I have elsewhere called this the "donational model.")  Bayer regards this to be the deepest presupposition of Luther's theological semantics, a position he claims is akin to the views on performative language advanced by Austin. 

Over and against the constative, Bayer regards the promissio as a performative utterance: "In contrast to every metaphysical set of statements that teach about the deity, this assertion [e.g. "To you is born this day a Savior"] declares that God's truth and will are not abstract entities, but are directed verbally and publicly as a concrete promise to a particular hearer in a specific situation. 'God' is apprehended as the one who makes a promise to a human being in such a way that the person who hears it can have full confidence in it" (53).  Bayer has many more things to say about promise-talk:  

  •  " . . . one cannot take the promise, which is not a descriptive statement, and transform it into a descriptive statement.” 
  • “Secondly, one cannot take the promise, which is not in the form of a statement that shows how something ought to be done, and transform it into an imperative. . . .” 
  •  "The truth of the promise . . . is to be determined only at the very place that the promise was . . . constituted. This means it is located within the relationship of the one who is speaking . . . and the one who hears. . . .”
Unfortunately, regardless of his authorial intent, Bayer’s formulations suggest a possible confusion.  One might hold that the sermon is a set of performative utterances - - promises being one type of performative - - that do something rather than say something, and then go on to claim that since performative utterances are not true or false, preaching expressions have no truth-conditions.  While this might seem a very bad thing, it is actually has some theological advantages.   How is this view possibly fruitful?  

Since the time of Kant there has been a tendency to claim that religious and theological language do not talk about the same reality as that talked about by historical, scientific, and even philosophical language.  This happened because the Kantian criticisms of natural theology succeeded in adding to the previous Enlightenment distrust that theological statements could be straightforwardly true.  If they weren't true, but still useful, then what were they?  The view that whatever religion and theology talk about, they don't talk about the same reality as discussed in the other disciplines is called the independence thesis in the theology and science discussion.  The question is then to locate the domain of theology with respect to other domains.  What domain is theology about?   

Here is where performative utterance-talk can come to the rescue.   The promise of performative utterances is that Lutheran theology can thus avoid metaphysical statements about God, God’s causal relationship with the universe, and God’s relationship to the realm of being generally. Instead one merely says that theology is all about doing, and doing cannot conflict with what is, with the saying of  metaphysics!   One can thus both be an academic, post-Kantian and a Lutheran theologian all at the same time!  
    
Accordingly, proclamations become first-order doing expressions without truth conditions, and they produce what they say.  Preaching is constituted by performative utterances declaring one’s freedom from sin, death, and devil through Christ.   Explicitly theological formulations then become second-order saying expressions which are merely regulative in that they order the performative utterances, and govern the occasions and context of their use.  One detects a fleeting ghost of Schleiermacher who held:  

  • First-order religious language is expressive and poetic;
  • First-order rhetorical language is rhetorical and persuasive;
  • Second-order theological language is didatic and dogmatic.  
Clearly, a great deal of weight must be carried by the notion of a performative utterance, if it is to ground the very questionable discipline of theology in our time.  Unfortunately, many theologians do not realize that the status of a performative utterance is itself a matter of considerable philosophical controversy, and that Austin was already attacking his own performative-constative distinction almost 60 years ago.  

In sections IV and VII of How to Do Things with Words, Austin accumulates a number of doubts about the performative-constative distinction.   It seems that certain "felicity conditions" must be met in order for a declaration or promise to occur, and that these conditions rest both on social convention and speaker intentionality.  A performative is null and void if issued by a person not in position to perform the act, e.g., the pastor can marry the couple only in the appropriate social context, not by himself in the shower.  An unelected plumber cannot declare war on behalf of the United States.   One cannot promise with the intention to break it or without any means to fulfill the promise.   It seems that, for Austin, there is an element of the constative in each performative, and an element of the performative in the constative.   For these reasons Austin abandons the performative-constative distinction and formulates instead a distinction among locutions, various illocutionary acts, and the different perlocutions accomplished through these illocutions.   

The locution is the semantic content of an utterance; it is the act of saying something.   The illocutionary act is that which is accomplished in the saying.  It is the "extra meaning" beyond the literal meaning of the locution.  It and the perlocution constitute part of the speech act's force.   The perlocution is the intended effect produced in the hearer by the illocution.   This effect clearly depends upon social convention.   Austin's student, John Searle, revised the threefold schema of Austin into five categories:  

  • Representatives state something in the doing.  Examples are "the cat is on the mat," and "David Hume died in 1776."  
  • Directives tell others to do something, e.g., "Give me the hammer!", "Don't make a sound during church." 
  • Commissives occur when promises are made, e.g., "I promise to be faithful to you until death parts us," "God sent his only begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him shall never die." 
  •  Expressives merely display the speaker's attitudes and states.   Examples are, "I am really sorry about that," "Congratulations!!!"  
  •   Declarations actually do something with words, e.g., "I name you John," "Class dismissed!"  
Searle regards directives, commissives and declarations to be general performatives where the world must now fit the words.  Alternately, representatives and expressives are general representatives where the words must fit the world.   (In an expressive, the word is supposed to fit the world of the speaker's attitudes and emotions.)  With all of these, however, there is an element of each in the other.   General performatives have locutionary semantic content; general representatives have a particular illocutionary force.  A single locution can sustain markedly different different illocutionary and perlocutionary force.

Take, for instance, the phrase, 'The dog is in the yard."   This could be a representative or an assertive merely stating what one thinks.  It might be used as a directive, telling others to stay away.   It might be a commissive that promises to all a safe yard.   Of course, it could be an expressive that does nothing more than display speaker fear.   The phrase, "I promise to be there tomorrow," can be a promise, but it might be a threat.  Saying 'the Day of the Lord is at hand' might be interpreted as a promise if God's presence is thought to be advantageous to the hearer, but it might be threat if divine presence is likely disadvantageous to the hearer.  (Notice how easy it is to explain now how the same locution of Scripture can both be Law and Gospel?)    

Given all of these distinctions, it becomes very hard to see how a performative utterance can somehow lead to Bayer's championed identity of a signum and res.  The signum does constitute the locutionary content of the expression.  The res, however, seems best associated with the perlocution, with what is brought about through the illocution.  Clearly, on this interpretation the perlocution cannot be a thing identifiable with the semantic content of the word itself.

We have found that the notion of a performative utterance has been employed in preaching to speak of the force of preaching and its effect, but that the notion of a performative as not having a truth value makes problematic this use.  We have also learned that Austin himself found his distinction between performatives and constatives problematic, and that newer views were subsequently devised to speak of illocutionary acts which utter locutions.  What Austin and Searle both discovered, however, is that in the analysis of speech act meaning, one simply cannot escape semantic content.    

We have previously concluded from this that there is nothing especially mysterious about using language to accomplish persuasive ends.   In good preaching, illocutions effect perlocutions.  Preachers thus exhort by demand and promise to move the hearts of their hearers.   This movements of the heart are the perlocutionary effects of these utterances.   Consequently, there is no simple identity between signum and res.  So far so good.   But there remains one really big problem for those finding an isolated doing in preaching performance that protects Lutheran's from an Enlightment-style critique of putative Lutheran saying.   

According to speech act theory, for a declaration to obtain certain felicity conditions must be in place.  For preaching to be interpreted as felicitiously performative, there can be no misfiring or abuse, and there must exist the proper preparatory conditions.  This means that while 'I absolve you' may have the sufficient felicity conditions in congregations whose attendees have appropriate presuppositions about the authority of the preacher to pronounce absolution and the sincerity of the preacher in pronouncing it, this is not the case in much of America now.   If preaching is a performative utterance, then any putative identity of signum and res can only occur as an “inside game” where the appropriate executive conditions --- are there appropriate background conditions? -- and essential  felicity conditions --is there proper fulfillment of the speech act? -- obtain.

I believe our time is like the time of the first century.   People to whom we preach must be convinced of the truth of what we are saying before they will join a community and adopt the appropriate felicity conditions making possible preaching declarations.   One can "hand over Christ" in preaching only if there are previous broad commitments about the existence and nature of a God causally efficacious in salvation.   The problem of our time is that only a few share the societal conventions that make possible the obtaining of the felicity conditions for proclamation.  The following likely hold:   

  • We find the background conditions of belief necessary for the social conventions grounding the felicity conditions of preaching declaration are no longer present. 
  • We find that few are moved by the illocutionary acts of preaching because the very possibility of perlocutionary response is tied to the question of truth. 
  • We discover that more than a few pastors are simply insincere; they use language in ways that downplay propositional content in order to bring about a perlocutionary effect that in the tradition was always tied to that content.   
Performative utterances are not mysterious and cannot remove us from the truth game.   Accordingly, they cannot lead us around the critique of modernity.

Wednesday, August 07, 2013

Christ School of Theology News


The Institute of Lutheran Theology's graduate school, The Christ School of Theology, now has its own webpage at http://www.ilt-cst.org/.   We are looking forward to an exciting semester with new students and courses.   Are you interested in the Lutheran Confessions?   The Theology of Luther?  Nineteenth Century Theology?  Philosophy of Religion?   Biblical Hebrew?   Christian Sexual Ethics?   Patristics?   Courses in the Synoptics and Epistles?  The Pentateuch?   Theology and Science?  We have these courses and more beginning in two weeks!

Remember that the Christ School of Theology offers a Masters of Sacred Theology (STM) as well as Masters of Religion and Masters of Divinity degrees.   This fall we offer four selections, one taught by Professor Paul Hinlicky entitled "Jenson's Systematic Theology."   This will be a wonderfully in-depth treatment of one of the most creative American Lutheran theologians of the past fifty years.   If interested, please visit our webpages and enroll today!   The ILT webpage remains www.ilt.org.