Divine Naming and Two-Layer Theological Reference
The previous post distinguished truth from felicity without separating them. Truth concerns the adequacy of articulated content within a teleo-space. Felicity concerns the aptness and authorized performance of an utterance within that same field. Spirit-felicity names the stronger theological case in which utterance is not only fitting in a general sense but authorized within the Spirit-ordered field. That distinction made it possible to preserve theology as both truth-claiming and performative. But it also forces the next question. If theological discourse can be true, felicitous, and Spirit-felicitous, how does it refer? Is ordinary semantic designation sufficient, or must one distinguish between ordinary reference and a stronger theological reference answerable to the ground of intelligibility itself?
The present post argues for the second option. Ordinary designation is real and indispensable, but it is not enough for theology. Theological discourse operates on two levels at once. At one level it refers within a teleo-space to determinables, determinate realities, and articulated contents. At another level it refers to the ground or mediation of that teleo-space itself. This is what I shall call two-layer theological reference. Without it, divine naming either collapses into ordinary object-reference or dissolves into pious gesture. With it, theological reference can remain both real and theologically specific. The result is not a second, disconnected discourse hovering above the first, but a layered structure in which object-level and meta-level reference belong together without collapse.
Why Ordinary Reference Is Not Enough
It is useful to begin with what ordinary reference does well. Within any given teleo-space an expression may refer to a determinable or determinate reality. A content may be about some articulated aspect of what is manifest there. This is already enough to support a rich range of discourse. In ordinary scientific, moral, and much philosophical language, such reference may be sufficient. Even theology cannot dispense with this level. It must speak about what is manifested in teleo-space, about promise, judgment, Christ, Church, obedience, faith, and truth.
Yet if one tries to reduce all theological reference to this level, something essential is lost. The problem is not simply that “God” is unlike other objects. It is deeper than that. Theology does not merely refer to something within a field of intelligibility. It also refers to the source and mediation of that field. Theological discourse speaks not only about what is manifested, but about the one through whom manifestation occurs, the one in whom intelligibility is articulated, and the one by whom comparative fittingness is ordered. Ordinary designation can refer within the field. It does not yet account for reference to the ground of the field.
This is why ordinary reference is insufficient. It treats every referent as though it belonged to the same logical order. But in theology the order of reference is itself layered. Some expressions designate determinables within teleo-space. Others, and often the same expressions in a deeper register, designate what grounds or mediates the teleo-space itself. A formal account that cannot distinguish these two levels will either flatten theology into one more regional discourse or render divine naming unintelligible.
The First Layer: Object-Level Reference
The first layer is straightforward enough. An expression may refer to a determinable in a teleo-space. Let n range over names, d over determinables, and t over teleo-spaces. Then one may write 'Des_1(n,d,t)' to mean that at the first layer, name n designates determinable d in teleo-space t.
This is ordinary object-level designation within the framework developed so far. It need not be trivial or shallow. It already presupposes donation, articulation, manifestation, and comparative fittingness. A theological utterance may say something about Christ, faith, promise, sin, righteousness, or divine action within a teleo-space, and in that sense its names and predicates function at the first layer.
The first layer must not be abandoned. If it were, theology would lose contact with articulated content. It would become pure gesture, mood, or aspiration. Theological discourse would then cease to say anything about what is manifested. The present account firmly rejects that result. Theology does speak about realities within teleo-space, and this requires object-level designation.
Yet object-level designation is not the whole story. It allows one to say what a content is about within a teleo-space, but not yet how the discourse refers to the ground of that intelligibility. For that a second layer is required.
The Second Layer: Meta-Level Theological Reference
The second layer concerns what may be called meta-level theological designation. Here the discourse does not merely refer to a determinable in a teleo-space. It refers to the source, mediation, or ground of that teleo-space itself. This is what occurs most clearly in divine naming. When theological language names the Logos, the Spirit, or the Father, it is not merely picking out one more item within a field. It is naming what gives, articulates, or orders the field in which items become intelligible at all.
To mark this formally one may introduce a second relation 'Des_2(n,g)' to mean that at the second layer, name n designates theological terminus g.
The word “terminus” is intentionally cautious. It does not imply that God is simply an object in a domain alongside other objects. Rather, it marks the formal place occupied by what is named at the meta-level. Theological naming terminates in that which grounds the intelligibility of the field in which first-layer reference operates.
This distinction immediately clarifies much that is otherwise obscure. The name “Christ,” for example, may operate at the first layer by referring to a determinable within a Christologically ordered teleo-space. But it may also operate at the second layer by referring to the one in whom the field of Christian intelligibility is mediated. Likewise, “Spirit” may refer within the field to the order of comparative fittingness and authorization, and at the same time designate the divine source of that order. Theological language is therefore layered. The same name may function in both registers without being reducible to either one.
Why Two Layers Do Not Mean Two Discourses
At this point a misunderstanding must be prevented. To say that theological reference is two-layered is not to say that there are two separate discourses, one ordinary and one theological, with no internal relation between them. Nor is it to say that theology first speaks about ordinary realities and then later adds a second mystical discourse about God. The two layers belong together. Theological language is one discourse, but a discourse whose reference cannot be captured on one plane alone.
The object-level is what allows theological speech to say something determinate and truth-apt within teleo-space. The meta-level is what allows that same speech to refer to the source and order of the intelligible field within which it operates. Without the first layer, theology becomes empty. Without the second, theology becomes flattened. The whole point of the present distinction is to preserve theological discourse as both meaningful and irreducibly theological.
This is why I have called the structure one of two-layer coherence rather than dual discourse. The issue is not separation, but ordered non-collapse.
Rigid Designation and Divine Naming
The need for a second layer becomes especially clear in relation to divine naming. In ordinary philosophical usage, a rigid designator is a name that designates the same referent across possible worlds or counterfactual situations. That notion is useful, but for present purposes it is not enough. Theological naming requires a stronger and more carefully disciplined sense of rigidity. The name must remain referentially stable not merely across possible worlds conceived abstractly, but across admissible articulations within teleo-space. Why? Because what is named at the second layer is not produced by those articulations. It is the ground or mediation of them.
One may therefore write 'Rigid_2(n)' as meaning that name n is rigid at the second layer.
This says that the theological terminus designated by n is not altered by the variations of articulation within the teleo-space. One and the same name may be used in multiple contents, performances, or contexts, yet the theological terminus of naming remains stable. This is not a secular rigid designation merely imported into theology unchanged. It is a theological rigidity grounded in the extra nos of intelligibility. Because the source of articulation is not produced by the act of articulation, the name that designates that source may remain stable across admissible articulative variation.
This provides a powerful way to think about divine naming. A divine name is not merely a description that succeeds if certain predicates are satisfied. Nor is it merely a performative marker of communal identity. It designates rigidly at the meta-level because it refers to what grounds the field in which descriptive and performative discourse occur.
Ground-Reference
To connect the two layers more closely, it is helpful to introduce one further relation 'GroundRef(e,g,t)' to mean that expression e, used in teleo-space t, refers at the meta-level to theological terminus g.
This relation is important because it connects utterance, teleo-space, and meta-level reference directly. The expression does not merely have a content and an object-level aboutness. It also bears a relation to the ground or mediation of the field in which it is spoken. This is precisely what makes theological discourse theological rather than merely regional.
Ground-reference is not an optional add-on. It is the way in which theological discourse remains answerable not only to what is manifested in teleo-space, but to the one in whom teleo-space is opened and ordered. Without such reference, theology may still speak meaningfully at the first layer, but it will fail to achieve full theological coherence.
Two-Layer Coherence
We might now give a name to that fuller relation. Let 'Coherent_2(e,c,t,g)' mean that expression e, saying content c in teleo-space t, is coherent across object-level and meta-level reference to g.
This formula gathers together the main burden of the present post. A theologically coherent utterance does not merely have content in a teleo-space. Nor does it merely utter a divine name. It speaks in such a way that its object-level content and its meta-level ground-reference belong together rightly. It is coherent across the two layers.
This is one of the most important formal gains of the whole project. It gives a disciplined way to say what is often only gestured at in theological prose. Some utterances are intelligible within a teleo-space, but do not achieve second-layer coherence. Others do. The difference is not merely rhetorical intensity or devotional tone. It concerns whether the discourse is rightly joined to its own ground.
This also helps to explain the difference between generic religious language and strongly theological language. The former may speak meaningfully and even truly at the first layer. The latter does so while also bearing coherent reference to the source and mediation of the teleo-space itself.
Naming Under Donation
The distinction between designation and donation now becomes sharper. Ordinary designation may attach a name to a determinable within a teleo-space. But some names function in a deeper way. They do not merely label what is articulated. They bear a donation-sensitive relation to what grounds and mediates the field of articulation itself. We may mark this with another relation 'DonName(n,g)' to mean that name n is donation-sensitive in its designation of g.
This relation is meant to distinguish names whose theological force cannot be reduced to object-level descriptive assignment. Such a name may indeed have object-level uses, but it is not exhausted by them. It remains answerable to the donated and mediated order of intelligibility itself.
This is why one and the same name may operate on both levels without collapse. At the first layer it may designate determinables within teleo-space. At the second it may designate the theological terminus through which that teleo-space is opened, ordered, or mediated. This is not ambiguity in the pejorative sense. It is a structured layering of reference.
Why This Matters for Theology
The theological significance of all this is considerable. Without a two-layer account of reference, theology is pulled in one of two directions. Either divine names become ordinary names for extraordinary objects, in which case theology is flattened into a kind of regional metaphysics, or divine names become merely expressive markers that do not really refer, in which case theology loses its realism. The present account avoids both. Divine naming is genuinely referential, yet its referentiality is layered and donation-sensitive.
This also clarifies why theology cannot be reduced to semantic designation alone. Theological utterance refers within teleo-space and toward the ground of teleo-space. It is therefore not enough to ask what a name picks out in the field. One must also ask how the expression stands in relation to the source and mediation of the field itself. The two-layer framework allows that question to be posed formally rather than merely rhetorically.
The Relation to Truth and Felicity
The relation to the previous post should now be evident. Truth concerns content within teleo-space. Felicity concerns the aptness of utterance within teleo-space. Spirit-felicity intensifies this into theological authorization. But none of these can be fully clarified without reference. If an utterance is to be Spirit-felicitous, it must not only be fitting and true; it must also be properly ordered in its reference. In strong theological cases, Spirit-felicity requires second-layer coherence. The utterance must speak truly within the field and refer rightly to the ground of the field.
This is why truth and felicity, though distinct, both press toward the present discussion. Truth requires aboutness. Felicity requires aptness. Theology requires both, but also a further coherence of naming and ground-reference. The present post therefore does not leave the earlier distinctions behind. It deepens them.
A Plain-Text Formal Sketch
The main formal markers of the present post may now be gathered in plain text.
- 'Des_1(n,d,t)' means that name n designates determinable d in teleo-space t.
- 'Des_2(n,g)' means that name n designates theological terminus g at the second layer.
- 'Rigid_2(n)' means that name n rigidly designates its second-layer terminus across admissible articulations.
- 'GroundRef(e,g,t)' means that expression e, used in teleo-space t, refers at the meta-level to g.
- 'Coherent_2(e,c,t,g)' means that expression e, saying content c in teleo-space t, is coherent across object-level and meta-level reference to g.
- 'DonName(n,g)' means that name n is donation-sensitive in its designation of g.
One may then state the following.
- There exist names n such that Rigid_2(n).
- There exist names n, determinables d, teleo-spaces t, and termini g such that both Des_1(n,d,t) and Des_2(n,g).
- If Coherent_2(e,c,t,g), then e says c in t and e bears ground-reference to g.
These formulas are still schematic, but they display the basic point: theology requires a formal distinction between first-layer designation and second-layer theological reference.
Summary
The argument of this post may now be stated briefly.
- Ordinary object-level designation is real and indispensable, but not enough for theology.
- Theology operates with a second layer of reference directed toward the ground or mediation of intelligibility itself.
- Divine naming must therefore be understood in a layered way.
- Meta-level designation is not reducible to ordinary object-reference.
- Some theological names function rigidly at the second layer because what they designate is not produced by the articulations in which they are used.
- The same name may operate at both layers without collapse.
- Finally, full theological coherence requires the right relation between object-level content and meta-level ground-reference.
What Comes Next
The next question now follows naturally. If theological discourse refers on two levels and if some utterances achieve strong coherence across those levels, what makes such discourse true in more than a merely formal or semantic sense? What grounds the truth of a theological content? And how should one distinguish ordinary satisfaction from a deeper, constitutive satisfaction by the real itself?
These are the questions to which the next post must turn.
Next in the series: Toward a Formal Theology of Teleo-Spaces X: Truthmakers and Constitutive Satisfaction
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